Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-1426 (NHP).
August 10, 1999
Abraham S. Alter, Esq., LANGTON ALTER, Rahway, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Anthony J. La Bruna, Jr., Assistant, United States Attorney, FAITH S. HOCHBERG, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant.
THE ORIGINAL OF THIS LETTER OPINION IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Counsel:
Plaintiff Georgia Randle brings this action before the Court, pursuant to §§ 205(g) and 1631(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, and U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking to overturn the final determination of Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff's claim for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Georgia Randle (hereinafter "plaintiff") was born on June 2, 1951, and is currently forty-eight years old. See Transcript of Proceedings, dated May 13, 1996 at page 34. Plaintiff is a high school graduate. (Tr. 32). Prior to April 1994, she worked as a floral designer for eight years. (Tr. 34) She also worked as a florist for approximately four years. (Tr. 34). Sometime thereafter, plaintiff began to experience severe pain; numbness in her feet, legs and arms; and back pain throughout her spine. (Tr. 33-34). Because of these problems, plaintiff claims that she can no longer stand on her feet or bend. (Tr. 34). In April 1994, plaintiff ceased working. (Tr. 34)
Hereinafter, this Court will refer to the Transcript of Proceedings as "Tr."
On July 27, 1994, plaintiff filed applications for Social Security disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income (hereinafter "SSI"), alleging that her condition became "disabling" as of June 20, 1994. (Tr. 15) Plaintiff's claim for benefits was initially denied, and then denied upon reconsideration. (Tr. 15) Next, the plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (Tr. 15) A hearing before the Honorable Gerald J. Ryan, Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") was then scheduled for May 13, 1996. (Tr. 15) On December 27, 1996, Judge Ryan issued an opinion finding that plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. (Tr. 21) Judge Ryan's findings contained in the December 27, 1996 decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, on January 26, 1998, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 4) On appeal to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, plaintiff contends that the decision of the Commissioner denying her application for disability benefits is not based upon substantial evidence.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction over this appeal is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is made applicable to SSI cases by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
Standard of Review
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) establishes the limitations that this Court must adhere to in reviewing the aforementioned appeals. In accordance with the statute, a court may review the factual findings of the Commissioner only to determine whether the administrative record contains substantial evidence for such findings. This Court must affirm the Commissioner's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence. If there is substantial evidence in the record to maintain the Commissioner's findings, they are conclusive; and as a result, the court is not empowered, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to conduct de novo review. Instead, the court's role must be viewed as narrowly-tailored, with considerable deference to the Commissioner's fact-finding. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court's inquiry must be directed to finding whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence.
Substantial Evidence
The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence in a Social Security case as "more than a mere scintilla" and as that evidence which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The fact that the record contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for the decision in the record. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1992). Consequently, this Court must review the record and the ALJ's findings and conclusion within the narrow confines of its limited scope of review. See id.
In reaching the findings in a disability benefits proceeding, the ALJ is entitled to draw inferences logically flowing from the evidence, and where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's conclusions that must be upheld. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5); see also Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Educ. Welfare, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975). However, the ALJ's ruling should clearly explain the foundation upon which it rests. See Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981). The ALJ is charged with the responsibility of analyzing all the relevant evidence and explaining why certain evidence was considered relevant while other evidence was dismissed. See Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978). Although administrative decisions are accorded a certain level of deference, it is the responsibility of this Court to closely sift through the record in order to determine whether the ALJ's ruling is supported by substantial evidence.
Definition of Disability
In order for a claimant to be deemed disabled, and thus entitled to benefits under the Act, he must comply with all relevant statutory requirements. To comply, the claimant must first meet the insured status requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 423(c) and the resource and income restrictions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) and (b) in order for SSI to be paid. Secondly, the claimant must establish that he is not "engage[d] in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months" as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382(c)(3)(A). Finally, the claimant must show that he is disabled within the meaning of the statute.
An individual is disabled "only if his physical or mental impairment(s) are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (c)(2)(B)(d) and § 1382(c)(3)(B). Thus, plaintiff must have a medically determinable impairment and this impairment must cause a functional limitation which negates plaintiff's ability to do any kind of work which exists in the national economy.
In this matter, the plaintiff has satisfied the first two requirements in that the plaintiff is insured and is not "engaged in substantial gainful activity." The issue before this Court is whether the ALJ's ruling denying the plaintiff "disabled" status is supported by substantial evidence.
The Social Security Act prescribes a five-step sequential analysis that must be satisfied in order for a claimant to be entitled to benefits.See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1995). First, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that she is not currently employed or engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a) (1995); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 n. 5 (1987). Second, the plaintiff must also prove that she is inflicted with a severe medical impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (1995); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Third, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (1995). Fourth, the claimant is under obligation to prove that she cannot return to the particular type of work the claimant has previously performed if the claimant's impairment does not meet the criteria set forth in the list of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995); see also Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146-47 n. 5. Failure to prove this requisite will result in a denial of benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) (1995). Fifth, if the claimant has proven that she is unable to perform prior occupational duties, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the claimant is able to work in some other occupation in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f) (1995). If the Commissioner is unable to carry this burden, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id.
The type of physical or mental impairment necessary to prove the existence of a disability has been defined as "[a]n impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3) and 1382(a)(3)(c). Although Congress requires the Commissioner to develop a complete medical record and make every reasonable effort to obtain all medical evidence, Congress nonetheless places the burden upon a plaintiff to show his or her entitlement to disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(H) ("An individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the [Commissioner] may require.").
In the present matter, this Court must look to the factual record developed at the May 13, 1996 hearing. At that time, plaintiff asserted that, in April 1994, she began to experience problems that precluded her from work. (Tr. 34). Plaintiff stated that she had severe pains and numbness. (Tr. 34-36). Judge Ryan employed the sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 in order to conclude that plaintiff was not disabled under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act. The ALJ made the following findings:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 20, 1994, the date on which she filed her application for supplemental security income.
2. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe impairments including insulin dependent diabetes mellitus, diabetic neuropathy, diabetic retinopathy, lower back pain, questionable capsulitis of the shoulders, and dysthymia but that she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
3. The claimant's allegations as to the frequency and severity of her symptoms are not fully credible.
4. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work-related activities except for work involving more than light lifting or the performance of complex tasks. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.
5. The claimant's past relevant work as a floral designer did not require the performance of the work related activities precluded by the above limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.965.
6. The claimant's impairments do not prevent the claimant from performing her past relevant work.
7. The claimant was not under a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e).
The ALJ determined, based on the lack of any medical evidence provided by plaintiff for the period from June 20, 1994 through the date of the ALJ's decision, that plaintiff was not disabled. Consequently, plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act, given her age, education, and work experience.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that the claimant does not have any impairments which significantly limit her ability to perform work related functions. Further, plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not provide a reasoned explanation for his findings: (A) that plaintiff's severe diabetic condition is the equivalent of Paragraph 9.08 of the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments as set forth in 20 C.F.R. Appendix 1; (B) that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a floral arranger; and (C) that the Administrative decision does not articulate the required analysis of plaintiff's pain and subjective complaints and dismisses the credibility of the plaintiff for improper reason.
Plaintiff's alleged diabetic condition
Plaintiff argues that her diabetic condition warrants the finding of a disability. She asserts a lack of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion that her diabetes mellitus does not render her disabled.
The ALJ took into account plaintiff's diabetes mellitus when rendering his opinion, but found that the condition and related ailments did not rise to the level where plaintiff could be found disabled. "The claimant has insulin dependent diabetes mellitus and peripheral neuropathy, but these disorders are not so advanced as would preclude the performance of . . . light work activity. The available clinical findings established that the claimant can sit, stand, walk, and perform light lifting." (Tr. 17) The ALJ also noted that although the plaintiff complained of pain, there are no physical manifestations that would preclude her from performing work-related activities. (Tr. 18) Further, the ALJ noted that "[n]one of her impairments meets or equals the level of severity of any impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P of Social Security Regulations #4, as the pertinent listings require specific findings which are not present." (Tr. 16) Therefore, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's diabetic condition does not render her disabled.
Plaintiff's ability to perform her past work
Plaintiff maintains that she is unable to perform her past relevant work as a floral arranger, contrary to the ALJ's findings. (Tr. 16) She argues that the ALJ concluded that she is not disabled without properly analyzing her condition and the demands of her work.
The ALJ referred to Dr. Vekhnis' assertions that "claimant can sit, stand, walk, reach, and handle without limitation." (Tr. 17) Furthermore, the ALJ noted, "[t]he claimant has insulin dependent diabetes mellitus and peripheral neuropathy, but these disorders are not so advanced as would preclude the performance of light work activity." (Tr. 17) The ALJ also referred to Dr. Candela's report, concluding that plaintiff's visual acuity and hand and arm motion would not preclude her from performing routine, repetitive tasks. (Tr. 18) Hence, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff is able to perform her past work, and therefore is not disabled.
Plaintiff's pain and subjective complaints
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider her pain and subjective complaints (Plaintiff's Brief, 19-25). A disability can not be premised solely on claims of subjective symptomatology. Rather, the ALJ must examine the subjective complaints for credibility, comparing them against medical findings to see if a medically determinable impairment exists that could cause plaintiff's alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); SSR 96-7p. Accord Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1069-70 (3d Cir. 1984). As long as the ALJ's decision is based on substantial evidence, his decision must stand.
In refuting plaintiff's alleged inability to work, the ALJ found the most critical factor to be the lack of medical evidence submitted by plaintiff for the period at issue. The ALJ considered the plaintiff's testimony in reaching his conclusion, but there was contrary objective evidence upon which he could find that plaintiff's claims of pain were not valid. (Tr. 19) He agreed with Dr. Myers' conclusion "that the claimant's symptoms were far out of proportion to the objective findings." (Tr. 19) Examples of these unsupported complaints include: depression, visual problems, leg, and arm pain. (Tr. 19) It is not erroneous for the ALJ to reject claimant's subjective complaints of pain because those complaints were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence. In this case, the objective evidence was clearly at odds with plaintiff's subjective complaints, and there was, therefore, substantial evidence for the ALJ to conclude that plaintiff is not disabled.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, it is the determination of this Court that the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff is not entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, be and hereby is AFFIRMED.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Letter Opinion.