Opinion
F043430.
10-30-2003
MATINDER RANDHAWA, Petitioner, v. WORKERS COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD, EMANUEL MEDICAL CENTER et al., Respondents.
William F. Morris, for Petitioner. Laughlin, Falbo, Levy & Moresi and Sidney L. Lamb, for Respondents.
THE COURT
Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Levy, J., and Dawson, J.
Matinder Randhawa (Randhawa) petitions for a writ of review to determine the lawfulness of the decision of the Workers Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denying her claim for compensation benefits. (Lab. Code,[] § 5950; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 57.) We will deny the petition.
Further statutory references are to the Labor Code.
BACKGROUND
Randhawa worked as a nursing assistant for respondent Emanuel Medical Center (Emanuel) when she injured the mid thoracic area of her back while lifting a patient in April 1997. Emanuel admitted the injury as industrially related, but the issues of permanent disability, further medical treatment, self-procured treatment, costs, and sanctions and penalties proceeded to hearing on January 30, 2003.
In April 2003, the workers compensation judge (WCJ) found Randhawa was not a credible witness at the hearing and that she gave "a willfully false and inaccurate history to every doctor who has examined her." Because she mislead the physicians, the WCJ concluded Randhawa failed to meet her burden of proving the industrial injury caused permanent disability or the need for continuing medical treatment. The WCJ further noted that "if any sanctions apply they should be applied against [Randhawas] attorney for his behavior in not only filing meritless petitions, but for deposing [a physician] and proceeding simply on a fishing expedition."
Randhawa petitioned the WCAB for reconsideration claiming in part that the evidence failed to support the WCJs decision. On June 13, 2003, the WCAB denied Randhawas petition and adopted the WCJs report and recommendation as its own reasoning.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing an order, decision, or award of the WCAB, an appellate court must determine whether, in view of the entire record, substantial evidence supports the WCABs findings. (& sect; 5952; Garza v. Workmens Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 317.) An appellate court may not reweigh the evidence or decide disputed questions of fact by substituting its choice of the most convincing evidence for that of the WCAB. (§ 5953; Western Growers Ins. Co. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 227, 233.) "The credibility of witnesses, the persuasiveness or weight of the evidence, and the resolving of conflicting inferences, are questions of fact." (Western Electric Co. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 629, 644.) Although we will not disturb an award merely because it is susceptible of opposing inferences, we nevertheless will not accept factual findings if they are illogical, unreasonable, improbable, or inequitable considering the entire record and overall statutory scheme. (Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 658, 664; Western Growers Ins. Co., supra, at p. 233.)
Notwithstanding the statutory requirement to construe workers compensation laws liberally in favor of extending disability benefits, an employee seeking benefits carries the burden of proof by a preponderance of evidence that an injury or disease arose out of the course of employment. (§§ 3202, 3202.5, 3208; Livitsanos v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 753.) To constitute an industrial injury, workplace events must have caused a temporary or permanent disability, death, or the need for medical treatment beyond first aid. (§§ 3208.1, 3208.2, 5401, subd. (a).)
In adopting the WCJs report and recommendation, the WCAB reasoned:
"Applicant has simply been untruthful with the examining physicians. This has resulted in a commingling of her industrial injury (mid back) and her non-industrial motor vehicle [accident], which superseded such (to the entire back including the low back). The record was clear; as of 7/31/98, she was discharged by her primary treating physician (Christopher Pugh, D.C.) as cured.
"Although applicant represented to Drs. Rose and Abelow that she injured her low back as well in the industrial event of 4/23/97, she clearly and unambiguously stated under oath before the WCJ that she did not injure her low back in the industrial event that is the subject matter of this case. It is well-settled law that an applicant who provides a materially false and inaccurate history to an examining physician creates a medical report that may not be relied upon. That is, the false and inaccurate history renders the report worthless. [Citations.] That is what we are facing in this case; no more, no less. In fact, the WCJ could have as easily followed the 7/31/98 opinion of Dr. Pugh, which predated the non-industrial motor vehicle accident and discharged applicant from ongoing care as cured, with no residual disability from her 4/23/97 date of injury.
"It is unnecessary to engage in a discourse as to the relative merits of applicants chosen QME [Qualified Medical Evaluator] and defendants chosen QME, since applicant has provided an equally false and inaccurate history to both examining QMEs. The result of such is that she has not proven that she was entitled to any permanent disability because of this injury. Furthermore, a short period of temporary disability was likewise due to uncertain causes and, once again, applicant failed in her burden of proof (Labor Code §§ 5705/3203.5)." (Fn. omitted.)
In her petition for writ of review, Randhawa does not specifically dispute the WCABs determination that she was an incredible witness. Instead, she claims the record lacks any evidence she suffered an automobile accident causing low back pain. However, Randhawas own admission at the hearing refutes her contention. The WCJ summarized Randhawas testimony as follows:
"Applicant was in a motor vehicle accident in 1998, and she sustained an injury. She doesnt recall currently what the body parts were that she hurt. It could have been her low back. She recalls the MRI being done at Modesto Imaging.... The MRI was to her low back. The current injury, that is the Workers Comp injury, was to her mid back. She told Dr. Rose of the 1998 motor vehicle accident and that she hurt her low back. She had no low back pain before that 1998 motor vehicle accident."
The WCJs impression of a witnesss credibility is entitled to great weight. (Garza v. Workmens Comp. Appeals Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 312, 319.) Here, the WCAB reasonably found Randhawas lack of credibility discounted the relevance of the QME reports. Moreover, the WCAB correctly noted that Randhawas treating physician, Dr. Pugh, had released her as "cured" before the 1998 non-industrial automobile accident. Thus, the WCABs finding that Randhawa failed to meet her burden of proving the industrial injury caused her continuing disability is not "unreasonable, illogical, improbable or inequitable when viewed in light of the overall statutory scheme." (Western Growers Ins. Co. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, at 16 Cal.4th at p. 233.) Accordingly, we must defer to the WCABs determination.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of review is denied. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court.