Ramirez v. Tatum

10 Citing cases

  1. Nasiruddin v. Pliler

    21-CV-7044 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. May. 17, 2024)

    (“[P]laintiff's allegations that the defendants used excessive force against him when they responded to the fire he started in his cell . . . fall outside of Bivens' purview.”); Ramirez v. Tatum, No. 17-CV-7801, 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“The Supreme Court has recognized only three Bivens contexts, none of which include . . . excessive force.”);

  2. Ruiz v. Fed. Police Dep't

    23-CV-7421 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2023)   Cited 2 times

    “Courts have consistently found that excessive force cases arising under either the Fifth or Eighth Amendment to present new Bivens contexts.” Edwards v. Gizzi, No. 20-CV-7371, 2022 WL 309393, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022) (holding that plaintiff's excessive force claim against Deputy U.S. Marshals for breaking his arm in the courtroom amidst sentencing hearing presented a new Bivens context “whether it arises under the Fifth or Eighth Amendment”); see also Rivera v. Samilo, 370 F.Supp.3d 362, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that an excessive force claim stemming from lawful arrest is sufficiently different from Fourth Amendment claim arising from a home search); Ramirez v. Tatum, No. 17-CV-7801, 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (declining to find Bivens remedy where the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, alleged that correctional officers used excessive force when transporting him from the hospital to the jail). Bivens does not authorize suit against a private corporation or its employees - even corporations that perform traditionally governmental functions.

  3. Bettis v. Grijalva

    21 Civ. 7505 (GWG) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 23, 2023)   Cited 9 times

    None of the three Bivens contexts recognized by the Supreme Court “include retaliation,” and “there are special factors that counsel against expanding a new Bivens remedy,” in the availability of relief under the FTCA and the existence of the PLRA. Ramirez v. Tatum, 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018).

  4. Edwards v. Gizzi

    20-CV-7371 (KMK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2022)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that plaintiff's excessive force claim against Deputy U.S. Marshals for breaking his arm in the courtroom amidst sentencing hearing presented a new Bivens context “whether it arises under the Fifth or Eighth Amendment”

    Courts in this district have found that “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized only three Bivens contexts, none of which include . . . excessive force.” Ramirez v. Tatum, No. 17-CV-7801, 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (declining to find Bivens remedy where the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee, alleged that correctional officers used excessive force when transporting him from the hospital to the jail); see also Rivera v. Samilo, 370 F.Supp.3d 362, 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that an excessive force claim stemming from lawful arrest is sufficiently different from Fourth Amendment claim arising from a home search); but see Bueno Diaz v. Mercurio, 442 F.Supp.3d 701, 707-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim pursuant to a lawful arrest does not “expand [the] outer reaches” of Bivens, is a “run-of-the-mill challenge to a standard law enforcement operation, ” and operates within the scope of “substantial ‘judicial guidance” as to the bounds of excessive force). The present case differs from Bueno Diaz, because, as Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiff's claim does no

  5. Wiley v. Fernandez

    9:19-CV-652 (GTS/CFH) (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2021)

    The Western and Southern Districts of New York have similarly determined that “there are also meaningful differences between [the] [plaintiff's allegations of severe physical abuse, and the indifference to medical needs at issue in Carlson.” Akande, 2018 WL 3425009, at *9; Ramirez v. Tatum, No. 17-CV-7801 (LGS), 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (“The Supreme Court has recognized only three Bivens contexts, none of which include retaliation or excessive force.”)

  6. Campbell v. City of Yonkers

    19 CV 2117 (VB) (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 15, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    "Second, if the claim arises in a new context, a court must consider whether there are special factors counseling hesitation in creating a Bivens remedy." Ramirez v. Tatum, 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857). "The question of what special factors counsel hesitation 'must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action [to] proceed.'"

  7. Martinez v. D'Agata

    16 CV 44 (VB) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2019)   Cited 18 times
    Finding a "meaningful difference" between Bivensand case at hand because "the type of officers involved in Bivens were DEA agents, whereas here the officers were appointed members of a federal task force"

    "Second, if the claim arises in a new context, a court must consider whether there are special factors counseling hesitation in creating a Bivens remedy." Ramirez v. Tatum, 2018 WL 6655600, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857), reconsideration denied, 2019 WL 2250339 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2019). "The question of what special factors counsel hesitation 'must concentrate on whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action or proceed.'"

  8. McKiver v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons of N.Y.

    17-CV-9639 (JMF) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2019)   Cited 1 times
    Granting motion to dismiss deliberate indifference claim based on broken finger where "x-ray images were taken, a splint was put on the injured finger, [the plaintiff's] hand was wrapped, and he was prescribed pain medication," and he received surgery approximately one year later after "he was seen multiple times to determine if surgery was appropriate given, among other things, a chronic cardiac condition"

    To state a claim based on the denial of medical care, a federal pretrial detainee — which is what McKiver was at the time of the relevant events — "must plead facts showing that (1) the deprivation of medical care is objectively sufficiently serious in light of a medical condition that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain, and (2) the defendant-official intentionally or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the alleged medical condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety." Ramirez v. Tatum, No. 17-CV-7801 (LGS), 2018 WL 6655600, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted). It is doubtful that McKiver's allegations even meet the first requirement, as there is little to suggest that any of his medical conditions was one "of urgency, one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain."

  9. McGarrell v. Arias

    18 Civ. 2273 (GBD)(HBP) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2019)   Cited 7 times

    Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35; see also Hill, 657 F.3d at 122-23.Ramirez v. Tatum, 17 Civ. 7801 (LGS), 2018 WL 6655600 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) (Schofield, D.J.); accord Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017); Warren v. Ewanciw, 15 Civ. 8423 (JCM), 2019 WL 589488 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2019) (McCarthy, M.J.); Van Hoven v. City of New York, 16 Civ. 2080 (GBD)(DCF), 2018 WL 4417842 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2018) (Daniels, D.J.); Ryan v. Cty. of Nassau, 12-CV-5343 (JS)(SIL), 2018 WL 354684 at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2018). Where a deliberate indifference claim is based on a delay in providing medical care, "the seriousness inquiry is narrower [and] 'focuses on the challenged delay or interruption in treatment rather than the prisoner's underlying medical condition alone.'"

  10. Challenger v. Bassolino

    Civ. No. 18-15240 (KM) (MAH) (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2019)

    As a federal pretrial detainee, his claims would be analyzed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. See Montgomery v. Ray, 145 F. App'x 738, 739-40 (3d Cir. 2005); Ramirez v. Tatum, No. 17-7801, 2018 WL 6655600, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2018) ("The Fifth Amendment protects federal pretrial detainees form deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs.") (citations omitted). For the delay or denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate "(1) that defendants were deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those needs were serious."