Similarly, in Ramos v. Rodriguez, the appellant argued that “the special verdict form submitted by the judge omitted necessary language which thereby resulted in a jury verdict that was contradictory and inconsistent on its face.” 1994–NMCA–110, ¶ 9, 118 N.M. 534, 882 P.2d 1047. In both cases, these arguments were not addressed on appeal because the appellant failed to raise them before the jury was discharged.
17. A more reasonable approach to reconciliation of the jury's findings is offered by Harrison, 98 N.M. at 251, 647 P.2d at 884 and Ramos v. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. 534, 537, 882 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App. 1994). The core of the estate's and Mrs. Turpie's claims turned on whether the doctors' negligence was the proximate cause of Mr. Turpie's death.
For example, in Ramos v. Rodriguez , the Court of Appeals applied the waiver rule to reject a third-party plaintiff’s argument that an inadequate special verdict form resulted in an inconsistent jury verdict. See 1994-NMCA-110, ¶ 13, 118 N.M. 534, 882 P.2d 1047. The district court read the jury verdict aloud in open court and polled the jurors at the third-party plaintiff’s request to confirm their agreement.
We note, however, that with the exception of Thompson Drilling, Inc. v. Romig, 105 N.M. 701, 703–04, 736 P.2d 979, 981–82 (1987), and G & G Servs., Inc. v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 2000–NMCA–003, ¶¶ 41–42, 128 N.M. 434, 993 P.2d 751, which are silent on whether the district court read the jury's answers aloud, Helena's authorities are distinguishable on the basis that the courts in those cases read the jury's answers to the special interrogatories aloud, thereby indisputably giving the parties notice of and an opportunity to object to any perceived inconsistencies in the verdicts. See Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2009–NMCA–037, ¶ 36, 145 N.M. 797, 205 P.3d 844,rev'd in part on other grounds,2010–NMSC–047, 149 N.M. 74, 244 P.3d 342;Ramos v. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. 534, 536, 882 P.2d 1047, 1049 (Ct.App.1994). These authorities, inapplicable to the peculiar circumstances of this case, are not persuasive.
The verdict was therefore not erroneous, judgment could be entered in favor of the defendant on the verdict, and the defendant had not forfeited its argument by failing to object to the special verdict form before it was submitted to the jury. {28} Our decision in Turpie followed our earlier decision in Ramos v. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. 534, 882 P.2d 1047 (Ct.App. 1994). Ramos stated that "[t]he general rule applied by courts in other jurisdictions . . . is that a finding that there was no proximate cause between the negligence of a defendant and the injuries suffered by a plaintiff, renders any additional jury findings concerning the allocation of the percentage of fault to be mere surplusage."
ead aloud by the judge and the jury polled at Allstate's request, Allstate waived its right to challenge the inconsistency in the verdict by failing to bring the matter to the trial court's attention before the jury was discharged."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds by, 2010-NMSC-047, 149 N.M. 74, 244 P.3d 342; O'Neel, 2002-NMCA-028, ¶¶ 5-6 (holding that USAA waived review of allegedly inconsistent jury verdict because it failed to alert the district court to the alleged inconsistency before the jury was discharged, the court read the special verdict in its entirety, polled the jurors, and after instructing counsel on the preparation of the judgment, asked counsel if there was anything else, "to which counsel for USAA answered in the negative"); G & G Servs., 2000-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 41-42 ("A litigant who fails to object to an alleged inconsistency in a jury's verdict before the jury is dismissed may be held to have waived any further challenge to the alleged inconsistency."); Ramos v. Rodriguez, 1994-NMCA-110, ¶ 13, 118 N.M. 534, 882 P.2d 1047 (holding that the defendant waived his opportunity to challenge a facially inconsistent verdict where he failed to raise the issue before the jury's discharge and rejecting the defendant's argument that he did not have an opportunity to object when the verdict had been read aloud and the jury had been polled). But see Helena Chem. Co. v. Uribe, 2013-NMCA-017, ¶¶ 26-29, 293 P.3d 888 (declining to apply the waiver rule to the party's claim that the verdict was inconsistent because the district court had not read aloud the jury's answers to special interrogatories before the jury was discharged, such that the parties did not have notice and an opportunity to object to the inconstancies in the verdict); Rule 12-321(A) NMRA ("If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party.").
Consequently, RVC cannot now complain of any such deficiencies. See Ramos v. Rodriguez, 1994-NMCA-110, ¶ 12, 118 N.M. 534, 882 P.2d 1047 ("Examination of the record indicates that the [defendant] failed to object to the omission of specific language from the special verdict form prior to submission of the case to the jury, and he cannot now be heard to complain of this omission on appeal."). Moreover, the portions of the record that could enlighten our inquiry here—e.g., discussions, if any, about the jury instructions and verdict form—have not been designated by RVC on appeal.
{36} To the extent that Allstate argues that inherent inconsistencies in the jury verdict require reversal or, at the very least, a new trial, we conclude that, after having the verdict read aloud by the judge and the jury polled at Allstate's request, Allstate waived its right to challenge the inconsistency in the verdict by failing to bring the matter to the trial court's attention before the jury was discharged. See Ramos v. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. 534, 536, 882 P.2d 1047, 1049 (Ct.App. 1994) (holding that the defendant waived his opportunity to challenge a facially inconsistent verdict where he failed to raise the issue before the jury's discharge and rejecting the defendant's argument that he did not have an opportunity to object when the verdict had been read aloud and the jury had been polled); see also G G Servs., Inc. v. Agora Syndicate, Inc., 2000-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 41, 42, 128 N.M. 434, 993 P.2d 751 ("A litigant who fails to object to an alleged inconsistency in a jury's verdict before the jury is dismissed may be held to have waived any further challenge to the alleged inconsistency."); Thompson Drilling Inc., 105 N.M. at 703, 736 P.2d at 981 ("[T]he right to object to an improper verdict is waived when not made at the time of the return of the verdict and cannot be reclaimed and revived by resorting to a motion for a new trial or on appeal."). {37} Finally, because we hold substantial evidence supports Guest's breach of contract claim, we do not address whether subst
{15} This Court has previously held that "a finding that there was no proximate cause between the negligence of a defendant and the injuries suffered by a plaintiff, [sic] renders any additional jury findings concerning the allocation of the percentage of fault to be mere surplusage." Ramos v. Rodriguez, 118 N.M. 534, 537, 882 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App. 1994); see Turpie v. Southwest Cardiology Assocs., 1998-NMCA-042, ¶ 17, 124 N.M. 787, 955 P.2d 716 (indicating that a jury finding of no causation "controls all other aspects of the case"). Accordingly, any such error within the verdict form or pertaining to its execution caused Plaintiffs no prejudice; it was rendered harmless once the jury determined that Chrysler's conduct in regard to the rear door latch was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries.