Opinion
14-23-00747-CV
12-17-2024
KEVIN RAY RANDOLPH, Appellant v. VICTORIA RANDOLPH, Appellee
On Appeal from the 505th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 20-DCV-272328
Panel consists of Christopher Chief Justice and Wise and Hassan Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Meagan Hassan, Justice.
Appellee Victoria Randolph filed a motion for enforcement of child support, requesting that Appellant Kevin Ray Randolph be ordered to pay child support arrears. The trial court signed an order awarding Victoria approximately $36,000 in arrears and holding Kevin in criminal contempt for the failure to maintain his child support obligations. Kevin appealed and, in three issues, challenges the trial court's contempt order and asserts that res judicata bars Victoria's arrearage claim.
For the reasons below, we dismiss Kevin's appeal in part and affirm the remainder of the trial court's order.
Background
Kevin and Victoria divorced in 2016. The parties were appointed joint managing conservators with respect to their four children and Kevin was ordered to pay Victoria $851 per month in child support.
Victoria brought a petition to modify the parent-child relationship in December 2019, seeking to increase Kevin's monthly child support obligation. The trial court signed an agreed order on June 22, 2021, increasing Kevin's child support to $2,844 per month.
Kevin filed an emergency petition to modify the parent-child relationship approximately two years later, seeking to change the parties' conservatorship arrangement and decrease his monthly child support. Victoria filed a motion for enforcement of child support and requested that Kevin be ordered to pay $37,966 in child support arrears. Kevin filed a separate motion for enforcement, requesting that Victoria be held in contempt for repeated denials of his possession of and access to their children.
The trial court held a hearing on Victoria's motion for enforcement and signed an order granting the motion on July 28, 2023. The trial court awarded Victoria $36,018.64 for child support arrearages, an amount that represented arrears accumulated from March 1, 2017, through June 26, 2023. The trial court's order also held Kevin in criminal contempt for the failure to maintain his child support obligations. The order of commitment was suspended as long as Kevin (1) timely paid his future child support obligations, (2) paid an additional $250 per month towards the arrearages, and (3) paid Victoria's attorney's fees in the underlying proceeding. Kevin timely filed his notice of appeal.
A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the judgment is signed; however, this timetable is extended to 90 days from the date of the judgment's signing if any party timely files a motion for new trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. A motion for new trial must be filed within 30 days after the complained-of judgment is signed. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a). Here, the trial court signed the complained-of order on July 28, 2023, and the deadline for timely filing a new trial motion was August 27, 2023. See id. Because this deadline fell on a Sunday, the last day of the applicable time period was extended to Monday, August 28, 2023 - the day Kevin filed his new trial motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 4. Thus, Kevin's new trial motion was timely filed and the time for perfecting the appeal was extended to October 26, 2023. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. Kevin timely filed his notice of appeal on October 11, 2023.
Analysis
Kevin raises three issues challenging the trial court's July 28, 2023 order and asserts:
1. the doctrine of res judicata bars the trial court from enforcing child support arrearages that accrued prior to the June 22, 2021 agreed order;
2. the trial court erred by holding Kevin in contempt for arrearages that could not properly form the basis for a contempt finding; and
3. Kevin established that he did not have the ability to pay the child support for which he was held in contempt.
We begin our analysis by considering together Kevin's second and third issues.
I. The Trial Court's Contempt Order
As outlined above, Kevin's second and third issues on appeal challenge the portion of the trial court's order that holds him in contempt for missed child support payments. In response, Victoria asserts we lack jurisdiction to consider Kevin's issues challenging the contempt order. Kevin did not respond to this argument.
We agree with Victoria. A contempt judgment is reviewable only via a petition for writ of habeas corpus (if the contemnor is confined) or a petition for writ of mandamus (if no confinement is involved). In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); In re L.A.N., No. 14-22-00719-CV, 2023 WL 3115741, at *8 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 27, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). This precept remains true even when, as here, the contempt order is appealed along with a judgment that is appealable. In re L.A.N., 2023 WL 3115741, at *8. Because Kevin brought his contempt-based complaints to this court on direct appeal and failed to make a specific request to invoke the court's original jurisdiction, we dismiss his second and third issues for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at *8-9; Fox v. Alberto, 455 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
II. Res Judicata
In his first issue, Kevin argues that the doctrine of res judicata bars the trial court from enforcing child support arrearages accruing prior to the June 22, 2021 agreed order that modified the amount of his child support obligation.
Kevin raised this issue at the hearing on Victoria's motion to enforce and in his motion for new trial, thus preserving the issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
A trial court's decision to grant or deny the relief requested in a motion for enforcement is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Graves v. Graves, 694 S.W.3d 814, 817 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.); Chenault v. Banks, 296 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules without reference to guiding rules and principles or when its decision is unreasonable or arbitrary. Transcor Astra Grp. S.A. v. Petrobras Am. Inc., 650 S.W.3d 462, 482 (Tex. 2022). When, as here, the trial court did not file findings of fact and conclusions of law, we imply that the trial court made all findings necessary to support the judgment and will uphold those findings if supported by sufficient evidence. Chenault, 296 S.W.3d at 189 (citing Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83-84 (Tex. 1992)).
In this context, the abuse of discretion standard overlaps with traditional standards for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. Graves, 694 S.W.3d at 817. "Consequently, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error but are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion." Id.
The doctrine of res judicata bars a second action by parties on matters that were "actually litigated in a previous suit, as well as claims 'which, through the exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit.'" Hallco Tex., Inc. v. McMullen Cnty., 221 S.W.3d 50, 58 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1992)). As with other final judgments, res judicata applies to arrearage judgments. In re J.A.L., No. 14-16-00614-CV, 2017 WL 4128947, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 19, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). To establish that a claim is barred by res judicata, the party asserting the defense must show:
1. there is a prior judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction;
2. the party currently asserting a claim was also a party to the prior action or was in privity with a party to the prior action; and
3. the current claims were raised, or could have been raised, in the prior action. Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 754 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).
The doctrine of res judicata is "substantially similar" to the compulsory counterclaim rule, which requires a defendant to bring as a counterclaim "any claim that 'arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.'" Barr v. Resol. Trust Corp. ex rel. Sunbelt Fed. Sav., 837 S.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Tex.R.Civ.P. 97(a)). Incorporating this transactional approach, res judicata bars the litigation of a claim if the claim bears a close factual and logical relationship to claims raised in an earlier proceeding. Id. In sum, "[a]ny cause of action which arises out of those same facts should, if practicable, be litigated in the same lawsuit." Id. at 630.
B. Application
Courts examining similar arguments in the child-support context have held that a claim for arrearages is barred by res judicata only if the prior order explicitly adjudicated previously-owed payments. See, e.g., In re D.W.G., 391 S.W.3d 154, 167 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2012, no pet.) (the trial court's 1970 order had a preclusive effect on the mother's 2009 attempt to collect past due child support payments because "the trial court actually addressed the child support payments owed to [mother] in the 1970 contempt order"); Prior v. Prior, No. 01-06-01185-CV, 2008 WL 5455691, at *2, *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (the trial court's 1982 order was res judicata as to any arrearages that accrued prior to that date because the order explicitly stated that unpaid support was "inapplicable"); In re M.K.R., 216 S.W.3d 58, 65-66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (the trial court's 1994 order was res judicata as to any arrearages that accrued prior to that date because it "was a judgment on the amount of unpaid child support owed by [father] as of June 15, 1994"); Howard v. Brizendine, 546 S.W.2d 136, 136-37 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1977, no writ) (the 1974 judgment was res judicata as to any arrearages that accrued prior to its signing because it specifically "den[ied] all relief including denial of a judgment for all arrearages of child support").
But here, the June 22, 2021 agreed order on which Kevin bases his res judicata argument does not contain similar language. The agreed order modifies Kevin's monthly child support obligation and the parties' possession order with respect to their children. The agreed order does not include any statements addressing any arrearages owed by Kevin at the time of its signing. Similarly, Victoria's petition to modify that preceded the agreed order did not seek a judgment with respect to child support arrearages.
These facts are more akin to those examined in In re P.D.D., 256 S.W.3d 834 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet.). There, the mother and father divorced in 1994, and the father was ordered to pay monthly child support. Id. at 837. In 2005, the father filed a motion to modify the custody arrangement and the mother responded with a request to modify the child support obligation. Id. at 838. The resulting agreed order modified the parties' possessory order and denied all other relief. Id. The mother subsequently filed an application for enforcement in 2006, seeking delinquent child support and reimbursement of health insurance premiums that preceded the parties' 2005 agreed order. Id. The trial court concluded that the 2005 agreed order barred the mother's claims by res judicata. Id. at 838-39.
Reversing this determination on appeal, the court reasoned:
Both of the issues raised by the [2005] pleadings involve questions of the current circumstances of the parties and seek orders to dictate future conduct. In contrast, the issue of delinquent child support is not a question of the present circumstances of the parties or their future conduct but, rather, the content of prior orders for support and the degree of compliance with those orders the support-paying parent has observed in the past. The issue of support delinquencies is not the same subject matter as present and future issues concerning child support and custody.Id. at 843 (emphasis added). Ultimately concluding that the issues of future child support and past delinquencies were "different and did not arise from the same transaction," the court held that the mother's claims were not barred by res judicata. Id. at 844.
Here too, we decline to find that the parties' June 22, 2021 agreed order barred Mother's child support arrearage claim under the doctrine of res judicata. Unlike the cases concluding that res judicata applied, the 2021 agreed order did not adjudicate any issues with respect to arrearages nor did Victoria request this relief in her motion to modify. See In re D.W.G., 391 S.W.3d at 167; Prior, 2008 WL 5455691, at *2, *4; In re M.K.R., 216 S.W.3d at 65-66; Howard, 546 S.W.2d at 136-37. Rather, the 2021 agreed order only addressed future issues regarding child support and possession - issues that, as the In re P.D.D. court concluded, do not arise from the same transaction. See 256 S.W.3d at 843-44. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Kevin's res judicata claim with respect to the assessed arrearages. See Graves, 694 S.W.3d at 817.
We overrule Kevin's first issue in its entirety.
Conclusion
We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Kevin's second and third issues, both of which challenge that portion of the trial court's July 28, 2023 order that holds him in contempt for missed child support payments. We overrule Kevin's first issue and conclude that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar Victoria's claim for arrearages. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's order.