Raines v. White

9 Citing cases

  1. Pinson v. State

    194 Ga. App. 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 1 times

    2. OCGA § 19-7-45 expressly authorizes the trial court to order blood tests when, as in the instant case, properly requested. As to violation of the constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court held in Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406, 407 ( 284 S.E.2d 7) (1981), that requiring a blood test for the purpose of proving or disproving paternity "would not compel appellant to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution [cit.] nor would such procedure compel him `to give testimony tending in any manner to incriminate himself' within the meaning of the Georgia Constitution." See also Smith v. City of East Point, 189 Ga. App. 454 ( 376 S.E.2d 215) (1988).

  2. Welch v. State

    254 Ga. 603 (Ga. 1985)   Cited 30 times

    In his fourth enumeration of error, Welch contends that taking the blood sample violated his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. We do not agree. Even compelled blood tests do not violate the self-incrimination clause of the United States Constitution, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 ( 86 S.C. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908) (1966), nor require a suspect to "give testimony tending in any manner to be self-incriminating" within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI of the Georgia Constitution. Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406 ( 284 S.E.2d 7) (1981). (Emphasis supplied.)

  3. Ingram v. State

    253 Ga. 622 (Ga. 1984)   Cited 115 times
    Requiring defendant to strip to his waist and be photographed did not compel self-incrimination

    Requiring defendant to strip to his waist and be photographed neither compelled him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the United States Constitution, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 ( 86 S.C. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908) (1966), nor compelled him to "give testimony tending in any manner to be self-incriminating" within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI of the Georgia Constitution. Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406 ( 284 S.E.2d 7) (1981).

  4. Boone v. State ex rel. Carter

    297 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1982)   Cited 7 times
    In Boone v. State, 250 Ga. 379 (297 S.E.2d 727) (1982), we looked at a close but not identical problem and ruled on state due process grounds that the state cannot require a putative father to pay the costs of a blood test requested by it for purposes of determining paternity when no hearing has been conducted on the merits of the case.

    We have held that a party may be compelled over self-incrimination objections to submit to a blood test under Code Ann. § 74-306 without violating his constitutional rights. Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406 ( 284 S.E.2d 7) (1981). Boone does not contend he may not be compelled to submit to an HLA test. His complaint is to the authority given the trial court under Code Ann. § 74-311 which provides: "The court may order reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and the child's guardian ad litem, and other costs of the action and pretrial proceedings, including blood and other tests, to be paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the court."

  5. Smith v. City of East Point

    189 Ga. App. 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 5 times

    5. Smith's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was not violated by the taking of the urine sample. Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406 ( 284 S.E.2d 7); Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603, 606 (3) ( 331 S.E.2d 573). 6.

  6. Elliott v. State

    305 Ga. 179 (Ga. 2019)   Cited 148 times
    Concluding that the Georgia Constitution precludes admission of evidence that a suspect refused to consent to a breath test

    There were also several cases decided by this Court under the Constitution of 1976 that continued Day’s and Calhoun’s interpretation of the scope of the right. See Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406, 407, 284 S.E.2d 7 (1981) ; Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 224-225, 275 S.E.2d 29 (1981) ; Fouts v. State, 240 Ga. 39, 44 (3), 239 S.E.2d 366 (1977). In short, the compelled self-incrimination provision at issue, which has remained materially the same since the 1877 Constitution, has received a consistent and definitive construction from its inception through the ratification of the 1983 Constitution.

  7. Olevik v. State

    302 Ga. 228 (Ga. 2017)   Cited 106 times
    Holding that the Georgia state constitution's protection against compelled self-incrimination extends beyond testimony -- as the federal right has been interpreted -- to incriminating acts, such as breath tests

    To the contrary, we have consistently and repeatedly applied the state constitutional protection against compelled self-incrimination in accord with Day. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 833, 836 (10), 426 S.E.2d 559 (1993) (1983 Constitution); Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406, 284 S.E.2d 7 (1981) (1976 Constitution); Aldrich, 220 Ga. at 135, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1945 Constitution) ; Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76, 78-79 (1) (1881) (1877 Constitution). Thus, although Paragraph XVI refers only to testimony, its protection against compelled self-incrimination was long ago construed to also cover incriminating acts and, thus, is more extensive than the Supreme Court of the United States's interpretation of the right against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.

  8. Rogers v. State

    256 Ga. 139 (Ga. 1986)   Cited 10 times

    We find no violation of the self-incrimination provisions of the state and federal constitutions. Welch v. State, 254 Ga. 603 (3) ( 331 S.E.2d 573) (1985); State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524 (2) ( 322 S.E.2d 711) (1984); Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406 ( 248 S.E.2d 7) (1981). 6. Rogers contends that the court should have sustained his motion for mistrial based upon a communication between a bailiff and a juror.

  9. Lawrence v. Bluford-Brown

    336 S.E.2d 899 (Va. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    The privilege only protects an individual from being compelled to provide evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature against himself, and the withdrawal of blood is not a compulsion of this nature. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the genetic blood grouping test required in this case did not violate the appellant's privilege against self-incrimination. Similar challenges have also been rejected in other jurisdictions. Jane L. v. Rodney B., 108 Misc.2d 709, 713, 438 N.Y.S.2d 726, 729 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1981); Raines v. White, 248 Ga. 406, 407, 284 S.E.2d 7, 8 (1981). Vagueness