Ramadan v. Ramadan

8 Citing cases

  1. Kopko v. Kopko

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 3853 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    t be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d)" (Smith v Smith, 152 A.D.3d 847, 848 [3d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see McGovern v McGovern, 218 A.D.3d 1067, 1070 [3d Dept 2023]). Those factors include "the income and property of each party[,]... the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties," the contributions of one party to the other's career and education, "the probable future financial circumstances of each party," the parties' business interests, "the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse" and "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]). The statutory factors need not be "specifically cited when the factual findings of the court otherwise adequately articulate that the relevant statutory factors were considered" (Ramadan v Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 [3d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

  2. Majid v. Hasson

    213 A.D.3d 1175 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    Supreme Court denied the wife's motion in an order and entered a judgment of divorce incorporating, but not merging, the settlement agreement, thus prompting the wife's appeal. The judgment of divorce brings up for review the issues raised in the August 2021 order as well the judgment (seeSpiegel v. Spiegel, 206 A.D.3d 1178, 1179 n. 1, 170 N.Y.S.3d 295 [3d Dept. 2022] ; Ramadan v. Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 n. 1, 150 N.Y.S.3d 365 [3d Dept. 2021] ). A settlement agreement is a legally binding and enforceable contract subject to enforcement in the same manner as any other contract (seeWeddell v. Trichka, 200 A.D.3d 1464, 1464, 161 N.Y.S.3d 396 [3d Dept. 2021] ; Matter of Dillon v. Dillon, 155 A.D.3d 1271, 1272, 64 N.Y.S.3d 755 [3d Dept. 2017] ).

  3. Spiegel v. Spiegel

    206 A.D.3d 1178 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    The entry of the judgment of divorce forecloses the wife's appeal of the November 2020 intermediate order, and that appeal is therefore dismissed (seeHassan v. Barakat, 171 A.D.3d 1371, 1373 n. 1, 98 N.Y.S.3d 656 [2019] ). Nonetheless, the issues raised with respect to that order are properly raised in the appeal of the December 2021 judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1] ; Ramadan v. Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 n. 1, 150 N.Y.S.3d 365 [2021] ). The wife argues that the husband's motion for summary judgment should have been denied because the agreement is the product of overreaching and should be set aside.

  4. King v. King

    202 A.D.3d 1383 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 5 times

    Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d) sets forth the statutory factors that must be weighed and directs that "the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived" ( Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][g] ). However, "[the factors] do not have to be specifically cited when the factual findings of the court otherwise adequately articulate that the relevant statutory factors were considered" ( Ramadan v. Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175, 150 N.Y.S.3d 365 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; seeLurie v. Lurie, 94 A.D.3d 1376, 1378, 943 N.Y.S.2d 261 [2012] ). Notably, "[the court's] award will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors under Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d)" ( Martin v. Martin, 178 A.D.3d at 1341, 116 N.Y.S.3d 714 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

  5. King v. King

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 1209 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2022)

    Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d) sets forth the statutory factors that must be weighed and directs that "the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived" (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [g]). However, "[the factors] do not have to be specifically cited when the factual findings of the court otherwise adequately articulate that the relevant statutory factors were considered" (Ramadan v Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Lurie v Lurie, 94 A.D.3d 1376, 1378 [2012]). Notably, "[the court's] award will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d)" (Martin v Martin, 178 A.D.3d at 1341 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

  6. Breen v. Breen

    2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 6566 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)

    As to the equitable distribution award, Supreme Court "has substantial discretion to fashion such awards based on the circumstances of each case, and the determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion or failure to consider the requisite statutory factors" (Westbrook v Westbrook, 212 A.D.3d at 1018 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Johnson v Johnson, 172 A.D.3d 1654, 1658 [3d Dept 2019]). Although the court need not specifically cite the statutory factors, its factual findings should adequately reflect its consideration of the factors outlined in Domestic Relations Law former § 236 (B) (5) (d) (1-15) (see Ramadan v Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175 [3d Dept 2021]). Importantly, equitable distribution of marital property need not be equal (see King v King, 202 A.D.3d at 1387; Allen v Allen, 179 A.D.3d 1318, 1319 [3d Dept 2020]).

  7. Belmonte v. Belmonte

    211 A.D.3d 1131 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 2 times

    Our review indicates that the record on appeal lacks sufficient information — beyond the husband's self-serving statements — to determine the appropriate ownership interests, the current value of the properties or any improvements made to the properties during the marriage. While we generally encourage pretrial classification of assets, under these circumstances, "Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the husband's cross motion to classify assets as separate property pretrial as additional discovery will place the motion court in a far better position to determine this legally dispositive issue — namely, what, if any, appreciation in the value of the real property can be considered marital property" ( Carter v. Fairchild–Carter, 199 A.D.3d 1291, 1293, 159 N.Y.S.3d 182 [3d Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; seeRamadan v. Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1177, 150 N.Y.S.3d 365 [3d Dept. 2021] ; Pace v. Pace, 187 A.D.3d 1443, 1445, 134 N.Y.S.3d 540 [3d Dept. 2020] ). We similarly conclude that Supreme Court appropriately declined to vacate its February 2021 order.

  8. William N. v. Lauren N.

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 51068 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

    The general rule is that when a parties' premarital debt, such as a student loan, is paid off during a marriage, the contributing spouse is entitled to a credit representing that contribution to the other spouse's premarital debt. See Ramadan v Ramadan, 195 A.D.3d 1174, 1175-1176 [3d Dept 2021] (Citations omitted). With respect to the $16,000 student loan Defendant obtained at