Opinion
C080687
03-15-2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. Nos. STKCRFE20140008834, SF130263A)
In this original writ proceeding, this court previously concluded petitioner Jaime Ramos waited too long to challenge respondent superior court's mistake in allowing the District Attorney to conduct voir dire of the grand jury in the absence of the trial court and therefore petitioner was barred from relief by statute. (See Pen. Code, § 1510.)
On May 26, 2016, this court issued the following order:
"The petition for writ of mandate or prohibition is denied. There is no statutory authority for respondent court to delegate the voir dire of prospective grand jurors to the District Attorney, as happened in this case, and which practice should cease forthwith. (See Pen. Code, §§ 909, 910, 939.5.) Nonetheless, petitioner's 'nonstatutory motion to dismiss' was effectively a Penal Code section 995 motion to set aside the indictment. [Citations.] Given that the motion was not asserted within 60 days of arraignment on the indictment, and inasmuch as petitioner offers no persuasive explanation excusing the lengthy delay in asserting such motion, petitioner has forfeited his right to pretrial review. (Pen. Code, § 1510.) Petitioner retains his remedy on appeal. (Id., § 996.)"
Petitioner sought review in the California Supreme Court, which, on August 15, 2016, issued the following order:
"The petition for review is granted. The matter is transferred to the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, with directions to vacate its order denying the petition for writ of mandate or prohibition and to issue an order directing respondent court to show cause why the exceptions to the timeliness requirement of Penal Code section 1510 should not apply in this case. (See McGill v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1513-1515; Fleming v. Superior Court (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 73, 103-105.)"
We issued an order to show cause in obedience to this order, and real party in interest filed a return and petitioner filed a traverse in due course.
Subsequently, petitioner's counsel advised us a plea arrangement had resolved the case, and moved to dismiss the petition, rendering this case moot.
In the current procedural context, we see no reason not to dismiss this case as moot.
DISPOSITION
Defendant's petition is dismissed and the order to show cause is discharged.
/s/_________
Duarte, J. We concur: /s/_________
Nicholson, Acting P.J. /s/_________
Mauro, J. DUARTE, J., Concurring
Although unnecessary to our disposition here, I feel compelled to write separately to note that our Supreme Court did not confer on this court jurisdiction to reconsider either (1) our conclusion regarding petitioner's claim on the merits, that is, that the local practice was unlawful, or (2) our conclusion that defendant's petition was subject to Penal Code section 1510, that is, that it should be treated as a Penal Code section 995 petition. Instead, the high court limited our jurisdiction to determining whether or not exceptions to Penal Code section 1510 were demonstrated in this particular case.
Because I presume the unlawful grand jury practice identified in our prior order has ceased, and will not recur in San Joaquin County or anywhere else, I am confident that dismissing this case as moot properly serves the public interest.
/s/_________
Duarte, J.