Opinion
676 CAF 18–00732
06-14-2019
In the MATTER OF RAMON F. Monroe County Department of Human Services, Petitioner–Respondent; v. Wilson F., Respondent–Appellant.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANET C. SOMES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–APPELLANT. MICHAEL E. DAVIS, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (ANDREW KLEEHAMMER OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER–RESPONDENT. TANYA J. CONLEY, ROCHESTER, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANET C. SOMES OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–APPELLANT.
MICHAEL E. DAVIS, COUNTY ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (ANDREW KLEEHAMMER OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONER–RESPONDENT.
TANYA J. CONLEY, ROCHESTER, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDERIt is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Respondent father appeals from an order that, inter alia, terminated his parental rights pursuant to Social Services Law § 384–b based on a determination that he had violated the terms of a suspended judgment that had been entered upon a finding of permanent neglect. We affirm.
Contrary to the father's contention, Family Court did not violate his due process rights by admitting in evidence two documents purportedly authored by a non-testifying psychiatrist. Although the father's contention is framed in terms of a violation of his right to confront the witnesses against him, "Family Court matters are civil in nature and the Confrontation Clause applies only to criminal matters" ( Matter of Guillermo v. Agramonte, 137 A.D.3d 1767, 1768, 29 N.Y.S.3d 720 [4th Dept. 2016] ). In addition, while every litigant has a right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions, to confront the witnesses against them (see generally Matter of Cecilia R., 36 N.Y.2d 317, 320, 367 N.Y.S.2d 770, 327 N.E.2d 812 [1975] ; Matter of Ana Maria Q., 52 A.D.2d 607, 607, 382 N.Y.S.2d 107 [2d Dept. 1976] ), "this right is not absolute" in civil actions ( Matter of Raymond Dean L., 109 A.D.2d 87, 88, 490 N.Y.S.2d 75 [4th Dept. 1985] ). The Family Court Act permits the admission of hearsay at dispositional hearings if such evidence is "material and relevant" (§ 624; see Matter of Blake T.L. [Robert L.], 141 A.D.3d 525, 526, 35 N.Y.S.3d 262 [2d Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 906, 45 N.Y.S.3d 374, 68 N.E.3d 103 [2016] ; Matter of Janasia H. [Ebony H.], 71 A.D.3d 1524, 1525, 896 N.Y.S.2d 702 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 701, 905 N.Y.S.2d 803, 931 N.E.2d 1059 [2010] ). Here, because the father did not object to either the relevancy or materiality of the challenged exhibits, we conclude that the exhibits were properly admitted in evidence (see § 624).
In any event, we conclude that any purported error in admitting the challenged exhibits is harmless inasmuch as it does not appear from the court's decision that the court relied on the challenged exhibits in determining that it would be in the best interests of the child to terminate the father's parental rights (see Matter of Chloe W. [Amy W.], 148 A.D.3d 1672, 1673–1674, 49 N.Y.S.3d 595 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 912, 2017 WL 2683455 [2017] ; Guillermo, 137 A.D.3d at 1769, 29 N.Y.S.3d 720 ).