Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2451-13T2
05-17-2016
INDRAWATTIE RAMLAKAN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SAM KAWALL, Defendant-Appellant.
Richard S. Mazawey, attorney for appellant. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Eileen M. Foley, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti, Guadagno, and Vernoia. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FM-12-2413-13. Richard S. Mazawey, attorney for appellant. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman & Stahl, P.C., attorneys for respondent (Eileen M. Foley, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Sam Kawall appeals from the January 9, 2014 final judgment of divorce entered by the Family Part, which determined that his June 30, 1990 marriage to plaintiff Indrawattie Ramlakan was legally binding. Defendant also challenges the judge's order removing him from his trucking company, Flash Carrier, LLC (Flash Carrier), and appointing a receiver. Finally, defendant contends that plaintiff waived any claim that the marriage was binding and any entitlement to support and equitable distribution of the marital assets. Finding no merit to any of these arguments, we affirm.
We glean the following facts from the trial testimony and exhibits admitted therein. Plaintiff testified that she met defendant in Guyana, South America and began dating him in 1984. Defendant admitted to knowing plaintiff around that time, but denied dating her. Plaintiff was sixteen years old and in school, while defendant was twenty and employed as a minibus driver.
Plaintiff came to the United States in 1987 on a student visa and lived with family members in Queens, New York. A few months later, defendant came to the U.S. and lived in Brooklyn. Soon thereafter, they resumed their dating relationship. Defendant claims they began a dating relationship in 1989.
Plaintiff graduated from business school in 1988 and purchased a home in Queens with her brother and sister. Later that year, plaintiff began working at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, doing data entry for a trucking/warehousing company. That same year, defendant moved to North Bergen and began to work as a mechanic for a car dealership.
Plaintiff testified that she and defendant began to discuss marriage in 1989 and began extensive preparations for their wedding. The marriage ceremony was performed in New York on June 30, 1990 by a Hindu priest. Plaintiff introduced a copy of the wedding invitation and photographs of her in a white wedding dress, defendant in a white tuxedo, guests dressed in traditional Hindu wedding garments, and the parties cutting a large wedding cake. Plaintiff described the ceremony in detail and provided a photograph of defendant performing a Hindu ritual of putting a mango leaf into a fire lit by the priest.
Plaintiff explained that they did not obtain a New York marriage license because their visas had expired, they were undocumented, and feared deportation.
After they were married, the parties moved to New Jersey and rented an apartment in North Bergen. In 1992, defendant obtained a permanent resident alien (green) card and opened a bank account at Hudson Savings Bank (HSB). Plaintiff continued to work at Brooklyn Navy Yard and deposited funds into the HSB account. Defendant was laid off in 1992 and remained unemployed for two years. During this time, the parties lived on plaintiff's income, and money from odd jobs that defendant performed.
In 1994, defendant obtained a commercial driver's license and purchased a tractor trailer for $3,500 using funds from the HSB account. Defendant hired a driver and paid him a percentage of the profits from the jobs he scheduled. In 1995, defendant purchased a second truck using the HSB account funds and began to provide interstate trucking services for several companies.
In 1996, the parties purchased a house in Jersey City for $106,000. Plaintiff explained that only defendant's name appeared on the deed, as she was still undocumented, although she claimed the $15,000 down payment came from joint funds.
Plaintiff obtained her green card in 1997 and, later that year, the parties purchased a home in Edison after plaintiff became pregnant. The deed listed both parties' names.
In 1998, their first child was born and defendant started a trucking company, Flash Express, Inc. Plaintiff testified that she participated in running the business, overseeing operations, and recruiting customers. In 2005, after Flash Express closed, the parties started Flash Carrier, and F.E.I. Leasing, LLC. In 2008, the parties purchased business property in Newark and created Sydney Equities, LLC (Sydney Equities). Plaintiff was listed as the registered agent of Sydney Equities, and both parties were listed as members/managers.
In March 2010, the parties' second child was born. Later that year, the parties began to experience marital difficulties and defendant left the marital home. In August 2011, defendant withdrew $60,000 from a Flash Carrier account. Defendant then made additional withdrawals of $20,000, $10,000 and $1,000. Plaintiff testified that when she confronted defendant about the withdrawals, he became enraged. On September 28, 2011, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant. On October 11, 2011, plaintiff dismissed her domestic violence complaint, apparently in favor of an "order with civil restraints."
Plaintiff then filed an order to show cause under a non-dissolution or FD docket seeking relief regarding support and custody of the parties' children, and the operation of Flash Carrier. On December 9, 2011, Judge John A. Jorgensen granted plaintiff's motion to appoint a receiver to run the daily operations of the business and restrain and enjoin defendant from dissipating assets of the company.
The non-dissolution docket provides relief to never married parents seeking custody, parenting time, paternity, child support and medical support. It also serves married couples seeking certain relief, such as financial support without dissolution of their union. R.K. v. D.L., 434 N.J. Super. 113, 131 (App. Div. 2014). --------
On January 30, 2012, Judge Jorgensen appointed Kalman Barson as receiver to oversee and manage the operations of Flash Carrier. Plaintiff and defendant were barred from the premises of the business without Barson's permission.
On February 15, 2012, Judge Jorgensen ordered defendant to return $76,500 to Flash Carrier by February 22, 2012, and indicated that a failure to comply would result in the issuance of a bench warrant.
On June 25, 2012, Judge Jorgensen entered an order permitting defendant to return to co-operate Flash Carrier with plaintiff on the condition that defendant obtain $200,000 in financing from the Jersey City property and make the funds available to the business. On September 18, 2012, Kalman Barson was relieved as receiver.
On October 5, 2012, Judge Jorgensen began a plenary hearing to determine the marital status of the parties, distribution of assets, visitation, child support, and counsel fees. Judge Jorgensen heard testimony on seven non-consecutive days and, on May 24, 2013, he read a comprehensive decision into the record concluding that the parties were lawfully married and all assets and debts acquired during the marriage are subject to equitable distribution. Judge Jorgensen ordered defendant to return $178,500 to Flash Carrier and to pay child support to plaintiff.
Following the decision, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on May 30, 2013. In defendant's answer, he continued to deny plaintiff's claim that they were lawfully married.
Judge Jorgensen entered a final order of divorce on January 9, 2014, providing that all business assets were subject to equitable distribution and that plaintiff was owed half of the sums defendant was ordered to return to Flash Carrier. Plaintiff received title to the Edison property subject to her payment of half of the property's equity to defendant. The parties each received one-half interests in the Jersey City property. The parties were ordered to dissolve Sydney Equities, as the Newark property was in foreclosure. The order required the parties to dissolve and divide the assets of each of their companies via equitable distribution.
Plaintiff was awarded $35,000 in counsel fees on February 12, 2014. On April 4, 2014, defendant was ordered to comply with the final order of divorce and sell the Jersey City property. Defendant's motion to stay the final order of divorce was denied.
Defendant now appeals from the January 9, 2014 final order of divorce and first challenges the judge's finding that the parties entered into a legally binding marriage. He maintains that the 1990 ceremony was a ritual that did not constitute a legal marriage under New York law.
"It is a general principle of . . . interstate law, subject to but few exceptions, that the validity of a marriage, so far as it depends upon the preliminaries and the manner or mode of its performance or solemnization, is to be determined by reference to the law of the place where it was performed or solemnized." Sturm v. Sturm, 111 N.J. Eq. 579, 582 (1932). Judge Jorgensen engaged in a thorough review of New York statutory and case law in concluding that this marriage was valid.
The parties' failure to obtain a New York marriage license does not render the marriage void. Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560, 563 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cty. 2001). New York's Domestic Relations Law provides: "Nothing in this article contained shall be construed to render void by reason of a failure to procure a marriage license any marriage solemnized between persons of full age . . . ." N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 25.
Like defendant here, the plaintiff in Persad challenged the validity of the marriage in terms of the parties' intent. Persad, supra, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 564. The plaintiff maintained that "the parties, either expressly or tacitly, entered into an agreement that the religious ceremony would be one of form not substance and that a subsequent civil ceremony would be held." Ibid.
The judge rejected the argument, finding:
In this case, there was a religious marriage that conformed with all the statutory requirements. As a result, the State of New York and this Court have a vested interest in that union. Alternatively stated, New York State became a "third party to the marriage" and "[a]ny private reservations [the parties] may have made in regard to their respective obligations under the marital status are void and of no effect."
[Id. at 565 (citations omitted).]
Judge Jorgensen considered the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits introduced at trial in concluding that the parties participated in a wedding ceremony on June 30, 1990. In reaching this conclusion, he rejected defendant's testimony that the ceremony was merely a "ritual" as not credible.
We will not overturn a trial judge's factual findings "when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence" in the record. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). The factual findings of matrimonial courts are entitled to substantial deference given those courts' "special jurisdiction and expertise" in family matters. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). Our deference to a trial court's credibility findings is enhanced when we are presented with the kind of exceptionally thorough and extensive analysis done by Judge Jorgensen here. The judge thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of all witnesses and culled portions of their testimony to provide a basis for his credibility determinations. In defendant's case, Judge Jorgensen identified several examples, which he described in detail, to support his conclusion that defendant's testimony was "not plausible . . . not believable . . . incredible . . . [and] made little sense."
We are satisfied that the parties participated in a valid marriage ceremony that satisfied the requirements of the New York Domestic Relations Law. A marriage valid under the law of another state will be recognized as valid in New Jersey. Jordan v. Mohan, 15 N.J. Super. 513, 517 (App. Div. 1951).
We find defendant's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION