Opinion
Civil Action 18-1686
06-08-2022
ANGELO S. RANDOLPH, Plaintiff, v. CHAD LOVELAND, MIKE JENKINS, and CONTRACT FACILITY STAFF, Defendants.
HORNAK, CHIEF JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 99) of Defendant Mike Jenkins be granted, that the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Angelo Randolph (ECF No. 122) be denied and that this action be dismissed.
II. Report
Plaintiff Angelo S. Randolph (“Randolph”), who is currently incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution at Benner Township, Pennsylvania, brought this pro se civil rights action against Chad Loveland (“Loveland”), a prison guard at the Alle-Kiski Pavilion, Mike Jenkins (“Jenkins”), a parole agent, and “contract facility staff.” His claims arise out of an incident that occurred at Alle-Kiski, a Community Corrections Center located in Arnold, Pennsylvania, in May 2018. At that time, Randolph was an “inmate” or “reentrant” at Alle-Kiski. He alleges that Loveland directed racial slurs at him and assaulted him, causing a back injury. Further, he alleges that Loveland fabricated a misconduct against him, resulting in Randolph's removal from AlleKiski and transfer to the State Correctional Institution at Mercer (SCI Mercer”).
Currently pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Jenkins (ECF No. 99) and Randolph (ECF No. 122). For the reasons that follow, the motion filed by Jenkins should be granted, Randolph's motion should be denied and the case should be dismissed.
Randolph and Loveland stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of all of Randolph's claims against Loveland and an order approving the dismissal was signed by Chief Judge Hornak on June 6, 2022 (ECF No. 126).
A. Procedural History
Randolph initiated this action on December 20, 2018 by filing a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) His motion was granted on December 28, 2018 (ECF No. 2) and the Complaint was docketed the same day. (ECF No. 3.) Federal question jurisdiction was asserted pursuant to the civil rights claim at issue, namely an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In January 2019, Randolph filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14), raising claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Loveland's subsequent motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery. Relevant documents were produced to Randolph, including copies of multiple reports which described the incident and identified witnesses to the events at issue. Randolph was also permitted to engage in certain discovery directed to both Jenkins and Loveland.
In July 2020, Randolph filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting brief and a concise statement of facts. (ECF Nos. 93, 94 and 95.) His motion sought a liability judgment in his favor solely with respect to his claims against Loveland. (ECF No. 93.) There was no reference to Jenkins in Randolph's motion.
Jenkins subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on August 31, 2020 with respect to Randolph's claims against him. (ECF No. 99.) After Loveland moved for an extension of time to pursue settlement, both of the pending summary judgment motions were stayed, the case was administratively closed and the matter was referred to the pro bono prisoner mediation program. Randolph and Loveland reached a settlement just prior to the mediation, rendering Randolph's motion for summary judgment against Loveland moot. However, Randolph's claims against Jenkins were not resolved. Thereafter, the case was re-opened and Randolph was directed to respond to Jenkins' motion by May 31, 2022.
On May 16, 2022, Randolph filed a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 122) regarding his claims against Jenkins. Notably, he did not file a supporting brief or a concise statement of material facts. Jenkins has responded to Randolph's motion. (ECF No. 124.)
Randolph did not file a response to Jenkins' motion by May 31, 2022. Since his motion for summary judgment also references Jenkins's motion for summary judgment, however, it will be considered both as a response to Jenkins' motion as well as a motion in its own right.
B. Relevant Factual Background
Given the dismissal of Loveland, a more detailed recitation of the facts related to his alleged involvement is not included.
In his unverified Amended Complaint, Randolph alleges that, on May 21, 2018, Loveland entered his dormitory room without a staff member, which is prohibited, to notify him of a meeting in the first-floor day room. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 14.) He claims that Loveland followed him out of the room and directed racial slurs to him. (Am. Compl. ¶ 9; ECF No. 45 Ex. A.) According to Randolph, Loveland then walked past him, turned around and pushed him with such force that he sustained back injuries from the incident. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) He also claims that Loveland fabricated a misconduct report and as a result, he was escorted by two police officers to the New Kensington police station on May 21, 2018. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 13.) He was then taken by two unidentified parole agents to SCI Mercer. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14) Randolph asserts that this conduct violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Amended Complaint identifies Defendant Jenkins as “the parole agent of Alle-Kiski Pavilion.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Randolph also alleges that Jenkins is “responsible for the welfare of all of the inmates in that facility.” (Id.) The only other allegation in the Amended Complaint that may relate to Jenkins is Randolph's statement that he was escorted by two parole agents to SCI-Mercer as a result of Loveland's allegedly fabricated misconduct report. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.)
There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint regarding the “contract facility staff” named as defendants in the caption.
C. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court of Appeals has held that “where the movant bears the burden of proof at trial and the motion does not establish the absence of a genuine factual issue, the district court should deny summary judgment even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” National State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1582 (3d Cir. 1992).
In following this directive, a court must take the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all doubts in that party's favor. Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266 (3d Cir. 2005); Doe v. County of Centre, Pa., 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir. 2001).
Although courts must hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), at the summary judgment stage a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from his burden of providing some affirmative evidence, not just mere allegations, to show that there is a genuine dispute for trial. See, e.g., Barnett v. N.J. Transit Corp., 573 Fed.Appx. 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the pro se plaintiff was still “required to designate specific facts by use of affidavits, depositions, admissions, or answers to interrogatories.. .sufficient to convince a reasonable fact finder to find all the elements of her prima facie case”) (citation and quotation omitted); Siluk v. Beard, 395 Fed.Appx. 817, 820 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural law.”); Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (pro se plaintiffs “cannot flout procedural rules-they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”)
D. Discussion
Randolph brings his constitutional claims against Jenkins under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but “provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).
“The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated and to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “Next, a plaintiff must demonstrate a defendant's ‘personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.'” Id. (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). That is because only a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected” another person to a civil rights violation can be held liable under § 1983.
Thus, importantly, Jenkins can be held liable only for his own conduct. See, e.g., Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; see also Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016); Barkes v. First Correctional Med., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds 575 U.S. 822 (2015); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 2005) (“To impose liability on the individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that each one individually participated in the alleged constitutional violation or approved of it.”) (citing C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc)). “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. On summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence of a defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation or the claims against that defendant must be dismissed. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (dismissing claims against Commissioner of Corrections and prison chaplain when plaintiff presented no evidence of their involvement in the alleged wrongs).
Other than his identification of Jenkins as a parole agent, the only other factual references to Jenkins in the Amended Complaint are that two unidentified parole agents participated in the transfer of Randolph from Alle-Kiski to SCI Mercer after Loveland issued an allegedly fabricated misconduct report, and that Jenkins was responsible for the welfare of all inmates at Alle-Kiski. As the uncontroverted record reflects, Jenkins was, in fact, a parole agent who participated in Plaintiff's transfer to SCI-Mercer on May 21, 2018. (ECF No. 24 at ¶ 14.) However, there are no other facts of record that reflect any involvement by Jenkins in the matters that purport to form the basis for Randolph's claims. He is not alleged to have used excessive force, uttered racial slurs or been involved in the creation a false misconduct report. Further, Randolph does not contend that Jenkins knew that the misconduct report was false nor is there any evidence to support such a claim.
Notably, in June 2020, well after the Amended Complaint was filed, Randolph sent a letter to counsel for Jenkins in which he stated, among other things, that “[at] this time after review I can say that your client was not part of a conspiracy but acted in good faith with respect to Chad Loveland [sic] claims . . . I believe Mr. Jenkins had made the only option available.” (ECF No. 101, Ex. 1.)
In his present motion, however, Randolph has reversed course and now contends that Jenkins was personally responsible for the events giving rise to his lawsuit and “participated in and [was] the person with authority to not send Plaintiff to prison, as respondeat superior.” (ECF No. 122 at 1, 2.) As discussed above, only a person who “subjects or causes to be subjected” a plaintiff to a deprivation of rights can be held liable under § 1983. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). This means that supervisory officials cannot be held liable for every illegal act allegedly committed by his or her subordinate. Rather, they can be held liable only for their own conduct. Id. Thus, Jenkins cannot be liable to Randolph based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The Court of Appeals has identified three ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates. Liability may attach if the supervisor: (1) directed the subordinate to take the action in question; (2) had “knowledge of and acquiesced” in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct, meaning the supervisor knew that his or her subordinate was violating the plaintiff's rights but failed to stop the subordinate from doing so; or (3) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the violation. See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208. “‘Failure to' claims-failure to train, failure to discipline, or, as in the case here, failure to supervise-are generally considered a subcategory of policy or practice liability.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316.
As noted above, Randolph's motion is not supported by a concise statement of facts and he does not cite to any facts in the record to support his bare allegations against Jenkins. It is undisputed that Jenkins was Randolph's parole agent, not a supervisor at Alle-Kiski. There is no factual support in the record that Jenkins directed, acquiesced in or had any personal involvement in the alleged acts of Loveland, or as alleged in the Amended Complaint, was responsible for the welfare of all inmates at Alle-Kiski. Similarly, there is no evidence that Jenkins maintained or had the responsibility to maintain any policies at Alle-Kiski. Further, Randolph has no provided any facts to support a claim that Jenkins made the decision to send him back to prison at SCI Mercer, or that even if he did, that decision was a violation of Randolph's civil rights. While Randolph states in his motion for summary judgment that Jenkins' job duties included reviewing videos and statements to “assure sending [him] to prison was warranted,” he fails to provide any evidentiary support to support these allegations.
As previously noted, the July 2020 motion for summary judgment filed by Randolph related solely to Loveland. While it was accompanied by a concise statement of material facts, Randolph only referenced facts associated with his claim against Loveland.
Thus, because it is uncontroverted that Jenkins had no personal involvement in the actions that form the basis of the Amended Complaint, was not Loveland's supervisor and cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior, it is recommended that Jenkins's motion for summary judgment be granted and Randolph's motion for summary judgment be denied.
In addition to Loveland and Jenkins, the Amended Complaint names “contract facility staff” as defendants in the caption. Randolph has never identified any individuals by name nor any actionable conduct by the unnamed staff. Both omissions are fatal to any claim that he may have attempted to assert against the “staff.”
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “on motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. The use of John Doe defendants is permissible “until reasonable discovery permits the true defendants to be identified.” Blakeslee v. Clinton Cty., 336 Fed.Appx. 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of John Doe defendants where plaintiff failed to amend her complaint to identify true defendants after ten months of discovery). “[I]n the adversarial system of litigation the plaintiff is responsible for determining who is liable for her injury ....” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 212 (3d Cir. 2006).
At no time since he filed his Amended Complaint has Randolph identified the “contract facility staff” or for that matter, any other individual whom he claims is liable to him. He had the opportunity to explore this issue during discovery. Multiple reports which described the incident and identified certain witnesses were produced to Randolph during discovery. Randolph also engaged in discovery directed to Jenkins and Loveland that was permitted by the Court. More significantly, as even the most generous reading of the Amended Complaint reveals, Randolph simply has not stated a claim against any “contract facility staff” in the Amended Complaint. Further, he has failed to adduce any evidence that could form the basis for a claim against any such person. Thus, “contract facility staff” should be dismissed as a party defendant, and as there are no remaining claims that Plaintiff has asserted, the entire case should be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 99) of Defendant Mike Jenkins be granted and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Angelo Randolph (ECF No. 122) be denied. It is further recommended that this action be dismissed.
Litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must seek review by the district judge by filing objections by June 27, 2022. Any party opposing the objections shall file a response by July 11, 2022. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.