Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-3314-CM
March 25, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case initially was before Judge VanBebber. On August 17, 2001, Judge VanBebber issued an order ("August 2001 Order") which considered a number of motions then pending. On August 21, 2001, this case was reassigned to Judge Murguia for all further proceedings. This matter is before the court on plaintiff Travis Raines and Patrick Lynn's Motion for Reconsideration Due to Judicial Reassignment (Doc. 32).
Pursuant to D. Kan. Rule 7.3, a party may seek reconsideration of non-dispositive orders. Such a motion to reconsider must be based on 1) an intervening change in controlling law, 2) the availability of new evidence, or 3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. D. Kan. Rule 7.3(b). Plaintiffs fail to identify either an intervening change in controlling law or the availability of new evidence. The court therefore presumes plaintiffs are arguing the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Defendants did not file a response to plaintiffs' motion. However, while a motion to which no response is filed is considered uncontested, the court is not required to grant the motion. Sims v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kan. City, Kan., 120 F. Supp.2d 938, 964 n. 2 (D.Kan. 2000) (citing D. Kan. Rule 7.4). Moreover, "[m]otions for reconsideration, in particular, present the unique situation in which the court need not rely on a response brief to aid its understanding of the reasons for maintaining its order in its original form." Id. The court will therefore address the merits of plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
In their complaint, both plaintiff Raines and Lynn alleged that they were subjected to unconstitutional conditions and unlawful disciplinary proceedings during their segregated confinement at Hutchinson Correctional Facility ("HCF"). Plaintiff Lynn also alleged that he was denied access to legal materials and that he was denied access to a telephone to contact a family member after clothing sent to him for use during a trial was inadequate. Finally, plaintiff Raines asserted a claim of excessive force.
With regard to plaintiffs' complaints about the conditions of their confinement, plaintiffs alleged that they were confined at HCF's segregation unit in cells with solid doors. The toilets in the cells were flushed by a mechanism outside the cells, and the cells had limited electricity and ventilation. Plaintiffs also alleged that the temperature inside their cells rose in excess of 100 degrees. In an order dated December 27, 2000 ("December 2000 Order") Judge VanBebber reviewed plaintiffs' complaints and ruled that the conditions of their confinement were not so egregious as to deny them necessities of life or to cause an objectively serious injury. With respect to plaintiffs' complaints that they were denied access to legal materials during their segregated confinement and plaintiff Lynn's claim that he was not allowed to contact a family member concerning clothing, Judge VanBebber ruled that plaintiffs had failed to establish actual injury, which is required under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1996). Finally, Judge VanBebber ruled that plaintiffs' allegations concerning their disciplinary hearings failed to present any detailed claims which would merit a response. Thus, the only claim that remained was plaintiff Raines's allegation of excessive force.
Plaintiff Lynn moved to alter or amend the December 2000 Order. In the August 2001 Order, Judge VanBebber denied plaintiff Lynn's Motion to Alter and Amend. Plaintiffs now seek reconsideration of Judge VanBebber's order.
The court has reviewed plaintiffs' underlying complaint, the December 2000 Order dismissing plaintiff Lynn's claims, plaintiff Lynn's Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment, and the August 2001 Order denying plaintiff Lynn's Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment. Having duly considered these papers, the court finds that plaintiff Lynn's claims were appropriately dismissed and, accordingly, that plaintiff Lynn's Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment was properly denied. Having found no clear error or manifest injustice, the court denies plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of plaintiff Lynn's Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment.
The court is mindful that the plaintiffs in this case appear pro se. Accordingly, the court liberally construes plaintiffs' complaint.
Also at issue in plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is Judge VanBebber's August 2001 Order staying discovery pending the court's review of the defense of qualified immunity. Citing Workman v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 332, 336 (10th Cir. 1992), Judge VanBebber recognized that, when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the district court ordinarily should stay discovery until that issue is resolved. Plaintiffs now complain that the defendants' assertion of qualified immunity "is ludicrous and will ultimately fail."
The court finds that Judge VanBebber's order staying discovery was not erroneous or manifestly unjust. Unlike other affirmative defenses, qualified immunity is not merely a defense to liability; it is also an immunity from suit. Qualified immunity protects a defendant from discovery, trial, and the other burdens of litigation. Sawyer v. County of Creek, 908 F.2d 663, 664 (10th Cir. 1990). Thus, when facing a qualified immunity defense that could be resolved as a matter of law, a district court has an obligation to determine this threshold issue before allowing discovery to proceed. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Having not yet determined whether defendants in this case were entitled to qualified immunity, Judge VanBebber properly stayed discovery.
Plaintiffs also complain that plaintiff Raines repeatedly sought discovery and has not yet received any documents "because of the arrogance and obstinance of opposing counsel." The court presumes plaintiffs seek reconsideration of Judge VanBebber's denial of plaintiffs' motion(s) to compel. In his August 2001 Order, Judge VanBebber concluded that plaintiffs' bare statements of opposing counsel's uncooperative conduct did not warrant the entry of orders to compel discovery. Upon review of plaintiffs' underlying motions, this court determines that there is no basis upon which to reconsider Judge VanBebber's decision. In other words, plaintiffs have failed to convince this court of a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.
Plaintiffs also take issue with Judge VanBebber's August 2001 Order, claiming that it contradicts the December 2000 Order. In the August 2001 Order, Judge VanBebber denied without prejudice plaintiff Raines's Request for Leave to File Amended Complaint After Completion of Discovery, finding that plaintiff Raines had not yet identified any fact through discovery which would warrant an amendment to the complaint. Plaintiff Raines points out that, in the December 2000 Order, Judge VanBebber stated: "Discovery by plaintiff Raines shall not commence until plaintiff has received and reviewed defendants' answer or response to the complaint . . . ." Plaintiff asks, "How then can Plaintiff Raines identify pertinent facts through discovery he is already preapproved to conduct, when the defendants arrogantly refuse to abide by that 12-27-00 Order?"
To the extent plaintiffs seek reconsideration of Judge VanBebber's ruling on plaintiff Raines's Request for Leave to File Amended Complaint After Completion of Discovery, this court agrees that plaintiff Raines failed to allege facts warranting an amendment to the complaint. Regarding plaintiffs' contention that the court's December 2000 Order contradicts the August 2001 Order, this court reminds plaintiffs of the inherent power of any district court to modify its own orders. Gorsline v. Kan., 1994 WL 129981, at *3 (D.Kan. Mar. 4, 1994). Accordingly, upon motion by the defendants, Judge VanBebber issued a stay of discovery which, in effect, modified the prior ruling that discovery would commence upon plaintiff Raines's receipt and review of defendants' answer. This court already has determined that Judge VanBebber's ruling staying discovery was neither erroneous nor unjust. As such, plaintiffs' argument for reconsideration fails.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration Due to Judicial Reassignment (Doc. 32) is denied.