"[I]f the instrument is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect according to its language, for the intention and understanding of the parties must be deemed to be that which their writing declares." Randall v. Clifford, 119 Vt. 216, 223, 122 A.2d 833 (1956). It is the duty of the court, if possible, to construe the instrument so as to give effect to every part, and form from the parts a harmonious whole . . . . While the language of a written instrument governs in determining its effect and operation, in construing such language the nature and condition of the subject matter, the purposes sought to be accomplished, and the circumstances in which the parties contract tending to throw light on their apparent intention at the time the instrument was executed, may be considered. . . . [W]hen the intent of the parties upon the face of the instrument is doubtful, or the language used will admit of more than one interpretation, the court will look at the situation and motives of the parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the object to be attained by it; and will receive parol evidence to this end.
If the deed was clear and unambiguous, then no other evidence should have been considered. Randall v. Clifford, 119 Vt. 216, 223, 122 A.2d 833, 837 (1956). In such a situation summary judgment would have been appropriate, because construing a deed is a matter of law not fact.
"If [an] instrument is clear and unambiguous, it is to be given effect according to its language, for the intention and understanding of the parties must be deemed to be that which their writing declares." Randall v. Clifford, 122 A.2d 833, 837 (Vt. 1956); see also Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd., 375 F.3d at 177 ("[T]he best evidence of intent is the contract itself; if an agreement is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face, it must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms." (internal citation omitted)).
Where a written instrument contains demonstrable ambiguities, evidence may be received of acts and expressions of the parties indicative of the construction they understood between themselves should be placed on the language used. Otherwise, written instruments are enforced according to their express terms. Randall v. Clifford, 119 Vt. 216, 223, 122 A.2d 833. As that case suggests, at pages 224-5, misrendering of terms is corrected by particular proceedings for reformation, not during actions for enforcement. It also, at page 224, points out some of the policy bases for forbidding parol modification of plain written language in suit on the instrument. As between the parties, it avoids the problem of a subsequent change in intention by one or both of them.
Negligence may lie in the creation of a dangerous situation, although the final harm is activated by some later event that might be expected to occur. Johnson v. Cone, 112 Vt. 459, 462, 28 A.2d 384; Wagner v. Village of Waterbury, 109 Vt. 368, 378, 196 A. 745; Restatement, Torts, § 302. If such a danger is a reasonable expectancy, then knowledge of its presence may be implied. Humphrey v. Twin State Gas Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 422, 139 A. 440, 56 A.L.R. 1011; Randall v. Clifford, 119 Vt. 216, 226, 122 A.2d 833; Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B. 503. So it was here. If the defendant carelessly confined the horses, reasonable triers could charge him with knowledge that they would escape onto the highway and obstruct its traffic, although actual knowledge of the fact had not been communicated to him. To avoid the impact of the evidence that confronted him, it was incumbent on the defendant to produce evidence to overcome the case presented.