Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 06-12120-RWZ.
September 19, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
In this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), plaintiff Lolanda Randal ("Randal") alleges that the Boston Housing Authority ("BHA") violated her constitutional rights when it transferred the administration of her Section 8 rental assistance to the Metropolitan Boston Housing Partnership ("MBHP") and thereby deprived her of an opportunity to purchase a home. For the reasons discussed below, the BHA is entitled to summary judgment on all asserted claims.
II. Statutory Background
In 1974, Congress established the Section 8 program "[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically mixed housing." Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-383, tit. II, § 8(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f). The Section 8 voucher program provides "tenant-based assistance" in the form of rental subsidies to private landlords. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o). Public authorities, such as the BHA, administer the Section 8 program.
In 1998, Congress enacted the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, which permitted public housing agencies, among other things, to provide Section 8 tenant-based assistance to a qualified "eligible family that purchases a dwelling unit . . . that will be owned by 1 or more members of the family, and will be occupied by the family." Pub.L. No. 105-276, tit. V, § 8(y), 112 Stat. 2461, 2518, 2611-12 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(y)). A public housing authority administering Section 8 tenant-based assistance may, but does not have to, offer this "homeownership option." Id. The homeownership option allows Section 8 tenant-based assistance, which would otherwise subsidize rent, to be used to cover a participating family's mortgage and other homeownership costs. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.625, et seq.
III. Factual Background
These facts are undisputed except where indicated. Randal received Section 8 rental assistance through the BHA from 1989 until in or around March 2003. She began working for the BHA in May 1995.
A. Urban Edge Lottery
In May 2002, the BHA informed plaintiff about a housing lottery to be conducted by Urban Edge, a community development corporation. Plaintiff completed and submitted the questionnaire for the lottery. In November 2002, she attended a BHA-sponsored class where an Urban Edge representative explained that it was building four town homes in Roxbury, Massachusetts, and planned to conduct a lottery to determine who would be selected to purchase them. Each of four winners of the lottery would have the opportunity to purchase one home for $155,000. Randal submitted a timely application to participate in the lottery. On February 5, 2003, she attended the lottery and was selected as a winner. On February 9, 2003, she viewed the four town homes and decided to purchase one. She executed a Unit Reservation Agreement with Urban Edge and made a deposit on the home. She held the exclusive right to purchase the home until March 14, 2003.
Randal intended to finance the purchase, in part, through the BHA's Section 8 homeownership program. However, on or about February 26, 2003, Sandra Henriquez ("Henriquez"), the BHA's Administrator, advised Randal that, due to her status as an employee of the BHA, the agency planned to transfer the administration of Randal's Section 8 assistance to another housing authority, the Metropolitan Boston Housing Partnership ("MBHP"). Henriquez told Randal that if the MBHP did not have a homeownership program, the BHA would place her with another housing authority that had a comparable homeownership program. Randal received a letter dated March 3, 2003, from Armando Zapata, the Director of the BHA's Section 8 Operations, advising her that the BHA had transferred the administration of her Section 8 assistance to the MBHP. The MBHP did not have a homeownership program. As a result, plaintiff was not able to purchase the home from Urban Edge.
The BHA has stated only that it "makes no admission with regard to the conversation" between Randal and Henriquez. It does not affirmatively dispute that this conversation occurred. (See Def.'s Mem. in Sup. of Mot. to Dismiss, Docket # 4-1, at 3; Second Declaration of Lolanda Randal, Docket # 10 ("Randal Second Decl.") ¶ 22.)
The parties dispute whether Randal satisfied the prequalification conditions necessary for participation in the BHA's homeownership program. (See Affidavit of Suzanne Forgione, Docket # 4-2 ¶ 3; Declaration of Lolanda Randal, Docket # 7-2 ("Randal Decl.") ¶¶ 4-6.) This factual dispute is not material to the determination that Randal's claims are time-barred.
B. Housing Choice Counseling Program
In October 2002, the BHA had advised Randal that she was eligible to participate in the Housing Choice Counseling Program, a program designed to increase housing access by assisting up to 400 minority families to move from "non-predominantly white neighborhoods" to "predominantly white neighborhoods." Randal indicated her interest in participating in the program but was not able to participate because of the BHA's subsequent decision to transfer the administration of her Section 8 assistance to the MBHP.
The parties dispute Randal's eligibility to participate in the Housing Choice Counseling Program. (See Def.'s Mem. in Sup. of Mot. to Dismiss 7; Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Docket # 7-1, at 18.) This factual dispute is also not material to the determination that Randal's claims are time-barred.
IV. Procedural History
On November 22, 2006, Randal filed a complaint against the BHA alleging four causes of action: (1) " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Violation of Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Massachusetts Constitution;" (2) " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, 24 C.F.R. § 982.625, et seq. and Massachusetts Contract Law;" (3) " 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Violation of Equal Protection Clause and Massachusetts Constitution, Part I Article 1;" and (4) "Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations." (Compl., as amended Nov. 27, 2006 (Docket # 2).)
The BHA filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, attaching the affidavits of two BHA employees to its motion. (Docket ## 3, 4, 6.) Randal opposed the motion to dismiss. (Docket # 7.) The court notified the parties that it would treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and gave the parties an opportunity to submit further materials. (Electronic Notice dated 5/10/2007); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) ("If, on a motion . . . to dismiss . . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . ."); Beddall v. State St. Bank and Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1998) ("the conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion is a matter quintessentially within the purview of the district court's sound discretion"). Both parties accepted the invitation; Randal submitted a second declaration (Docket # 10) and the BHA a reply brief (Docket # 11). The court held a hearing on the motion on May 31, 2007. The parties attempted to reach settlement, but on July 19, 2007, plaintiff informed the court that they had reached an impasse, and asked the court to rule on the motion. (Docket # 14.)
V. Legal Standard
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "Some alleged factual dispute" between the parties does not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Instead, the party opposing summary judgment must identify a "genuine issue ofmaterial fact." Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 145 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)) (emphasis in original). "A dispute is 'genuine' if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party." Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A material fact is one which has the "potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If that burden is met, the opposing party can avoid summary judgment only by providing properly supported evidence of disputed material facts that would require trial. See id. at 324. The court must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and indulge all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. See O'Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir. 1993). If, after viewing the record in the non-moving party's favor, the court determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Walsh v. Town of Lakeville, 431 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (D. Mass. 2006).
B. Statute of Limitations
1. Section 1983 Claims
Poy v. Boutselis 352 F.3d 479483Wilson v. Garcia 471 U.S. 261 superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co. 541 U.S. 369 377-81 Wilson471 U.S. at 276-80260, § 2A
2. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations Claim
Count IV of the complaint, for tortious interference with contractual relations, is similarly subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A.
VI. Discussion
Although the statute of limitations period in § 1983 actions is determined by state law, the date of accrual is a federal law question. Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2005). In general, § 1983 claims accrue "when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis for his action." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With regard to the state law claim for tortious interference, the cause of action accrues when an event or events have occurred that are reasonably likely to put the plaintiff on notice that she has been harmed. Stark v. Advanced Magnetics, Inc., 736 N.E.2d 434, 442 (Mass.App.Ct. 2000) (citing Bowen v. Eli Lilly Co., 557 N.E.2d 739, 741 (Mass. 1990)).
Defendant asserts and Randal does not dispute that her claims accrued, at the latest, on March 14, 2003, when she was prevented from finalizing the exercise of her purchase option and from purchasing the town home. (See Def.'s Mem. in Sup. of Mot. to Dismiss 3.)
Randal argues, however, that the BHA is equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations, or, alternatively, that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. As the two doctrines are distinct, I will consider each argument separately.Vistamar, 430 F.3d at 71.
A. Equitable Estoppel
1. Section 1983 Claims
In § 1983 claims, federal equitable estoppel principles apply.Vistamar, 430 F.3d at 73. Generally, one seeking to assert equitable estoppel must show "that (1) the party to be estopped made a 'definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other [would] rely upon it'; (2) the party seeking estoppel relied on the misrepresentations to its detriment; and (3) the 'reliance [was] reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did not know nor should it have known that its adversary's conduct was misleading.'" Mimiya Hosp., Inc. SNF v. United States Dep't of Health Human Servs., 331 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Heckler v. Community Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984)). "The conduct of the defendant must be so misleading as to cause the plaintiff's failure to file suit." Benitez-Pons v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Randal argues that Henriquez's February 26, 2003, representation to her that the BHA would transfer the administration of her Section 8 assistance to another housing authority if the MBHP did not have a homeownership program was calculated to induce her not to bring a suit, and that she relied on this statement to her detriment. (Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss 13.) I bypass the issue of whether Henriquez's statement was a misrepresentation and conclude that Randal's argument fails in any event because she cannot show that she reasonably relied on this statement to delay filing her suit for over three years. First, the statement was proven incorrect when the BHA failed to transfer her assistance to another housing authority with homeownership assistance prior to March 14, 2003. Second, she points to no other statements by the BHA or any of its employees during the entire period from February 26, 2003, to March 14, 2006, the last day of the limitations period, that may have induced her to delay bringing suit. Her reliance on a single statement, made prior to the accrual of her claims, is unreasonable as a matter of law. See Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 662-63 (1st Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the BHA is not equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense to Randal's § 1983 claims.
Randal makes reference to statements from a "senior BHA manager" in "the spring of 2006" regarding her possible participation in the Framingham Housing Authority's homeownership program. (Randal Second Decl. ¶ 28.) However, Randal does not specify whether these statements occurred before or after March 14, 2006.
2. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
Massachusetts' equitable estoppel law applies to Randal's state law claim of tortious interference with contractual relations. It requires plaintiff to show "(1) a representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is made; (2) an act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made, [and] (3) detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission." Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Mass. 1996). Significantly, the representation at issue "must be such that a reasonable man would rely thereon" in delaying to file suit within the statute of limitations period. Ford v. Rogovin, 194 N.E. 719, 720 (Mass. 1935).
Plaintiff's estoppel argument fails because a reasonable plaintiff would not delay filing suit for over three years in reliance on Henriquez's February 26, 2003 statement. See supra Section VI.A.1; Ford, 194 N.E. at 720-21 (estoppel inapplicable because statements made during the first two months of the limitations period were not sufficient to induce reasonable reliance when the defendant did not make any statements to the plaintiff during the ten months which remained in the limitations period); Deisenroth v. Numonics Corp., 997 F. Supp. 153, 157 (D. Mass. 1998) (Massachusetts' estoppel doctrine inapplicable because plaintiff was not reasonable in relying on settlement discussions which ceased at least one year before expiration of the statute of limitations). Therefore, the statute of limitations applies.
B. Equitable Tolling
Plaintiff's equitable tolling argument is the same as her equitable estoppel argument: she relied upon Ms. Henriquez's February 2003 statement. The First Circuit has left open the question of whether the equitable tolling of § 1983 actions is governed by state or federal law. Vistamar, 430 F.3d at 71-72. However, it is not necessary to decide which applies here because tolling is inapplicable under either test.
Application of equitable tolling under federal law requires the plaintiff to show "excusable ignorance of the statute of limitations caused by some misconduct of the defendant."Benitez-Pons v. Com. of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 1998). Equitable tolling is unavailable where a party fails to exercise reasonable diligence. Id. Under Massachusetts law, "the doctrine of equitable tolling is applicable only where the prospective plaintiff did not have, and could not have had with due diligence, the information essential to bringing suit."Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 682 N.E.2d 624, 635 (Mass. 1997). Randal does not satisfy either of these standards. Henriquez's statements did not concern a possible suit by Randal or the statute of limitations, and Randal had the necessary information to bring suit by March 14, 2003, when her exclusive right to purchase the town home from Urban Edge expired and she was unable to purchase the town home.
VII. Conclusion
This situation is unfortunate. Randal, through no actions of her own, may have been unfairly deprived of an opportunity to purchase an affordable home and to participate in the BHA's Housing Choice Counseling Program. Home ownership is a dream for many, and it is troubling that Randal's dream may have been dashed by the BHA's unilateral decision to transfer the administration of her housing assistance to another housing authority. The court recognizes that the BHA feels constrained by a large and intricate body of regulations. Nevertheless, the court urges it to reevaluate Randal's situation with a view to improving her opportunities for homeownership.
For the reasons stated above, Randal's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, and summary judgment is appropriate. Accordingly, the BHA's motion to dismiss, converted into a motion for summary judgment (Docket # 3), is ALLOWED as to all claims. Judgment may be entered for defendant.