Opinion
No. 570713/11.
2012-12-11
Vincenza RANDAZZO, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Leonard DINGFELDER and Brillo Abudalluhi, Defendants–Respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered November 30, 2010, which granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Present: LOWE, III, P.J., SHULMAN and HUNTER, JR., JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Order (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered November 30, 2010, modified to reinstate plaintiff's threshold claims with respect to the “permanent consequential limitation of use” and “significant limitation of use” categories of serious injury, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff alleges that she sustained various serious injuries as a result of a vehicular accident involving a taxicab owned and operated by defendants. Defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff did not suffer serious injury of a permanent nature, by submitting expert medical reports of a neurologist and orthopedist, who examined plaintiff and found normal ranges of motion, as well as reports of a radiologist who opined that changes shown on MRIs of the then 57–year–old plaintiff were degenerative and unrelated to acute or recent injury ( see Thompkins v. Ortiz, 95 AD3d 418 [2012] ). In opposition, plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to the extent of her injuries and causation. In this connection, plaintiff submitted, inter alia, the affirmed report of her treating physician, who found limitations in plaintiff's range of motion in the affected body areas shortly after the accident and persisting three years later ( see Duran v. Kabir, 93 AD3D 566 [2012] ), and opined that plaintiff's injuries were permanent and related to the accident ( see Pakeman v. Karekezia, 98 AD3d 840 [2012] ).
While we otherwise reinstate the complaint, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's 90/180–day claim on the ground that the claim was refuted by plaintiff's own deposition testimony, in which she admitted that she missed only 10 days of work as a result of the accident ( see Pakeman, 98 AD3d 840).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.