In 1949, two cases were decided by the Washington Supreme Court wherein the constitutional limitation of article 2, section 19, was applied to legislation by initiative. Randles v. State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 846 (1949), was an action to enjoin the enforcement of Initiative 171, which, along with amendatory and supplemental legislation, was known as the Washington state liquor act. The court determined that the ballot title and legislative title of the initiative were not defective.
¶ 43 The ability to sell and distribute spirits does not implicate a “privilege” under article I, section 12. This court has explicitly recognized the distinction between privileges and rights granted only at the discretion of the legislature when considering claims of disparate treatment of businesses. See Randles v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wash.2d 688, 694, 206 P.2d 1209 (1949) (“the distinction between a lawful business which a citizen has the right to engage in and one in which he may engage only as a matter of grace of the state” must be considered). Here, the only right asserted is the right to sell liquor under the authority of a license issued pursuant to the State's police power.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that "[t]here is no natural or constitutional right to sell or engage in the business of selling or dispensing intoxicating liquor." Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 33 Wn.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 1213 (1949). Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971), and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), cited by Freeman, do not apply to the facts of this case.
In fact most courts prior to 1950 found that statutes which forbade the sale of liquor to women in certain establishments, the employment of females in some businesses dispensing liquor, or even the presence of women in such places were constitutional as a reasonable exercise of the state's police power to protect the public safety, welfare and morals. E.g., Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 33 Wn.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209 (1949); Great Atlantic and P. Tea Co. v. Danville, 367 Ill. 310, 11 N.E.2d 388, 113 A.L.R. 1386 (1937); Laughlin v. Tillamook County, 75 Or. 506, 147 P. 547 (1915); People v. Case, 153 Mich. 98, 116 N.W. 558, 18 L.R.A., N.S., 657 (1908); Hoboken v. Greiner, 68 N.J.L. 592, 53 A. 693 (1902). I recognize these decisions.
The full title to chapter 88 is as follows: "An Act relating to the appropriation of waters of the State for irrigation purposes, granting to the United States the right to exercise the power of eminent domain in acquiring lands, water and other property for rights of way, and for reservoirs and other irrigation works, granting to the United States certain rights in State lands and in the waters of the State, relating to water users' associations, and declaring an emergency." State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, 50 Wn. 508, 97 P. 728; Shea v. Olson, 185 Wn. 143, 53 P.2d 615, 111 A.L.R. 998; De Cano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613, 110 P.2d 627; State ex rel. Washington Toll Bridge Authority v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 200 P.2d 467; Randles v. State Liquor Control Board, 33 Wn.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 531. It is our conclusion that the United States has a right-of-way for irrigation canal purposes, granted to it by statute over tracts 4, 6, and 8 of the defendants.
See Ass'n of Wash. Spirits , 182 Wash.2d 342, 340 P.3d 849 (" ‘[T]he distinction between a lawful business which a citizen has the right to engage in and one in which he may engage only as a matter of grace of the state’ must be considered." (quoting Randles v. Wash. State Liquor Control Bd. , 33 Wash.2d 688, 694, 206 P.2d 1209 (1949) )). So, for purposes of article I, section 12 ’s analysis, even acknowledging the general right to pursue a common calling and, as a corollary, the fundamental right to work and earn a wage, statutorily exempted workers do not enjoy a fundamental right to overtime pay.
Washington State voters passed Initiative 171 on November 2, 1948, creating the class H "liquor by the drink" license. Randles v. State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 531 (1949) upheld the constitutionality of Initiative 171 stating at page 694: There is no natural or constitutional right to sell or engage in the business of selling or dispensing intoxicating liquor.
We agree. [1] Certainly the "strict scrutiny" applicable to suspect classifications and those which burden fundamental rights would not be appropriate here: age discriminations are not inherently "suspect" ( Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 295 n. 14, 27 L.Ed.2d 272, 91 S.Ct. 260 (1970) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1972), and the "right" to consume alcohol is far from "fundamental" ( Randles v. State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn.2d 688, 694, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 846 (1949). The criminal penalties that drinking laws carry impact on the right to be free from imprisonment and would, in other contexts, make them subject to some more demanding scrutiny than "minimum rationality" review.
When applied to defendants who raise constitutional defenses to criminal prosecutions, the rule requires simply that the constitutional issues relate directly to the particular statutory provisions upon which the prosecutions are based. That requirement is satisfied in each of the present cases. Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn.2d 688, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 531 (1949).E.g., Poffenroth v. Culinary Workers Union Local No. 328, 71 Idaho 412, 232 P.2d 968 (1951).
The plaintiffs argue that the title of the Act does not refer to elections and that it therefore gives no notice of the fact that the Act deals with that subject. In Randles v. State Liquor Control Bd., 33 Wn.2d 688, 695, 206 P.2d 1209, 9 A.L.R.2d 531 (1949), we said: All incidentals germane to a title may be brought within the legislation although not specifically referred to in such title.