Opinion
2:17-cv-02292-JAM-JDP
07-20-2021
GRINDSTONE INDIAN RANCHERIA and ONE HUNDRED PLUS MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LIVING ON THE GRINDSTONE INDIAN RESERVATION, Plaintiffs, v. TERRENCE OLLIFF, individually and as a beneficiary/trustee of the Olliff Family Trust, DIANNE L. OLLIFF, individually and as a beneficiary/trustee of the Olliff Family Trust, and DOES 1-10, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE UNDER FRCP 11
JOHN A. MENDEZ, NITED STATES DBTRICT JUDGE
This lawsuit concerns a property dispute over a strip of land between Grindstone Indian Rancheria and 100 of its residents' (“Plaintiffs”) and the Olliffs' (“Defendants”) properties. See First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 10-2. Before the Court is Plaintiffs' second motion for summary adjudication on its declaratory relief claim. See Pls.' Second Mot. for Summ. Adjudication (“Mot.”), ECF No. 52. Defendants oppose this motion. See Opp'n, ECF No. 54. Plaintiffs replied. See Reply, ECF No. 55. Because the motion is procedurally improper and because genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion.
This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled for May 4, 2021.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties are familiar with the factual background of this case-it is set forth extensively in the parties' briefings and the Court's prior order. See Order denying Mot. for Summ. Adjudication (“Prior Order”), ECF No. 37.
In July 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary adjudication on their declaratory relief claim. See Pls.' Mot. for Summ. Adjudication (“Prior Mot.”), ECF No. 29. The Court denied Plaintiffs' motion in August 2019. See Prior Order. Almost two years later, Plaintiffs move again for summary adjudication on the same claim. See Mot. Plaintiff asserts its motion is “not simply a do-over of [the] motion previously denied by this Court” and “relies on new declarations and the recent deposition testimony of Defendants' expert.” Reply at 1, 3.
II. OPINION
A. Request for Judicial Notice
Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute, ” because it (1) “is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction”; or (2) “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed.R.Evid. 201(a)-(b). A court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. United States ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011). Matters of public record include “documents on file in federal or state courts.” Harris v. County of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012). However, courts may not take judicial notice of “disputed facts stated in public records.” See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).
Defendants request the Court take judicial notice of three documents in the Court's records for this case. See Defs.' Req. for Jud. Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 54-4. These documents are matters of public record and therefore proper subjects of judicial notice. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice. However, the Court takes judicial notice only of the existence of these documents and declines to take judicial notice of their substance, including any disputed or irrelevant facts within them. Lee, 250 F.3d at 690.
B. Evidentiary Objections
Defendants also raise evidentiary objections to Plaintiffs' statement of undisputed facts. See Defs.' Objections, ECF No. 54-3. The Court has reviewed these evidentiary objections but declines to rule on each one individually as courts self-police evidentiary issues on motions for summary judgment and a formal ruling is unnecessary to the determination of this motion. See Sandoval v. Cty. Of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. Jan. 13, 2021) (citing to Burch v. Regents of the University of California, 433 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119) (E.D. Cal. 2006) (noting objections “are generally unnecessary on summary judgment because they are “duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself” and that “parties briefing summary judgment motions would be better served to ‘simply argue' the import of the facts reflected in the evidence rather than expending time and resources compiling laundry lists of objections”)).
C. Legal Standard
A Court must grant a party's motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying [the documents] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Once the movant makes this initial showing, the burden rests upon the nonmoving party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. An issue of fact is genuine if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
D. Analysis
Defendants argue Plaintiffs have, without justification, “re-filed the exact same Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Declaratory Relief Claim which was previously adjudicated and ruled on.” Id. at 1-2, 7. The Court agrees.
“The order of denial of summary judgment is an interlocutory decree” and “the court in its discretion may reconsider such order.” Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp.656, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (internal citations omitted). Thus, a district court has discretion to consider a second motion for summary judgment. Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 304 F Supp.2d 1208, 1214-1215 (C.D. Cal 2004) (internal citations omitted). A renewed or successive summary judgment motion is appropriate if one of the following grounds exists: “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence or an expanded factual record; and (3) [the] need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Id. at 1215(internal citations omitted); see also Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc. v. Applied Materials, Inc., 922 F.Supp. 1439, 1442 (N.D. Cal 1996) (“a moving party may renew a motion for summary judgment notwithstanding denial of an earlier motion by showing a different set of facts or some other reason justifying renewal of the motion”).
Plaintiffs do not contend there has been an intervening change in controlling law or that there is need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Mot; Reply. Rather, Plaintiff asserts the grounds for this motion are an expanded factual record, particularly “new declarations and the recent deposition testimony of Defendants' expert.” Reply at 3.
However, while there are new declarations and new deposition testimony, Plaintiffs raise the same argument that this Court previously considered and rejected: that they are entitled to summary judgment based upon Defendants' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. Mot. at 1, 19-20; Reply at 5-6. Specifically, they stress the fact that Defendants had a 60-day period to file a protest of the 2011 Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) Cadastral Survey “which expired on October 16, 2012” yet failed to do so. Mot. at 7. However, Plaintiff raised and the Court specifically rejected this argument in its prior order: “Plaintiffs … do[] not meaningfully respond to Defendants' argument that disputed issues of fact preclude summary adjudication. Instead, they double-down on their theory that Defendants failed to timely exhaust their administrative remedies and are now using a ‘backdoor approach' to ‘completely contradict and challenge the BLM Survey.' Despite these accusations, Plaintiffs are the only ones who seek to muddle the distinction between interpreting the BLM's survey and challenging the validity of that survey. Citing to the APA, 5. U.S.C. § 704, Plaintiffs argue the Court is without authority to interpret the BLM Survey. This argument misses the mark. The APA allows courts to review the accuracy of an administrative decision under certain circumstances. 5 U.S.C. § 702. It does not curtail the Court's ability to discern how an agency's decision applies to a set of facts. As explained above, Defendants do not challenge the accuracy of the BLM Survey; they challenge Plaintiffs' reading of it.” Prior Order at 9-10 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). The same reasoning holds true here.
The disputed issues of fact that led the Court to deny Plaintiffs' prior motion again preclude summary judgment. See Defs.' Response to Statement of Undisputed Facts (“RSUF”) ¶¶ 7, 8, 16, 18, ECF No. 54-1. Defendants are not challenging the validity of the 2011 BLM Survey or the fact that they did not object to the Survey. Prior Order at 9; Opp'n at 2. Rather, Defendants dispute Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Survey, particularly where it sets the “western boundary of Plaintiffs' 20-acre Parcel 2.” Opp'n at 8; RSUF ¶¶ 7, 8, 18. Plaintiffs interpret the Survey as reinstating the Knox corner marker to Parcel 2 and thus including the disputed strip of land in Parcel 2. Mot. at 3-6. Defendants disagree. See Opp'n at 2-3, 7-8. These are material issues of fact. See U.S. v. State Inv. Co., 264 U.S. 206, 2011 (1924) (instructing that questions of “where the line run by a survey lies on the ground, and whether any particular tract is on one side or the other of that line, are questions of fact”).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated proper grounds for bringing this second motion let alone that they are entitled to summary adjudication. See Nightlife Partners, Ltd., 304 F Supp.2d at 1214-1215; see also Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 922 F.Supp. at 1442.
E. Sanctions
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(3), a court may order a party to show cause why Rule 11(b) has not been violated and why sanctions should not be imposed. Rule 11(b)(1) provides: “By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion or other paper - whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it - an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to . . cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”
Plaintiffs are ordered to show cause why filing this second motion for summary adjudication - based on the same arguments that the Court already considered and rejected - did not violate Rule 11(b)(1). Plaintiffs shall file their response within ten (10) days of this order.
III. ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' motion for summary adjudication on their declaratory judgment claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.