Opinion
No. 04-15-00450-CR
05-11-2016
Cesario RAMON, Jr., Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 452nd Judicial District Court, Menard County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2012-02190
Honorable Rob Hofmann, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Marialyn Barnard, Justice Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice AFFIRMED
Cesario Ramon, Jr. appeals the trial court's judgment revoking his community supervision. Ramon asserts the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his deferred adjudication community supervision based on a judicial confession he gave in another criminal case which was on appeal at the time of the revocation hearing. Ramon also asserts the judicial confession did not prove the offense alleged in the State's motion to proceed to adjudicate. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
In 2011, Ramon pled guilty to the offense of possession of a controlled substance. The trial court deferred a finding on Ramon's guilt, and Ramon was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision.
In October of 2013, the State filed a motion to proceed to adjudicate alleging Ramon: (1) committed the offense of manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance in violation of the conditions of his community supervision requiring him to abstain from the use or possession of controlled substances and not to commit any new offense; (2) failed to report to his probation officer on various dates; and (3) failed to pay certain fines and fees. At an initial hearing on the State's motion, concerns were raised regarding the State's first allegation because Ramon's conviction for the new offense was pending appeal. In order to allay those concerns, the State filed an amended motion to proceed to adjudicate alleging the same violations except instead of alleging Ramon committed the offense of manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance, the State alleged Ramon made a judicial confession that he committed the offense.
At the subsequent revocation hearing, the judicial confession and the reporter's record from the plea hearing on the new offense were admitted into evidence. In addition, the assistant district attorney who prosecuted the new offense testified regarding Ramon's admissions on the record at the plea hearing. Finally, the probation officer who was initially assigned to supervise Ramon testified his supervision was transferred to another county. Based on the information provided by the probation office in that county, the probation officer waived the reporting violations because Ramon had reported as scheduled. With regard to the fines and fees, however, the probation officer testified as follows:
In the judicial confession, Ramon confesses to intentionally and knowingly possessing a controlled substance in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams.
Q. Was he current on his fines and fees?
A. No. He was not.
Q. What was the arrearage on those?
A. When this was filed in June the 5th of this year, he was delinquent $1,970 on his probation fee; $1,346 on his fine; $68 on his restitution.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court adjudicated Ramon's guilt and sentenced him to two years in a state jail facility. In its judgment, the trial court found Ramon violated the terms and conditions of his community supervision as set out in the State's motion to adjudicate. Ramon appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a revocation proceeding (whether regular probation or deferred adjudication), "the trial court has discretion to revoke community supervision when a preponderance of the evidence supports one of the State's allegations that the defendant violated a condition of his community supervision." Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Dansby v. State, 468 S.W.3d 225, 235-36 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). In the probation-revocation context, a "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition of his probation. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Miles v. State, 343 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. Proof of a violation of one condition of community supervision is sufficient to support the trial court's decision to revoke. Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20, 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
DISCUSSION
The two issues Ramon presents on appeal relate to the allegation in the State's motion that he made a judicial confession regarding a new offense. As previously noted, however, the State also alleged Ramon failed to pay certain fines and fees which he was required to pay as a condition of his community supervision. Although Ramon acknowledges this other violation in his brief, he asserts the probation officer's testimony was insufficient to support the trial court's finding on this allegation because the probation officer: (1) was not the probation officer who supervised him; and (2) did not specify the rate at which Ramon was supposed to pay his fees and fines or how the payments were to be applied.
Each of Ramon's assertions is a challenge to the weight the trial court should give to the probation officer's testimony. As previously noted, at a revocation hearing, the trial judge is the sole judge of the weight to be given to a witness's testimony. Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865. Viewing the probation officer's testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see id, we hold the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Ramon violated a condition of his community supervision by failing to pay the required fines and fees. See Turner v. State, No. 05-02-00329-CR, 2002 WL 31151226, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 27, 2002, no pet.) (holding testimony of probation officer that probation department records showed appellant was delinquent in paying costs, fines, and fees sufficient to support revocation even though appellant was supervised by a different probation officer after appellant's probation was transferred to the county where he lived) (not designated for publication); see also King v. State, 156 S.W.3d 669, 671 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding evidence sufficient to support revocation where probation officer testified appellant failed to pay court-ordered fees). Because proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation, we need not reach Ramon's issues regarding the other violation. Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26.
Although we agree the judicial confession regarding the new offense was a primary focus at the revocation hearing, we cannot hold the trial court abused its discretion in revoking Ramon's community supervision where the trial court's judgment recites the trial court found all of the allegations in the State's motion to be true and a preponderance of the evidence supports the allegation that Ramon failed to pay his required fees and fines. See Leonard, 385 S.W.3d at 575-77 (noting abuse of discretion is overall standard of review in revocation proceedings). --------
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice DO NOT PUBLISH