¶ 6 Although this provision might be construed to allow the type of setoff the defendant now requests, Illinois case law has held that a setoff under section 2–403(a) cannot be based on a contract separate from the assigned contract. See R.A.N. Consultants, Inc. v. Peacock, 201 Ill.App.3d 67, 147 Ill.Dec. 283, 559 N.E.2d 283 (1990). The defendant does not dispute that its requested setoff is based on a contract or other indebtedness separate from the debts assigned to the plaintiff, and it does not ask us to overturn Illinois case law interpreting section 2–403(a).
First, Friesen has failed to even acknowledge the case law cited in the Report. See Report, at 15-16 (analyzing R.A.N. Consultants, Inc. v. Peacock, 201 Ill. App.3d 67, 70, 147 Ill.Dec. 283, 285, 559 N.E.2d 283, 285 (3d Dist. 1990); KFK Corp. v. American Continental Homes, Inc., 71 Ill. App.3d 304, 315, 27 Ill.Dec. 420, 427, 389 N.E.2d 232, 239 (2d Dist. 1979)). Based on this analogous case law, we believe the Report reaches the correct conclusion.