Opinion
1:22-cv-01610-ADA-SAB (PC)
03-23-2023
ISRAEL MALDONADO RAMIREZ, Plaintiff, v. J. QUICK, et al., Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION
(ECF Nos. 9, 10)
Plaintiff Israel Maldonado Ramirez is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. Plaintiff's complaint in this action was filed on December 15, 2022. (ECF No. 1.)
On January 19, 2023, the Court screened the complaint, found no cognizable claims, and granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.)
Plaintiff failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the Court's January 19, 2023 order. Therefore, on February 27, 2023, the Court issued an order for Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff has failed to respond to the order to show cause and the time to do so has now passed. Accordingly, dismissal of the action is warranted.
I.
SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and “facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability” falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
II.
SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations in his complaint as true only for the purpose of the screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Jessica R is deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's release as she could have gotten Plaintiff released but refuses to do the right thing. Sergeant Quick also did not want to do the right thing and release Plaintiff. Rather, Quick wants to place Plaintiff on conservatorship on his will.
Corporal Graza never answered Plaintiff's request for his blude print federal corpus.
Registered nurse Eva is a tortfeasor because she does not keep Plaintiff healthy. She provides Plaintiff medication that he does not want to take.
Magistrate Judge Erica Grosjean did not allow his previous case to proceed without a penological interest. Judge Stanley Boone is not regarding his Fourteenth Amendment rights as he has a case of penological interest for which he does not want to do the right thing.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Release from Custody
Section 1983 provides a remedy for the violation of constitutional rights by any person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Section 1983 is not a vehicle for challenging the validity of confinement. See, e.g., Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 533-34 (2011) (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016). Complaints for relief turning on the circumstances of a prisoner's confinement may be brought in a § 1983 action. See Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533-34; Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927.
The exclusive remedy for a prisoner seeking immediate or speedier release from confinement, however, is a writ of habeas corpus. See Skinner, 562 U.S. at 533-34; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (“[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus”). Because a habeas petition is the exclusive method by which a prisoner may seek release from custody, a temporary restraining order or injunction ordering a prisoner's release in a civil rights action is inappropriate. See, e.g., Henson v. Corizon Health, No. CV 19-04396-PHX-MTL (DMF), 2020 WL 2319937, at *1-2 (D. Ariz. May 11, 2020). If Plaintiff wishes to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement, he may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
B. Medical Treatment
The Ninth Circuit has held that the objective, not subjective, deliberate indifference standard applies when evaluating a pretrial detainee's medical care claim. See Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care for pretrial detainees are evaluated under the objective standard set forth in Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016).) The elements of a detainee's medical care claim under the Fourteenth Amendment are: (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused plaintiff's injuries. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124-1125.
The “mere lack of due care” by a defendant does not deprive an individual of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). “Thus, the plaintiff must ‘prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent-something akin to reckless disregard.' ” Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (citations omitted). Hence gross negligence, a difference in medical opinion, malpractice, and misdiagnosis does not establish a constitutional violation. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990); Thompson v. Worch, 6 Fed.Appx. 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2001); Anchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); and DiMarzio v. Jacobs, 162 Fed.Appx. 774, *1 (9th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff makes vague reference to the fact that registered nurse Eva provides him medication that he does not want to take. However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that nurse Eva placed Plaintiff at a substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff's claim is simply too vague to give rise to a cognizable medical claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for relief.
C. Judicial Immunity
Absolute judicial immunity is afforded to judges for acts performed by the judge that relate to the judicial process. In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (Sept. 6, 2002). “This immunity reflects the long-standing ‘general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.' ” Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1871)). This judicial immunity insulates judges from suits brought under section 1983. Olsen, 363 F.3d at 923.
IV.
FAILURE TO OBEY COURT ORDER AND FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
Here, the Court screened Plaintiff's complaint, and on January 19, 2023, an order issued providing Plaintiff with the legal standards that applied to his claims, advising him of the deficiencies that needed to be corrected, and granting him leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. (ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or otherwise respond to the Court's January 19, 2023 order. Therefore, on February 27, 2023, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause within fourteen (14) days why the action should not be dismissed. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff failed to respond to the February 27, 2023 order.
Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply with these Rules or with any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” The Court has the inherent power to control its docket and may, in the exercise of that power, impose sanctions where appropriate, including dismissal of the action. Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000).
A court may dismiss an action based on a party's failure to prosecute an action, failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order to file an amended complaint); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissal for failure to comply with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) (dismissal for lack of prosecution and failure to comply with local rules).
“In determining whether to dismiss an action for lack of prosecution, the district court is required to consider several factors: ‘(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.' ” Carey, 856 F.2d at 1440 (quoting Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423). These factors guide a court in deciding what to do, and are not conditions that must be met in order for a court to take action. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
In this instance, the public's interest in expeditious resolution of the litigation and the Court's need to manage its docket weigh in favor of dismissal. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint within thirty days of January 19, 2023 and has not done so. Accordingly, the operative pleading is the December 15, 2022 complaint which has been found not to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff's failure to comply with the order of the Court by filing an amended complaint hinders the Court's ability to move this action towards disposition. This action can proceed no further without Plaintiff's compliance with the order and his failure to comply indicates that Plaintiff does not intend to diligently litigate this action.
Since it appears that Plaintiff does not intend to litigate this action diligently there arises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendants in this action. In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994). The risk of prejudice to the defendants also weighs in favor of dismissal.
The public policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits is greatly outweighed by the factors in favor of dismissal. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to move this action forward. In order for this action to proceed, Plaintiff is required to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies in the operative pleading. Despite being ordered to do so, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint or respond to the order to show cause and this action cannot simply remain idle on the Court's docket, unprosecuted. In this instance, the fourth factor does not outweigh Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's orders.
Finally, a court's warning to a party that their failure to obey the court's order will result in dismissal satisfies the “consideration of alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court's January 19, 2023 order requiring Plaintiff to file an amended complaint expressly stated: “If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will recommend to a district judge that this action be dismissed consistent with the reasons stated in this order.” (ECF No. 9.) In addition, the Court's February 27, 2023, order to show cause specifically stated: “Plaintiff's failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation to dismiss the action for the reasons stated above.” (ECF No. 10.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal would result from his noncompliance with the Court's order.
V.
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
The Court has screened Plaintiff's complaint and found that it fails to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff has failed to comply with the Court's order to file an amended complaint or respond to the Court's order to show why the action should not be dismissed. In considering the factors to determine if this action should be dismissed, the Court finds that this action should be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to state a cognizable claim, failure to obey the January 19, 2023 and February 27, 2023 orders, and failure to prosecute this action.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to state a claim, failure to comply with a court order, and failure to prosecute.
This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 304. Within fourteen (14) days of service of this Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections to this findings and recommendation with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation.” The district judge will review the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.