Opinion
CV F 05 0427 OWW SMS HC, [Doc. #1].
August 29, 2005
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
BACKGROUND
This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
On April 26, 2002, Petitioner was convicted in the Orange County Superior Court of unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, transportation/sale of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance, being under the influence of a controlled substance, receiving stolen property, and several enhancements. Petitioner was sentenced to serve a total determinate term of fourteen and two-thirds years in state prison.
Because the instant petition alleges constitutional error in the execution of his sentence and does not challenge the underlying conviction, the Court will only recite the state court proceedings relevant to the petition.
After several unsuccessful administrative appeals, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising the underlying claim in the Monterey County Superior Court. On December 8, 2003, the petition was denied. See Exhibit A, Petition. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District. On February 26, 2004, the petition was denied. Id. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. On February 23, 2005, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. Id.
On March 31, 2005, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition contains one ground for relief: "The enactment and implementation of California Penal Code § 2933.3 violates petitioner's Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and, same rights under the State of California Constitution as well."
On July 25, 2005, Respondent filed an answer to the petition.
On August 17, 2005, Petitioner filed a traverse to the response.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.
Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment. Even though Petitioner is not challenging the underlying state court conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for his habeas petition because he meets the threshold requirement of being in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004); Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 2005 WL 1406100, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.").
The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, `clearly established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.
Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). "Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. "Under the `reasonable application clause,' a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case."Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
"[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.
Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision is objectively unreasonable. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003);Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999).
AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state court's factual findings are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). We are bound by a state's interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003).
II. Analysis of Claim
Petitioner claims "the enactment and implementation of California Penal Code § 2933.3 violates [his] Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." He further claims "the same rights under the State of California Constitution" are violated as well.
Under Cal. Penal Code § 2933, prisoners may receive six months of worktime credit for every six months of full-time performance in a credit qualifying work, training or education program established by the Director of Corrections. In essence, a qualifying inmate can earn one day of credit for each day of service. Cal. Penal Code § 2933.3 provides an additional day of worktime credit for every day of service provided the inmate is a assigned to a conservation camp. However, § 2933 provides that prisoners have no right to earn the worktime credits provided by that section. According to § 2933(b), "[w]orktime credit is a privilege, not a right." Cal. Penal Code § 2933(b) (emphasis added). § 2933 specifically contemplates that not all inmates will be assigned to a credit-qualifying program. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069, 107 S.Ct. 2462, 95 L.Ed.2d 871 (1987). In fact, prisoners are not entitled automatically to participate in worktime credit programs, People v. Rosaia, 157 Cal.App.3d 832, 848, 203 Cal.Rptr. 856, 867 (1984), and there is no guarantee that work programs will be available. People v. Caruso, 161 Cal.App.3d 13, 16 n. 5, 207 Cal.Rptr. 221, 224 n. 5 (1984).
Cal. Penal Code § 2933.3 provides:
Notwithstanding any other pro vision of law, any inmate assigned to a conservation camp by the Department of Corrections who is eligible to earn one day of worktime credit for every one day of service pursuant to Section 2933 shall instead earn two days of worktime credit for every one day of service. This enhanced worktime credit shall only apply to service performed after January 1, 2003.
"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall `deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985), quoting, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Here, Petitioner does not allege an invidious classification, nor is a fundamental right at stake, because § 2933 does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d 1080. Thus, Petitioner must demonstrate that the CDC's denial of his requested placement was not rationally related to legitimate state interests. Kalka v. Vasquez, 867 F.2d 546, 547 (9th Cir. 1989). In other words, the CDC's decision must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Bunyan v. Camacho, 770 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1985).
In Kalka, an inmate who was otherwise qualified and willing to work but was not assigned work was denied the same worktime credit against his sentence under § 2933 as those inmates who actually did work. 867 F.2d at 547. The inmate claimed a violation of his equal protection rights. The Ninth Circuit denied the claim finding the state appropriately denied the inmate the additional worktime credits, because he did not actually perform work. Id. The Ninth Circuit found there was a rational basis for this distinction: "those prisoners who actually perform the work successfully are better prepared for reintegration into society." Id.
Here, the CDC denied Petitioner's placement in a credit-qualifying work program, thereby foreclosing additional worktime credit against his sentence under § 2933.3. The CDC based this decision on the position that Petitioner cannot be placed in a minimum security camp, because he is serving a lengthy sentence and therefore poses an escape risk, and his classification status precludes him from placement at a lower security facility. While Petitioner takes exception to the CDC's position that he poses a security risk, the CDC's reasoning is reasonable. Denying placement in minimum security facilities to inmates who face a lengthy sentence is not irrational. Instead, separating inmates who have a higher custody classification and pose a security risk from minimum security inmates who pose less of a risk is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in institutional security. In addition, Petitioner has no legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement to custody classification or eligibility for rehabilitative programs sufficient to invoke due process. Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). Rather, "Congress has given federal prison officials full discretion to control these conditions of confinement." Id. Moreover, as in Kalka, Petitioner has not actually performed work, so the CDC has reasonably denied the additional worktime credits that would be awarded to an inmate who qualified for a work program and did perform work. Kalka, 867 F.2d at 547;Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1094-95. Consequently, the state court rejection of Petitioner's claims was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was the decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The petition should be denied.
With respect to Petitioner's claim that the CDC's denial of worktime credits violated Petitioner's state constitutional rights, the claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas action, because generally, issues of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, (1991) ("We have stated many times that `federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'"), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas").
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED with prejudice and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent.
This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger, United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge's ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.