Opinion
Civil Action 21-424
12-10-2021
ERIC X. RAMBERT Plaintiff, v. TRACY SHAWLEY WILLIAM NICHOLSON MARK HAMMER Defendants.
STICKMAN DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ECF Nos. 21 & 23
LISA PUPO LENIHAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Tracy Shawley and William Nicholson (ECF No. 21) be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is also recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant Mark Hammer (ECF No. 23) be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff Rambert (“Plaintiff” or “Rambert”) commenced this action against Defendants Mark Hammer (physician's assistant at SCI-Greene) (“Hammer”), William Nicholson (healthcare administrator at SCI-Greene) (“Nicholson”), and Tracy Shawley (grievance coordinator at SCI-Greene) (“Shawley”), alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, that Defendant Shawley denied his grievances for retaliatory reasons, and that all three Defendants conspired against him to prevent him from receiving medical care. Amended Complaint, ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 2-4, 21-22.
Plaintiff alleges that he was transferred from SCI-Pine Grove to SCI-Greene on November 4, 2020. Id. ¶ 5. He arrived at SCI-Greene with an unresolved cervical spine injury, which was originally diagnosed by a licensed professional neurosurgeon as needing an operation or strong pain medications. Id. ¶¶ 6, 18. He further alleges that this injury has caused him paralysis in his arms, hands, and legs. Id. ¶ 18. A physician's assistant at SCI-Pine Grove ordered him a back brace and cervical spine collar; Plaintiff alleges he received the back brace but not the cervical spine collar. Id. ¶¶ 6, 18.
On November 12, 2020, a week after arriving at SCI-Greene, Plaintiff filed a sick call request concerning the cervical spine collar that was ordered at SCI-Pine Grove. Id. ¶ 7. Defendant Hammer evaluated him that same day. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Hammer asked him to sign medical release forms for Plaintiff's medical records from external medical providers, acknowledged that Plaintiff “has a crooked cervical out of place, ” and that there was no order for a cervical spine collar. Id. Defendant Hammer prescribed Plaintiff Mobic to manage his pain, although Plaintiff alleges that his doctor at SCI-Pine Grove discontinued Mobic. Id. ¶ 8.
Rambert further avers that Defendant Hammer charged him a $10 copay on January 4, 2021 for the November 12, 2020 visit. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. That same day, Plaintiff sent Defendant Hammer a sick call request in an attempt to resolve questions he had regarding the copay. That is, Plaintiff alleges that Hammer knew he should not have been charged a copay because he fell under an exception provided for in DC-ADM-820- “medical service provided as a result of an injury or illness from an inmate's facility work assignment.” Id. ¶¶ 9-11.
Relatedly, Rambert alleges that on January 12, 2021, Defendant Nicholson denied the sick call request, stating, “you can't keep getting free care for 18 years.” Id. ¶ 11. That same day, Plaintiff filed Grievance No. 909519 to Defendant Shawley to contest the charge. Id. ¶ 12. On January 25, 2021, Defendant Shawley denied the grievance because it “was not signed and/or dated with correct commitment name, number, contained UCC references, or was not presented in proper format.” Id. ¶ 13.
Plaintiff alleges that he believes Shawley rejected the grievance because he inserted the middle initial “X” to his commitment name (ECF No. 18 ¶ 14), but the Rejection Form does not indicate this reason as the basis for the rejection of the grievance. See Rejection Form, ECF No. 21-3 at 1.
Plaintiff concludes that all three Defendants were aware of his long-standing medical issues and that they conspired to stop Plaintiff's free care. He further alleges as a result of Defendant Shawley's rejection of his grievance, his access to the grievance process was impeded and he had “no available remedies thr[ough] the grievance process.” Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff sets forth several examples of grievances that were “obstructed” and “corrupted” from processing for retaliatory purposes only. Id. ¶ 16.
Finally, Plaintiff states that all three defendants were deliberately indifferent to his longstanding medical needs stemming from a work-related injury and that they wanted to stop his access to free medical care. Id. ¶ 17.
B. LEGAL STANDARDS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
Under the “notice pleading” standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a “plausible” claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Although “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Covington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir. 2013).Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014).
In addition to the complaint, courts may consider matters of public record and other matters of which a court may take judicial notice, court orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint when adjudicating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 5A Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, § 1357; Chester Cty. Intermediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990)). A court may also consider indisputably authentic documents. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Golden v. Cook, 293 F.Supp.2d 546, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“[C]ourts are permitted to consider matters of which they may take judicial notice, including records and reports of administrative bodies, and publicly available records and transcripts from judicial proceedings ‘in related or underlying cases which have a direct relation to the matters at issue.'”) (citations omitted).
When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.”). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
Summary judgment is appropriate if, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the pleadings, documents, electronically stored information, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with any affidavits or declarations, show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (a) & (c). Summary judgment may be granted against a party who fails to adduce facts sufficient to establish the existence of any element essential to that party's case, and for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact; that is, the movant must show that the evidence of record is insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof. Id. Once that burden has been met, the non-moving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” or the factual record will be taken as presented by the moving party and judgment will be entered as a matter of law. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added by Matsushita Court). An issue is genuine only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty-Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In Anderson, the United States Supreme Court noted the following:
[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial....[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.Id. at 249-50 (internal citations omitted).
C. ANALYSIS
Exhaustion
Through the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to prohibit prisoners from bringing an action with respect to prison conditions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law, until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. Specifically, the act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required under this provision regardless of the type of relief sought and the type of relief available through administrative procedures. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In addition, the exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence, including those that involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Federal courts are barred from hearing a claim if a plaintiff has failed to exhaust all the available remedies prior to filing the action. See Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir. 2000) (by using language “no action shall be brought, ” Congress has “clearly required exhaustion”).
This broad rule favoring full exhaustion admits of one, narrowly defined exception. If the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate's procedural default on a grievance, the inmate will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (Section 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust such administrative remedies “as are available”). In Rinaldi v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained that “once a defendant has established that the inmate failed to resort to administrative remedies, “the onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him.” 904 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir. 2018). The appellate court held that to defeat a failure-to-exhaust defense, “an inmate must show (1) that the threat was sufficiently serious that it would deter a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness and fortitude from lodging a grievance and (2) that the threat actually did deter this particular inmate. Id. at 269.
No analysis of exhaustion may be made absent an understanding of the administrative process available to state inmates. “Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.' The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison's requirement, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007).
Relevant Provisions of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Grievance Procedure
Within DC-ADM 804, the Inmate Grievance System Policy, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections established a three-step Inmate Grievance System to provide inmates with an avenue to seek review of problems that may arise during the course of confinement. Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, after an attempt to resolve any problems informally, an inmate may submit a written grievance to the facility's Grievance Coordinator for initial review. This submission must occur within fifteen days after the events upon which the claims are based. Specifically, relevant portions of DC-ADM 804, § 1 provide as follows:
C. Initial Review
1. The Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee shall assign a grievance tracking number to every grievance (even a rejected grievance) upon receipt and enter every grievance into the Automated Inmate Grievance Tracking System. ...
3. If the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee determines that the grievance is properly submitted according to this procedures manual, the Facility Grievance
Coordinator/designee will designate a staff member to serve as the Grievance Officer tor that grievance. ...
4. If the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee determines that the grievance is not properly submitted according to this procedures manual, it shall be rejected and returned to the inmate with a Grievance Rejection Form (Attachment 1-C) enumerating the reason(s) the grievance was rejected. ...
A. Filing of an Initial Grievance
...
20. If a grievance is rejected, the grievance may be resubmitted, using the same grievance number, within five working days of the rejection notice date. A rejected grievance may only be re-submitted one time.
21. An inmate may appeal the rejected grievance to the Facility Manager in accordance with Section 2 of this procedures manual.DC-ADM 804 § 1.C. & A (emphasis in original). Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator, an inmate may then appeal to the Facility Manager of the institution. Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Facility Manager, an inmate may file a final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). An appeal to final review cannot be completed unless an inmate complies with all established procedures. An inmate must exhaust all three levels of review and comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an issue. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (outlining Pennsylvania's grievance review process).
Here, Plaintiff's Grievance No. 909519 was directed to Defendant Shawley, the Grievance Coordinator. ECF No. 21-3 at 2. In his Grievance, Plaintiff discusses his sick call request to Defendant PA Hammer to address the propriety of the copay, and Defendant HCA Nicholson's response to the sick call request including his statement that Plaintiff cannot keep getting free care. Plaintiff emphasizes that SCI-Greene must be in compliance with the care he received at previous facilities pursuant to the “Medical Manual Procedures.” Id. He further complains that if his care or charges “were to change[, ] there had to be notice[.]” Id. He concludes that an outside neurosurgeon indicated he needed an operation but that the “DOC decided to feed me meds to save operation money ....” Id. For relief he states: “I want reimbursement & operation.” Id. The grievance was received on January 13, 2021.
As alleged by Plaintiff, Defendant Shawley, in her capacity as Grievance Coordinator, rejected Grievance No. 909519 on January 25, 2021 on the official Rejection Form. Thereafter, Plaintiff did not attempt to resubmit the grievance as provided in § 1, ¶ 20 of DC-ADM 804, nor did Plaintiff appeal the rejected grievance to the Facility Manager as provided in § 1, ¶ 21. Instead, Plaintiff moved for in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status in the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County the next day, even though he still had five (5) days to re-submit the rejected grievance pursuant to DC-ADM 804 § 1, ¶ 20. His Complaint and Motion for IFP are both dated for January 26, 2021, the day after Grievance No. 909519 was rejected.
The Greene County state court action was later removed to this Court on April 1, 2021. ECF No. 1.
As evidenced by the record on exhaustion of administrative remedies, Plaintiff did nothing to avail himself of further procedures at DC-ADM 804. He asserts baldly that grievance procedures were unavailable to him, but he fails to describe any circumstances demonstrating this unavailability, and the record does not support such a proposition. He offers nothing as to why he failed to re-submit the rejected grievance or why he chose not to take an appeal to the Facility Manager. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden to show that administrative procedures were unavailable to him. See Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268 (“[T]he onus falls on the inmate to show that such remedies were unavailable to him.”).
Consequently, his claims against Defendants Hammer and Nicholson must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. His claims against Defendant Shawley, likewise, must be dismissed because he never filed a grievance at all as to any of her actions complained of in the Amended Complaint.
Finally, in light of his failure to exhaust, the Court need not reach Defendants' arguments in their Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Tracy Shawley and William Nicholson (ECF No. 21) be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It is also recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant Mark Hammer (ECF No. 23) be granted for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation to file objections. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.