Opinion
42184-4-II
01-16-2013
In re the Marriage of: JAMES P. RAMEY, Respondent, v. GLORIA L. RAMEY, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Penoyar, J.
James Ramey filed for dissolution of his marriage. Before the final dissolution decree was entered, his wife, Gloria Ramey, died. The trial court denied her estate's representative's motion to enter the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc and abated the proceedings. Her representative appeals, arguing that the trial court erred because it had authority to enter the decree nunc pro tunc under both RCW 26.09.290 and the common law. Because this factual pattern is outside the scope of RCW 26.09.290 and entry of the decree is not necessary to correct a clerical error or effectuate an important public policy, we affirm.
FACTS
Gloria and James Ramey were married in 1969 and separated on January 10, 1998, when Gloria moved to California. James filed for dissolution on February 15, 2008. Gloria executed a will on August 26, 2009, leaving the majority of her property to her two daughters. The dissolution hearing took place on April 20, 2010. The trial court issued a written opinion on May 5, 2010, declaring the marriage defunct since 1998 and distributing $600,000 to Gloria. The trial court scheduled entry of the final decree for June 18, 2010. Due to the judge's personal conflict, the hearing was rescheduled for July 9, 2010. Gloria died on June 28, 2010, before the trial court entered the final decree.
For clarity, this prehearing refers to the Rameys by their first names. No disrespect is intended.
A $600,000 check in satisfaction of James's obligation was deposited in Gloria's account the morning she died. James's counsel placed a stop payment order on the check after learning of Gloria's death.
James moved to strike the upcoming hearing, arguing that the dissolution action abated upon Gloria's death. Gloria's representative moved to enter the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc. The trial court entered the order denying the motion to enter the decree nunc pro tunc and granting the motion to abate the dissolution on April 26, 2011, stating that the public policy requirement set forth in Pratt was not satisfied in this case. Gloria's representative appeals.
In re Marriage of Pratt, 99 Wn.2d 905, 665 P.2d 400 (1983).
ANALYSIS
I. Entry of Dissolution Decree Nunc Pro Tunc
Gloria's representative argues that the trial court erred by denying the motion for entry of the final dissolution decree nunc pro tunc and granting the motion to abate the dissolution. He argues that the trial court had statutory and common law authority to enter the decree nunc pro tunc. Because this fact pattern is outside the scope of RCW 26.09.290 and entry of the decree is not necessary to correct a clerical error or effectuate an important public policy, we disagree.
A. Statutory Authority
Gloria's representative argues that the trial court had authority under RCW 26.09.290 to enter the decree nunc pro tunc because the final judgment was delayed by inadvertence. Because the delay in entering the judgment was not due to oversight or lack of care or attention, we disagree.
We review a question of statutory interpretation de novo. Estate of Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice Arena, Inc., 166 Wn.2d 489, 497, 210 P.3d 308 (2009). If the meaning of a statute is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain meaning. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We discern plain meaning from the ordinary meaning of the language, the context of the statute, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Manary v. Anderson, 164 Wn.App. 569, 574, 265 P.3d 163 (2011), review granted, 173 Wn.2d 1023 (2012). When a statutory term is undefined, it is given its ordinary meaning, which may be discerned from the dictionary. Haselwood, 166 Wn.2d at 498.
Generally, a dissolution proceeding abates upon the death of one of the spouses. Osborne v. Osborne, 60 Wn.2d 163, 165-66, 372 P.2d 538 (1962). However, a court has authority under RCW 26.09.290 to enter a final dissolution decree nunc pro tunc in certain circumstances. This authority is limited to situations where the final judgment was not entered due to mistake, negligence, or inadvertence, and then only when necessary to validate a subsequent marriage. RCW 26.09.290; Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 909.
RCW 26.09.290 states:
Whenever either of the parties in an action for dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership is, under the law, entitled to a final judgment, but by mistake, negligence, or inadvertence the same has not been signed, filed, or entered, if no appeal has been taken from the interlocutory order or motion for a new trial made, the court, on the motion of either party thereto or upon its own motion, may cause a final judgment to be signed, dated, filed, and entered therein granting the dissolution as of the date when the same could have been given or made by the court if applied for. The court may cause such final judgment to be signed, dated, filed, and entered nunc pro tunc as aforesaid, even though a final judgment may have been previously entered where by mistake, negligence or inadvertence the same has not been signed, filed, or entered as soon as such final judgment, the parties to such action shall be deemed to have been restored to the status of single persons as of the date affixed to such judgment, and any marriage or any domestic partnership of either of such parties subsequent to six months after the granting of the interlocutory order as shown by the minutes of the court, and after the final judgment could have been entered under the law if applied for, shall be valid for all purposes as of the date affixed to such final judgment, upon the filing thereof.
The dictionary definition of inadvertence is "lack of care or attentiveness" or "an oversight, mistake, or fault from negligence." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1139-40 (2002). Here, the delay in entering the judgment was due to a judge's personal emergency and not oversight or lack of care or attention. There was no inadvertence. Even if the delay could be characterized as inadvertence, neither party remarried, so there is no subsequent marriage to validate. This fact pattern is outside the scope of RCW 26.09.290.
B. Common Law Authority
Next, Gloria's representative argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to enter the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc because it had common law authority to do so under Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 284 P. 343 (1930). Because entry of the decree is not necessary to correct a clerical error or effectuate an important public policy, his argument fails.
We review a trial court's exercise of its inherent authority to enter a decree nunc pro tunc to determine if it exercised its discretion in a manner that was manifestly unreasonable, or exercised it on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971). A trial court acts in a manner that is manifestly unreasonable if its actions are outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable legal standard; its actions are based on untenable grounds if the record does not support its factual findings; and its actions are based on untenable reasons if they are based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 136 (1997). The purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc decree is to "record judicial action taken, and not to remedy inaction." Bruce v. Bruce, 48 Wn.2d 635, 636, 296 P.2d 310 (1956). "'If the court has not rendered a judgment that it might or should have rendered, or if it has rendered an imperfect or improper judgment, it has no power to remedy these errors or omissions by ordering the entry nunc pro tunc of a proper judgment.'" Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 911 (quoting State v. Ryan, 146 Wash. 114, 117, 261 P. 775 (1927)).
A court has inherent common law authority to enter a decree nunc pro tunc when a party dies before entry of the final judgment. Garrett, 155 Wash. at 357. But a court can only enter a decree nunc pro tunc if (1) the case is ripe for judgment at the time of the party's death, (2) the party applying for judgment did not cause the delay in entering the judgment, and (3) the judgment does not injuriously affect the rights of innocent third parties. Garrett, 155 Wash. at 357. In the dissolution context, the decree may be entered only where it is necessary to effectuate an important public policy or to correct a clerical or ministerial error. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 909.
In Pratt, the Supreme Court denied entry of a final dissolution decree nunc pro tunc under RCW 26.09.290 and the common law where a party to the dissolution died before the trial court entered a final judgment. 99 Wn.2d at 909, 911. The Pratts married in November 1978 and separated four months later. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 906. The husband filed for dissolution in April 1979. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 906. After a brief trial, the court issued an oral decision dissolving the marriage and distributing the property. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 907. The trial court delayed entry of the decree by request of the wife's attorney until the husband paid attorney fees. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 907. Before the trial court entered the final decree, the husband died intestate. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 907. His attorney filed a motion to enter the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc, which the trial court granted. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 907.
In reversing, the Supreme Court stated that a nunc pro tunc decree can be entered in a dissolution setting only where necessary to correct a clerical error or to effectuate an important public policy. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 909. The court held that the decree did not merely correct a clerical error, it attempted to make the record reflect what might have happened if both parties had lived. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 911. The trial court could not enter a decree nunc pro tunc based on a clerical error in the absence of a final judgment. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 910-11. The court further held that the inheritance rights of the husband's children were not a sufficient public policy reason to enter the decree nunc pro tunc. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 911. The court indicated that avoiding bigamy or legitimizing children would be important public policies necessitating entry of the decree, but neither situation was at issue. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 909, 911.
The husband died intestate. Since he died before the dissolution was final, his wife of only four months received half of his separate property as his surviving spouse. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 908 n.2. If the decree had been entered nunc pro tunc, the husband's children would have received his entire estate. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 908 n.2.
Here, the trial court properly refused to enter the final dissolution decree. Although the three Garrett elements are met, there is no clerical error or important public policy that necessitates entry of the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc. The decree would not have corrected a clerical error, it would have reflected what might have happened if Gloria had lived. Further, there is no public policy served by entering the decree nunc pro tunc. In Pratt, the inheritance rights of the husband's children were adversely affected by the court's refusal to allow entry of the dissolution decree nunc pro tunc. However, the Pratt court held that the equitable concerns favoring the children were not sufficient to meet the public policy requirement for entry of a dissolution decree nunc pro tunc. Similarly, the inheritance rights of Gloria's children will be affected by the trial court's refusal to enter the decree nunc pro tunc. If the children's rights in Pratt were not sufficient, the inheritance rights of Gloria's children are not sufficient to meet the public policy requirement. The trial court properly denied the motion to enter the decree nunc pro tunc.
Although the trial court has discretion to enter a decree nunc pro tunc, the decision to follow applicable case law is not discretionary. Thus, while we review the trial court's entry of a nunc pro tunc decree to determine if it exercised its discretion in a manner that was manifestly unreasonable, or based on untenable grounds or reasons, the application of the Pratt court's public policy requirement to this case is a question of law we review de novo. Wash. State Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Gregoire, 162 Wn.2d 284, 300, 174 P.3d 1142 (2007) (stating that we review questions of law de novo). Because this case falls within the scope of Pratt, the trial court was required to apply Pratt to the facts of this case.
Gloria's representative argues that the public policy requirement in Pratt should be read as dicta. Because the Pratt court based its holding on both the fact that there was no clerical error and the lack of an important policy reason requiring entry of the decree nunc pro tunc, his argument is not convincing. 99 Wn.2d at 911.
Statements that do not relate to an issue before the court and are unnecessary to decide the case constitute dicta. Pierson v. Hernandez, 149 Wn.App. 297, 305, 202 P.3d 1014 (2009) (quoting DCR, Inc. v. Pierce County, 92 Wn.App. 660, 683 n.16, 964 P.2d 380 (1998)). The Pratt court made several statements indicating that it considered public policy in deciding the case. In discussing when a nunc pro tunc decree can be entered in a dissolution setting, the court stated that "[i]n a dissolution setting, however, that discretion [to enter a decree nunc pro tunc] may be exercised only where it is necessary to effectuate an important public policy (i.e., avoidance of bigamy or bastardy) or where necessary to correct a clerical or ministerial error." Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 909. The court went on to say that "[r]egardless of the apparent equities which favor the respondents, there was no second marriage involved and, therefore, no public policy served by entering the decree nunc pro tunc." Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 911. The court concluded by stating that "[a] court's limited power to enter a decree nunc pro tunc in a dissolution setting cannot be exercised in the absence of a ministerial or clerical error or an important public purpose for so doing." Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 911. The public policy requirement is not dicta, and, while it may be difficult to determine how the court formulated its public policy limitation, we are nonetheless bound by it. State v. Hunley, 161 Wn.App. 919, 932, 253 P.3d 448 (2011), affirmed, ____ Wn.2d ____, 287 P.3d 584 (2012) (stating that Supreme Court precedent is binding on this court).
Gloria's representative also argues that Pratt can be read as a case that failed to meet two of the Garrett prongs; however, the court there specifically states that "the Garrett requirements have been met herein." 99 Wn.2d at 909.
Gloria's representative further argues that this fact pattern can be distinguished from the facts in Pratt. While he is correct that there are some factual distinctions, they do not further his argument.
First, although the two courts reached different stages of the proceeding, neither court entered a final judgment. The trial court in Pratt issued an oral decision, while the trial court here issued a written opinion. 99 Wn.2d at 907. However, as discussed above, the trial court cannot enter a decree nunc pro tunc to correct a clerical error unless it has rendered a final judgment, and a judgment is not final until it is signed and entered by the trial court. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 910-11.
Second, although different parties caused the delay in each case—the wife's attorney caused the delay in Pratt and the court caused the delay here—in neither case was the delay caused by the party seeking entry of the decree nunc pro tunc. 99 Wn.2d at 907; see Garrett, 155 Wash. at 357 (stating that the delay in entering judgment must not have been caused by the party seeking the decree nunc pro tunc).
Third, although the husband in Pratt died intestate and Gloria died with a will, this cuts against the appellant's argument. 99 Wn.2d at 907. The equitable concerns facing the Pratt court were much more compelling: the court's failure to allow entry of the decree nunc pro tunc meant that the wife of only four months received half of the husband's separate property, when, otherwise, the husband's children would have received his entire estate. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 908 n.2. Nevertheless, the Pratt court held that this was not an important public policy necessitating entry of the decree nunc pro tunc. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 911.
Finally, although the chance of reconciliation was less likely under these facts than under the facts in Pratt—the Pratts had been separated for only a few months before the dissolution proceeding and the Rameys had been separated for a decade—potential reconciliation by the parties is only one reason why the court cannot enter a decree nunc pro tunc if a final judgment has not been entered. 99 Wn.2d at 906. As the Pratt court noted, the terms of the property distribution could be altered or the trial court could decide not to grant the decree. 99 Wn.2d at 910.
II. Attorney Fees
Gloria's representative argues that her estate is entitled to attorney fees under RCW 26.09.140 and RAP 18.1. James argues that he is entitled to attorney fees for having to defend a frivolous appeal.
We have discretion to order a party to pay for the cost of maintaining the appeal and attorney fees in addition to statutory costs. RCW 26.09.140. The prevailing party standard does not apply. In re Marriage of Wilson, 117 Wn.App. 40, 51, 68 P.3d 1121 (2003). When awarding attorney fees, we examine the arguable merit of the issues and the financial resources of the parties. In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 772, 779, 791 P.2d 519 (1990). Here, although the issues have arguable merit, the parties failed to file financial affidavits as required by RAP 18.1(c). Therefore, we cannot evaluate the financial resources of the parties, and we deny the award of attorney fees. In re Marriage of Johnson, 107 Wn.App. 500, 505, 27 P.3d 654 (2001) (failure to file the financial affidavit will result in a denial of attorney fees).
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
I concur: Johanson, A.C.J.
Quinn-Brintnall, J. (concurring in result)
Because the standard of review allows us to reverse a trial court's decision only for an abuse of discretion, I cannot hold in this case that the trial court's belief that Pratt v. Pratt, 99 Wn.2d 905, 665 P.2d 400 (1983), required this result was manifestly unreasonable. Accordingly, I am compelled to concur in the result. I do so with great hesitation for two reasons: the first factual, the second legal.
Factually, the record shows that James Ramey tendered a check for the amount the trial court awarded in its written order on decree. The check was deposited in Gloria Ramey's bank account before her death. After the check was deposited, James learned of Gloria's death and stopped payment on the check. In light of these events, it is clear that the parties believed the matter resolved although the trial court had yet to enter final orders. Accordingly, the Pratt rationale that the parties could "reconcile" or that the property distribution could be altered is inapposite. 99 Wn.2d at 910.
The first names of the parties are used for clarity and mean no disrespect.
I note, as well, that the trial court's decision in this case was reduced to writing in the form of a memorandum opinion. Although not a final order, I believe such a writing evinces greater finality than the oral ruling at issue in Pratt.
Legally, I question the weight and scope of the Pratt decision. In expanding the requirements for when a nunc pro tunc order is warranted in circumstances where a party to a divorce has died, the Pratt court gave two seemingly nonexclusive examples (the "avoidance of bigamy or bastardy") of public policy interests the high court would recognize. 99 Wn.2d at 909. Because Pratt did not involve either circumstance, however, this "public policy" rationale in the Pratt decision is akin to an advisory opinion and to that extent appears to run afoul of provisions in our state's constitution and longstanding jurisprudence prohibiting the issuing of such opinions.
Moreover, I agree with Justice Dolliver's dissent in which he wrote that it is "a desirable public policy to prevent the fortuitous receipt of a windfall by one who had no expectation or moral claim to the inheritance." Pratt, 99 Wn.2d at 912 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). And, most importantly, I believe justice dictates that a party (or that party's beneficiaries) should not be prejudiced for, as here, accommodating a trial judge's scheduling conflicts.
Washington courts have long recognized their inherent power to enter orders nunc pro tunc. In 1861, for instance, the Supreme Court of the Washington Territory announced that courts could enter nunc pro tunc judgments "to answer the purposes of justice, but never to do injustice." Hays v. Miller, 1 Wash. Terr. 143, 149 (1861). And, in 1930, our Supreme Court developed what have been referred to as the "Garrett factors" for determining when nunc pro tunc judgments following the death of a party are appropriate:
[T]he courts of this state have power to enter a judgment, operative nunc pro tunc. . . . The courts recognizing and applying the principle have somewhat narrowed its limitations. One of such limitations, and perhaps the most common one, is that the cause at the time of such death must be ripe for judgment. Another is that the delay in entering judgment must not have been caused by the party applying for the judgment, and still another, finding sanction in our decisions, is that the judgment must not injuriously affect the subsequently acquired rights of innocent third persons.Garrett v. Byerly, 155 Wash. 351, 357, 284 P. 343 (1930), overruled in part on other grounds by Martin v. Hadenfeldt, 157 Wash. 563, 289 P. 533 (1930). Importantly, beyond these three factors, the Garrett court also discussed how "delays caused by the court will not defeat the right to a judgment nunc pro tunc, as where the court takes a motion under advisement and a party dies pending a decision." 155 Wash. at 357-58. The Garrett court quoted an 1880 opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 26 L.Ed. 369 (1880), at length in support of this proposition. 155 Wash. At 359.
In Mitchell, the Court explained,
The adjudged cases are very numerous in which have been considered the circumstances under which courts may properly enter a judgment or a decree as of a date anterior to that on which it was in fact rendered. It is unnecessary to present an analysis of them, some of which are cited in a note to this opinion. We content ourselves with saying that the rule established by the general concurrence of the American and English courts is, that where the delay in rendering a judgment or a decree arises from the act of the court, that is, where the delay has been caused either for its convenience, or by the multiplicity or press of business, either the intricacy of the questions involved, or of any other cause not attributable to the laches of the parties, the judgment or the decree may be entered retrospectively, as of a time when it should or might have been entered up. In such cases, upon the maxim actus [curiae] neminem gravabit, -- which has been well said to be founded in right and good sense, and to afford a safe and certain guide for the administration of justice, -- it is the duty of the court to see that the parties shall not suffer by the delay. A nunc pro tunc order should be granted or refused, as justice may require in view of the circumstances of the particular case. These principles control the present case. Stutzman was alive when it was argued and submitted. He was entitled at that time, or at the term of submission, to claim its final disposition. A decree was not then entered because the case, after argument, was taken under advisement. The delay was altogether the act of the court. Its duty was to order a decree nunc pro tunc, so as to avoid entering an erroneous decree.Mitchell, 103 U.S. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
"An act of the court will prejudice no one." Black's Law Dictionary 1816 (9th ed. 2009).
For more than 50 years following the Garrett decision, Washington courts adhered to the principle that an order nunc pro tunc is appropriately entered when the trial court has caused the delay in final judgment. See, e.g., In re Tabery, 14 Wn.App. 271, 276, 540 P.2d 474 (1975).However, in its 1983 Pratt decision (in apparent abrogation of precedent and the common law), our Supreme Court has been understood to have severely limited the circumstances under which nunc pro tunc orders issue.
The Tabery decision quotes H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations 384 (1968), for the proposition that, if fully adjudicated, it is appropriate to enter a divorce decree nunc pro tunc: "One final rule governing parties to divorce suits says that the death of a party at any time before the entry of the final decree abates the action automatically. This result occurs even though the death follows an interlocutory decree of divorce. It does not, however, where the case was fully adjudicated so that a final decree should have been entered before the death of a party but the decree was not in fact entered for some reason. In this unusual situation a divorce decree nunc pro tunc may be entered." 14 Wn.App. at 276.
The Pratt decision involved a divorce proceeding where one party died after an oral ruling of the trial court granting the divorce but before the entry of final judgment. 99 Wn.2d at 907. In overturning the trial court's decision to grant the divorce decree nunc pro tunc, the Pratt court held that in a dissolution setting, a nunc pro tunc decree may be entered "only where it is necessary to effectuate an important public policy (i.e., avoidance of bigamy or bastardy) or where necessary to correct a clerical or ministerial error." 99 Wn.2d at 909. In support of this proposition, the Pratt court cited to three cases: State ex rel. Tufton v. Superior Court, 46 Wash. 395, 90 P. 258 (1907); State v. Ryan, 146 Wash. 114, 261 P. 775 (1927); Barros v. Barros, 26 Wn.App. 363, 365-66, 613 P.2d 547 (1980). 99 Wn.2d at 909-10. But none of these cases mention the need to effectuate an important public policy or discuss a situation, like that in Mitchell, where the trial court created the delay of final entry. Nevertheless, having created this new policy requirement, the Pratt court concluded, in essence, that "the legitimate expectation[s] of those who clearly have an expectation and moral right -- the children of the decedent" do not warrant public policy consideration. 99 Wn.2d at 912 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
Here, the trial court explicitly declined to enter the Ramey divorce decree nunc pro tunc believing the Pratt decision limited its authority to enter such a decree by expressly deciding that recognizing beneficiaries' rights is not an important public policy. Because the trial court cannot be faulted for this reading of the Pratt decision, I am compelled to concur in the result. Although I agree with the Pratt dissent's view that respecting the potential property interests of heirs is an important public policy consideration which may warrant entry of a divorce decree nunc pro tunc, Pratt holds that it is not. In my opinion reasonable minds could think otherwise.
In addition, I note that a number of other jurisdictions addressing this issue have concluded that it is appropriate to relate a final divorce decree nunc pro tunc where, as here, "the facts justifying the entry of a decree were adjudicated during the lifetime of the parties to a divorce action." Thrash v. Thrash, 385 So.2d 961, 962-63 (Miss. 1980). See also Koester v. Koester, 101 Nev. 68, 693 P.2d 569 (1985); Berkenfield v. Jacobs, 83 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1955); Caprita v. Caprita, 145 Ohio St. 5, 60 N.E.2d 483 (1945).
Over 130 years after being decided, the Mitchell decision is still good law and the Pratt decision did not explicitly overrule the principle that when the trial court has caused the delay in final judgment, a nunc pro tunc order is appropriate. See Broom v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 169 Wn.2d 231, 238, 236 P.3d 182 (2010) (the Washington Supreme Court "disapprove[s] of overruling binding precedent sub silentio"). Unlike the public policy interests at stake in Pratt, I believe that where delay in entry of final judgment occurs because the parties are accommodating a judge's scheduling conflict, public policy and the interests of justice dictate that neither party should gain an undeserved benefit or suffer undue hardship as a consequence of that accommodation.
I acknowledge that the Mitchell decision is not binding on this court as it does not touch upon constitutionally guaranteed rights. But I am persuaded by the fact that for nearly a century and a half, Mitchell has instructed federal courts on how best to address situations like the one presented here.
Whether the Pratt decision intended to eviscerate this important consideration from the scope of when a nunc pro tunc order is appropriate is not entirely clear to me. Because Pratt did not directly hold otherwise, I believe the portion of the Garrett decision which allows for entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc in cases where a party dies after the cause is ripe for judgment but judgment is delayed due to an accommodation of the trial court's schedule is still good law. Were I making the decision in the first instance, I would so hold. But the applicable standard of review does not allow me to substitute my judgment for that of the trial court. As an error-correcting court, we may reverse a decision declining to enter an order nunc pro tunc only when the trial court's decision is manifestly unreasonable. In light of the overbroad language in Pratt, I cannot make such a determination here. Accordingly, I am compelled to concur in the result and affirm.