Summary
dismissing Title I claim for money damages against state department
Summary of this case from Keithly v. University of Texas Southwestern Med. CenterOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. SA-00-CA-231-00
February 11, 2002
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Although Plaintiff sought an extension of time to file a response to the Motion to Dismiss, and such request was granted, a response was never filed. Plaintiff has filed a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and, in turn, Defendant filed its reply and objection to evidence attached to Plaintiffs response.
Dkt. No. 35.
Dkt. No. 42.
Dkt. No. 36.
Dkt. No. 40.
Dkt. Nos. 43, 44.
Dkt. No. 45.
I. Background of the Case
A. Procedural background:This is an employment action based on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's claim for money damages under Title I of the ADA, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001). Plaintiffs remaining claim under the ADA is limited to a request for injunctive relief (i.e. reinstatement with reasonable accommodation).
See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 33). Although the pleading includes a claim under the Texas Labor Code, Plaintiff was denied leave to assert such claim, and it has been disregarded.
See Dkt. No. 29.
B. Factual background:
For 18 years, Lillian Ramos (Plaintiff) was employed as a Senior Parole Officer by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (Defendant). In 1998, Plaintiffs supervisor informed her that she would be reassigned from a regular (non-specialized) caseload to a sex offender (specialized) caseload. Plaintiff informed her supervisor that she could not supervise sex offenders because she had been the victim of sexual abuse/assault and was suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Defendant requested documentation from a medical provider to confirm her diagnosis and clarify her limitations, if any. Plaintiffs psychiatrist responded in writing, and stated that Plaintiff was diagnosed in 1990 as suffering from PTSD, with delayed onset, and that the proposed reassignment triggered symptoms associated with PTSD. He further advised that Plaintiff should not return to work unless she was returned to her regular caseload. Defendant was not satisfied with the explanation given by Plaintiff's physician and did not offer to reinstate Plaintiff to her former position. Plaintiff never returned to work. Instead, she began working for a local school district as a family outreach worker. Plaintiff has not taken medication and her visits to the psychiatrist have been sporadic. It remains unclear whether some of her physical symptoms, such as hot flashes, inability to concentrate and moodiness, are the result of PTSD or menopause.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. A @ 88:8-25.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. A @ 120:8-15.
Plaintiff testified, during deposition, that she had been fondled as a child, and narrowly escaped an attempted rape. (Dkt. No. 42, Ext. A @ 26:14-25; 28:17-25). While corresponding with Defendant, the psychiatrist also stated that Plaintiff was assaulted in 1984 by a sex offender during a routine home visit. (Dkt. No. 42, Ext. B @ bates nos. 43, 62).
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. B @ bates no. 62.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. B @ bates no. 62.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. B, bates nos. 42, 4548, 100-101.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. A @ 53:20-54:8.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. A @ 122, 124-132.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. A @ 120-127.
In sum, Plaintiff contends that she suffers from a disability (PTSD) and that she is entitled to reasonable accommodation under the ADA (assigned to a regular caseload with a guarantee of no contact with sex offenders). Defendant contends that it is immune from all claims under the ADA; and, that even if it were not immune, Plaintiff is not disabled as defined by the ADA, the accommodation sought was not reasonable, and the suggested accommodation would impose an undue hardship on Defendant's operations. Defendant further asserts that the program or activity in which Plaintiff worked does not receive federal funding; therefore, her claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are barred.
Dkt. No. 42, Exh. A @78:6-11; 56:6-17; 57:16-20; 61:12-18.
II. Summary judgment standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides that a defending party may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor. Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings and evidence show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The party opposing a motion must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. An adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial; if he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. The dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. All of the evidence and inferences drawn from that evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248.
Id.
Hibernia Nat'l Bank v. Carner, 997 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1993).
III. Analysis
A. Americans with Disabilities Act:Defendant contends that all claims asserted by Plaintiff under the ADA are barred by sovereign immunity. In February 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that state employees may not sue the State for money damages under Title I of the ADA. In that case, two state employees brought separate actions against Alabama state employers for money damages under Title I of the ADA. The question presented was whether Congress, in abrogating the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the ADA, acted within its constitutional authority. The Supreme Court determined that it did not. Following the clear mandate of the Supreme Court in Garrett, this Court promptly dismissed Plaintiff's claim for money damages under the ADA, but allowed Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief to remain pending. The Court has since conducted a closer examination of the immunity issue, and has determined that Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief is also barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955 (2001).
121 S.Ct.at 958.
Id at 962.
Id. at 968.
While the plaintiffs in Garrett did not sue their employers for declaratory and injunctive relief, the Supreme Court did provide some guidance on the issue when it stated:
Our holding here that Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I does not mean that persons with disabilities have no federal recourse against discrimination. Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards applicable to the States. Those standards can be enforced by the United States in actions for money damages, as well as by private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 28 S.Ct. 441 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). In addition, state laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment and other aspects of life provide independent avenues of redress.121 S.Ct. at 968 n. 9. These statements clearly show the Supreme Court's intent to limit future claims for injunctive relief to those brought under Ex parte Young, and that limitation effectively prohibits all claims for injunctive relief against the State, because Ex parte Young lawsuits are allowed only against state officials — not the State itself. Moreover, the courts have repeatedly held that, in the absence of a waiver of immunity, claims by private individuals against the State are barred by sovereign immunity regardless of the type of relief sought.
Reickenbacker v. M.J. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 976 n. 9 (5th Cir. 2001) ("It is axiomatic that Ex parte Young does not provide an exception to sovereign immunity when a State (or its agency) is the defendant"); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 306 (5th Cir. 2001) (" Ex parte Young held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state official who is alleged to be acting in violation of federal law");Aguilar v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) ("To meet the Ex parte Young exception, a plaintiffs suit alleging a violation of federal law must be brought against individual persons in their official capacities as agents of the state, and the relief sought must be declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective in effect").
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 113 S.Ct. 684, 688 (1993) (suits against the States and their agencies are barred regardless of the relief sought); Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Government, 2002 WL 32810, 3 (5th Cir. 2002) (the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for both money damages the injunctive relief).
Since the Garrett decision, the Fifth Circuit has determined that claims against the State under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are also barred by immunity, based on the same reasoning and analysis applied in Garrett. If Congress, in enacting the ADA, exceeded its authority in abrogating the State's immunity then all claims by private individuals against the State (including claims for injunctive relief) must be barred. Plaintiffs ADA claim for injunctive relief must therefore be dismissed.
Reickenbacker, 274 F.3d at 983-84 ("Title II created an affirmative accommodation obligation on the part of public entities that far exceeds the constitutional boundaries").
Because Plaintiff did not sue any state officials, her lawsuit may not proceed under Ex parte Young.
B. Rehabilitation Act:
Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because the parole division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (the program or activity in which Plaintiff worked) does not receive federal financial assistance. This argument was first asserted in Defendant's motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff failed to respond. Defendant now makes the same argument in its motion for summary judgment and, once again, Plaintiff has failed to respond.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating against disabled, but otherwise qualified individuals. Specifically, the Act provides for suit against "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." As summary judgment evidence, Defendant filed the affidavit of Brad Livingston, the Chief Financial Office of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, which states that the parole division in which Plaintiff worked was not the recipient of any federal monies. There is no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, Defendant is not an entity which may be sued under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (West 1999); Lollar v. Baker 196 F.3d 603, 608-609 (5th Cir. 1999).
Docket No. 42, Exh. C.
More important, however, is the question of immunity. The parties filed their briefs prior to the Fifth Circuit decision in Reickenbacker, so they did not have an opportunity to address the immunity issue as it applies to the Rehabilitation Act. However, the Fifth Circuit inReickenbacker clearly stated that claims under the Rehabilitation Act are barred by sovereign immunity for the same reasons that claims against the State under the ADA are barred. Plaintiffs claim under the Rehabilitation Act must therefore be dismissed.
Reickenbacker 274 F.3d at 983 ("the accommodation obligation imposed by § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act far exceeds that imposed by the Constitution").
For these reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. It 42) is GRANTED; Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b) (Dkt. 435) and Defendant's Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence (Dkt. # 45) are MOOT; and, all claims herein are DISMISSED. Final Judgment may be entered accordingly.