Opinion
99 Civ. 5736 (JFK) S2 94 Cr. 466 (JFK)
June 25, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Petitioner Jesus Ramos' ("Ramos") pro motion to vacate or set aside his conviction and sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("§ 2255"). For the reasons that follow in this Memorandum Opinion and Order, Ramos' motion is dismissed as untimely under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
DISCUSSION
This Court ruled in a previous Memorandum Opinion and Order dated August 28, 2000 (the "2000 Order") that Ramos had failed to file a complete § 2255 petition within the one-year deadline established by the AEDPA. Ramos' deadline for filing his § 2255 petition was February 15, 1999. Although he filed notice of the petition on November 7, 1998, that notice merely stated four unsupported and broad "issues" upon which it was purportedly based. It reported, simply, "Memorandum of facts to follow."
In the Government's June 21, 1999 opposition to Ramos' petition, the Government argued not only that the petition should be dismissed for Ramos' failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, but also that any additional amendments to the petition were time-barred by the AEDPA. Ramos subsequently filed a supporting memorandum that finally set forth the factual and legal bases for his § 2255 petition. That memorandum was dated July 28, 1999, more than five months after his February 15, 1999 deadline under the AEDPA.
This Court ruled in its 2000 Order that Ramos had failed to file a complete § 2255 petition within the mandatory one-year deadline under the AEDPA. The Court noted, however, that the Second Circuit has adopted the doctrine of equitable tolling in the "rare and exceptional circumstance[s]" where a petitioner can show that "extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing on time." See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 2000). The Court granted Ramos leave to file an amended petition stating why the Court should consider his petition as timely.
Although Ramos responded to this Court's 2000 Order primarily by challenging its ruling that his petition was not filed before the February 15, 1999 deadline, he also submitted copies of two letters that he received from the Pro Se Office of this Court. The first letter, which bears no date, acknowledged that the Pro Se Office received his papers on November 12, 1998, and instructed him to refrain from submitting any further papers until after he received a docket number. He received notice of that docket number in the second letter, dated February 10, 1999.
The Court finds that in light of these two letters, equitable tolling should apply in this case. The first letter directed Ramos not to submit any further materials until he received a docket number, and the second letter advising him of his docket number arrived too close to February 15, 1999 for him to prepare an adequate supplement by that deadline. The Court therefore rules that Ramos' time to file a complete § 2255 petition should be tolled for the three-month interim between his receipt of those two letters and extended to May 15, 1999.
Tolling makes no difference in this case, however, because Ramos failed to complete his § 2255 petition before his new, tolled deadline of May 15, 1999. This Court can only toll Ramos' AEDPA deadline for those three months in which he was instructed not to submit papers, for the doctrine of equitable tolling "does not reset the date from which the one-year statute of limitations begins to run." See McGinnis, 208 F.3d at 17. The memorandum in support of Ramos' § 2255 petition was dated July 28, 1999, more than two months after his new, tolled deadline. His petition must therefore be dismissed as untimely under the AEDPA.
CONCLUSION
Ramos' motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is hereby dismissed as untimely. The Court orders this case closed, and directs the Clerk of the Court to remove it from the Court's docket.
SO ORDERED.