Opinion
# 2016-015-123 Claim No. NONE Motion No. M-87652
03-09-2016
JOHN RAMOS v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
John Ramos, Pro Se Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Motion for late claim relief was granted in part and denied in part. Movant failed to establish the merit of his proposed wrongful confinement cause of action as the basis for the administrative reversal of the disciplinary determination.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-015-123 |
| Claimant(s): | JOHN RAMOS |
| Claimant short name: | RAMOS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | NONE |
| Motion number(s): | M-87652 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANCIS T. COLLINS |
| Claimant's attorney: | John Ramos, Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | March 9, 2016 |
| City: | Saratoga Springs |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Movant, a pro se inmate, seeks late claim relief pursuant to Court of Claims Act § 10 (6).
In his proposed claim, movant asserts causes of action for medical negligence/malpractice, assault and battery, wrongful confinement and discrimination in violation of the NYS Constitution and various State and Federal statutes. Movant alleges that in response to certain remarks he purportedly made about a female staff member employed by the Office of Mental Health (OMH), on June 23, 2015 correction officers confiscated his inmate identification card so as to deprive him of his ability to obtain his prescribed anti-psychotic medication from the dispensary in the OMH section of Great Meadow Correctional Facility. Movant describes the facts underlying the claim as follows:
"[d]enied access to his anti-psychotic medication, [he] . . . degenerated into the intended psychotic state. On June 24, in a paranoid , psychotic state, and under threat by the Officers of an impending assault/beating for making an alleged sexual advance on a white female staff member, the claimant barricaded himself in his cell. A second group of Officers, completely disregarded all the policies and procedures established by N.Y.S. D.O.C.C.S., for the extraction of a known mentally ill inmate from a cell, rushed into the Claimant's cell, and savagely beat him" (proposed claim, p. 2).
Movant further alleges that the beating continued until they arrived at the facility medical department. A false misbehavior report was allegedly issued and movant alleges that he was threatened by the correction staff in an effort to coerce him to plead guilty to the charges, which he did. He alleges that the disciplinary hearing was a "farce in which many of D.O.C.C.S. established policies to ensure the rights of the Claimant to a fair, and impartial, hearing, were disregarded" (id.). The Hearing Officer's guilty determination was administratively reversed on September 29, 2015, only after movant had been in disciplinary confinement for a period of 58 days. Movant alleges that his claim accrued on August 21, 2015, which appears to be the date of his release from punitive confinement.
Court of Claims Act § 10 (6) permits this Court, if the applicable statute of limitations set forth in article 2 of the CPLR has not expired, to allow the filing of a late claim upon consideration of the following factors: "whether the delay in filing the claim was excusable; whether the state had notice of the essential facts constituting the claim; whether the state had an opportunity to investigate the circumstances underlying the claim; whether the claim appears to be meritorious; whether the failure to file or serve upon the attorney general a timely claim or to serve upon the attorney general a notice of intention resulted in substantial prejudice to the state; and whether the claimant has any other available remedy."
The first issue for determination upon a late claim motion is whether the application is timely. Section 10 (6) requires that a motion to file a late claim be made "before an action asserting a like claim against a citizen of the state would be barred under the provisions of article two of the civil practice law and rules." Movant alleges causes of action for both intentional and unintentional conduct, all of which would be timely as against a citizen of the state, including the one-year statute of limitations for assault, battery and wrongful confinement (CPLR 214 [5]; 215 [3]; 214-a).
Turning to the statutory factors, this Court has broad discretion in deciding a motion to permit the late filing of a claim (Ledet v State of New York, 207 AD2d 965 [4th Dept 1994]). The statutory factors are not exhaustive nor is any one factor controlling (Matter of Gavigan v State of New York, 176 AD2d 1117 [3d Dept 1991]). The most important factor is whether the potential claim has merit, as it would be a futile exercise to permit litigation of a clearly baseless lawsuit (Martinez v State of New York, 62 AD3d 1225 [3d Dept 2009]; Savino v State of New York, 199 AD2d 254 [2d Dept 1993]).
The excuse advanced by the movant for failing to timely file and serve the claim is that he was ignorant of the law and unable to fully access the prison law library during the 58-day period of his punitive confinement. However, ignorance of the law is not an acceptable excuse for delay and there still remained ample time to file and serve a claim after movant's release from punitive confinement. Accordingly, this excuse does not weigh in movant's favor.
Addressing the intertwined issues of notice, opportunity to investigate and prejudice, movant supports his late claim application with copies of correspondence from prison personnel regarding the incident, and his written complaints and administrative appeal statement, all of which are dated within 90 days of the incident. The incident giving rise to the claim is therefore well documented and the State has not argued that it will suffer prejudice in the event late claim relief is permitted. These factors weigh in movant's favor.
With respect to the required showing of merit, the claim is sufficiently established if the movant demonstrates that the proposed claim is not patently groundless, frivolous, or legally defective and there is reasonable cause to believe that a valid cause of action exists (Fernandez v State of New York, 43 Misc 3d 1221 [A] [Ct Cl 2014]; Matter of Santana v New York State Thruway Auth., 92 Misc 2d 1 [Ct Cl 1977]). Addressing first movant's cause of action for medical negligence/malpractice, the law is settled that "the State owes a duty to provide for the health and care of inmates" (Levin v State of New York, 32 AD3d 501 [2d Dept 2006]). "Where an inmate alleges that defendant abdicated its duty to provide adequate medical care, he or she must present competent evidence demonstrating defendant's common-law negligence or that it departed from accepted standards of care and that such deviation was the proximate cause of the sustained injuries" (Knight v State of New York, 127 AD3d 1435, 1435 [3d Dept 2015], citing Lowe v State of New York, 35 AD3d 1281, 1282 [2006]; see also Hunt v State of New York, 36 AD3d 511 [1st Dept 2007]; Kagan v State of New York, 221 AD2d 7 [2d Dept 1996]). While movant presents no medical evidence establishing a departure from accepted standards of medical care, he sufficiently alleged a cause of action for medical negligence arising from DOCCS' alleged failure to provide him with prescribed medications to treat his mental illness. In fact, the Hearing Officer noted as a mitigating factor that "your behavior may have been caused by your missed medication" (movant's Exhibit G). As a result, the medical negligence cause of action arising from DOCCS' alleged failure to provide the movant with prescribed medication has at least the appearance of merit. To the extent the claim alleges a cause of action for medical malpractice, however, movant failed to establish the potential merit of his claim because he provided no medical evidence from which a potential departure from accepted medical practice might be discerned (see Matter of Robinson v State of New York, 35 AD3d 948 [3d Dept 2006]).
Turning to movant's proposed cause of action for assault and battery, it is well settled that the State is not immune from liability for assault and battery which results when an officer uses more force than is necessary to perform his or her duty (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]; Jones v State of New York, 33 NY2d 275 [1973]; Barnes v State of New York, 89 AD3d 1382 [4th Dept 2011], lv dismissed 19 NY3d 949 [2012]). Correction Law § 137 (5) prohibits the use of force "unless in self defense, or to suppress a revolt or insurrection." It also permits officers and employees to use "all suitable means . . . to maintain order" when an inmate or group of inmates "resist or disobey any lawful direction". When force is required, "only such degree of force as is reasonably required shall be used" (7 NYCRR § 251-1.2 [b]; see also Bush v State of New York, 57 AD3d 1066 [3d Dept 2008]; Koeiman v City of New York, 36 AD3d 451 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 814 [2007]; Lewis v State of New York, 223 AD2d 800 [3d Dept 1996]; Hinton v City of New York, 13 AD2d 475 [1st Dept 1961]). Movant's allegations that he was savagely beaten by correction officers during the course of extracting him from his cell and while en route to the medical department are not patently devoid of merit.
Turning to movant's proposed wrongful confinment cause of action, the law is settled that conduct of correction employees taken in furtherance of authorized disciplinary measures is quasi-judicial in nature and entitled to absolute immunity (Arteaga,72 NY2d 212; Kairis v State of New York, 113 AD3d 942 [3d Dept 2014]; Loret v State of New York, 106 AD3d 1159 [3d Dept 2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 852 [2013]; Mitchell v State of New York, 32 AD3d 594 [3d Dept 2006]). Only when the actions of correction personnel violate a due process safeguard is the protective cloak of immunity lost (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 221). However, "not every violation of the rules and regulations governing the imposition of prison discipline will result in liability on the part of the State; the rule violations merely remove the cloak of absolute immunity and make the State potentially liable, if liability would be imposed under common law tort principles" (Moustakos v State of New York, 133 AD3d 1268 [4th Dept 2015] [inner quotation marks and citation omitted]). To impose liability under common law principles it must be established that the outcome of the hearing would have been different had there been no violation of the applicable rules (id.). Here, movant failed to allege or otherwise establish the particular rule he claims was violated in the conduct of the disciplinary hearing and the sole fact that the disciplinary determination was administratively reversed provides no basis for liability. Accordingly, movant failed to establish the potential merit of his wrongful confinement cause of action.
To the extent movant alleges he was the victim of discrimination, he fails to allege in what respect he was treated differently than others similarly situated and therefore fails to state a cause of action for discrimination in the proposed claim (see generally Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295 [2004]).
Lastly, the Court is unaware of the availability of an alternative remedy. Balancing the applicable factors, including the potential merit of the claim, the Court finds that late claim relief is appropriate with respect to movant's proposed causes of action for medical negligence and assault and battery. Movant failed to demonstrate the potential merit of his causes of action for medical malpractice, wrongful confinement and discrimination. Inasmuch as it would be a futile exercise to permit litigation of these causes of action, late claim relief is denied with respect thereto.
Based on the foregoing, movant's application for leave to file and serve a late claim is granted in accordance with the foregoing, and the movant is directed to file and serve his verified claim in accordance with Court of Claims Act §§ 11 and 11-a within 45 days of the date this Decision and Order is filed.
March 9, 2016
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims The Court considered the following papers:
1. Notice of motion dated November 2, 2015;
2. Affidavit of John Ramos sworn to November 2, 2015 with exhibits;
3. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich dated November 20, 2015;
4. Letter dated November 23, 2015 from John Ramos;
5. "Reply Affirmation" of John Ramos filed December 15, 2015 with exhibits.