Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1308-13T4
03-30-2015
R.R., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. A.Y. and RUTGERS THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY, Defendants-Respondents.
Anthony R. Suarez argued the cause for appellant (Werner Suarez & Moran, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Suarez, on the brief). Aron M. Schwartz, Deputy General Counsel, argued the cause for respondent Rutgers The State University of New Jersey (Greenbaum Rowe Smith & Davis and Monica C. Barrett, Interim General Counsel (Rutgers), attorneys; Maja M. Obradovic, on the brief). Respondent A.Y. has not filed a brief.
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Koblitz and Haas. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-3817-11. Anthony R. Suarez argued the cause for appellant (Werner Suarez & Moran, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Suarez, on the brief). Aron M. Schwartz, Deputy General Counsel, argued the cause for respondent Rutgers The State University of New Jersey (Greenbaum Rowe Smith & Davis and Monica C. Barrett, Interim General Counsel (Rutgers), attorneys; Maja M. Obradovic, on the brief). Respondent A.Y. has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Plaintiff, a former student at Rutgers University (Rutgers), appeals from the Law Division's August 8, 2013 order granting summary judgment to Rutgers University, and dismissing her complaint alleging that Rutgers violated the Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49, by failing to take appropriate remedial action after being advised that another student was sexually harassing her. We affirm.
Plaintiff also appealed the court's October 11, 2013 order denying her motion for reconsideration. However, her brief does not address this issue and we therefore deem it to have been abandoned. Grubb v. Borough of Hightstown, 353 N.J. Super. 333, 342 n.1 (App. Div. 2002) (explaining that an issue raised in a notice of appeal but not briefed is abandoned). In any event, we discern no basis for disturbing the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, which merely repeated the same arguments the court previously considered and rejected in granting Rutgers' motion for summary judgment. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996); D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990).
I.
The following facts are derived from the evidence submitted by the parties in support of, and in opposition to, the summary judgment motion, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 56 n.1 (2012) (citing Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)).
Plaintiff was a first-year student at Rutgers in the 2008-09 academic year. She lived in a residence hall. Defendant, a fellow student (defendant), lived in the same dormitory. A Resident Advisor lived on each floor of the residence hall, and each hall also had a Hall Supervisor living on the premises. These individuals were available to address any problems encountered by the residents of the dormitory. During orientation, plaintiff reviewed the Rutgers Policy Against Verbal Assault, Defamation, and Harassment, which included information about where and how students could make complaints about such conduct.
At the beginning of the school year, plaintiff met defendant and they exchanged telephone numbers and "friended" each other on Facebook. Throughout the fall semester, they sometimes socialized with each other, and attended a few of the same parties and functions. At some point during the fall, defendant expressed a romantic interest in plaintiff, which she did not return. At her deposition, plaintiff testified that defendant did not engage in any conduct during the fall semester that she considered to be sexual harassment and plaintiff did not report any such conduct to Rutgers during the semester.
At the end of her first semester, plaintiff's grade point average (GPA) was below 1.8, and Rutgers placed her on academic probation due to her poor academic performance. Rutgers informed plaintiff that if her GPA fell below 1.5, she would be dropped from her academic program. Plaintiff and defendant did not see or speak to each other during the winter break, which concluded on January 20, 2009.
On January 26, 2009, plaintiff found a vulgar message written on an erasable message board on the outside of her dorm room door. The message stated: "You're a dirty slut. I tell A. everything [illegible]. Fuck you." Plaintiff suspected that defendant may have written the message. On that same date, defendant sent plaintiff the following message via Facebook: "YOU SNITCH ON ME I SNITCH ON YOU HAHA. ENJOY YOUR TALK WITH ALEXANDER LATER YOU SLUT."
As we did with the student-parties in this case, we use initials to identify other students in order to protect their privacy. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that A. was her boyfriend at the time and was attending a different university.
On January 29, 2009, plaintiff and her father went to the University Police Department and met with Officer Ruditsky. Plaintiff told the officer that defendant had begun harassing her after the winter break and that the harassment consisted of the two messages she received on January 26. She also advised the officer that, although defendant had expressed a romantic interest in her during the fall semester, she did not consider any of his prior conduct to be harassing in nature. The officer instructed plaintiff to keep any further messages or internet postings she might receive from defendant and to communicate with "Residence Life" to address any housing issues. Officer Ruditsky prepared a report documenting his conversation with plaintiff and her father and, at her deposition, plaintiff stated that the report accurately described everything that occurred during the meeting.
Residence Life staff organizes and oversees student programming and outreach in Rutgers' residential facilities and addresses student problems, issues, and conflicts that arise in a residence hall setting through advising, counseling, and mediation.
The next day, January 30, 2009, Officer Rager called plaintiff to follow up on her meeting with Officer Ruditsky. Officer Rager told plaintiff to contact the New Brunswick Police if she wished to file a criminal complaint against defendant, and advised her to speak with Rutgers Judicial Affairs if she wanted to pursue the matter internally. The officer gave plaintiff the appropriate contact information. Plaintiff told the officer she would talk it over with her father and decide at a later date whether to pursue either option. Officer Rager prepared a report of his telephone call, which plaintiff later acknowledged was accurate.
On February 2, 2009, the Director of the Rutgers Office of Sexual Assault Services and Crime Victim Assistance e-mailed plaintiff. The Director told plaintiff she had reviewed the police report and said she was contacting plaintiff to see if she needed any assistance. The Director provided additional information to plaintiff about services that were available to her through Rutgers. Plaintiff sent the Director a reply e-mail stating that she was "doing alright" and advising that she would contact the director if she "ha[d] any problems." Between January 29, 2009 and March 10, 2009, plaintiff had no other issues or problems with defendant.
On March 10, 2009, defendant approached plaintiff outside a lecture hall and asked if she wanted to eat with him at the dining hall. Plaintiff had already made plans to eat dinner with a friend. She declined defendant's invitation, and told him, "no thanks, I am not hungry." Later, as plaintiff was leaving the residence hall with her friend to go to dinner, defendant saw plaintiff and asked, "you're going to eat with her?" Plaintiff said yes and began walking to the dining hall. Defendant walked behind plaintiff and her friend as they proceeded to the dining hall, which was about 150 yards away. Although plaintiff stated that defendant was yelling and cursing as he walked, she could not recall what he said and was not sure that any of his comments were directed to her.
At the dining hall, plaintiff encountered defendant in the food serving area. At her deposition, plaintiff testified that defendant said, "this is what you do to me" and poked her shoulder with his finger. Plaintiff stated that defendant "began yelling and cursing at" her friend, but she could not recall what he said. Defendant then slapped a piece of garlic bread out of plaintiff's hand, and left the dining hall.
A short time later that evening, several students, including one of plaintiff's friends, accosted defendant in his dorm room. He ran out of the residence hall and contacted the Rutgers Police, who investigated and prepared written reports of the incident.
That same evening, Residence Life staff became involved and decided that plaintiff and defendant should not stay in the same residence hall that evening. Both students made alternate sleeping arrangements for the night.
The next day, the Assistant Director of Residence Life spoke with plaintiff and later with her father about the incident. She also spoke to defendant, who admitted to writing the vulgar message on the message board on plaintiff's dorm room door and posting the comment on Facebook. With regard to the March 10, 2009 incident, defendant said that plaintiff was motioning with her hand very close to his face and, as he tried to push her hand away, he knocked the piece of bread out of her hand.
That same day, the Assistant Director informed the Director of the Office of Student Conduct about the incident at the dining hall, and her conversations with plaintiff and defendant. Residence Life then made arrangements to relocate defendant from plaintiff's residence hall to a dorm on another campus. The Assistant Director also told defendant not to enter plaintiff's residence hall without an escort from Residence Life and not to have any further contact with plaintiff.
The Assistant Director explained the student conduct judicial process to plaintiff and her father, and gave plaintiff instructions on how to pursue a complaint against defendant. When plaintiff stated that she wanted something done, but did not want to be the complainant, the Assistant Director asked the Associate Director of Residence Life to assume the role of complainant. Thus, although plaintiff declined the opportunity to file a written complaint against defendant under the Rutgers Code of Student Conduct, a student conduct proceeding was initiated against him.
During this proceeding, defendant accepted responsibility for his actions and was placed on disciplinary probation until December 31, 2009, with the express condition that he have no contact with plaintiff. The Associate Dean of Students, who served as the judicial officer for the student conduct proceeding, sent an e-mail to plaintiff on April 16, 2009 advising her of the outcome. The Associate Dean also instructed plaintiff to advise him if defendant contacted her again.
At her deposition, plaintiff testified that she had no further contact with defendant for the rest of the school year and she reported no problems or incidents to Rutgers. However, in a subsequent certification, plaintiff alleged that defendant was in one of her classes during the spring semester. However, he did not speak to her again.
On March 30, 2009, plaintiff asked the Assistant Director of Residence Life for help in obtaining permission for her to take a make-up exam for one she had missed because she had been with the Assistant Director on the day of the exam. The Assistant Director contacted the Dean of Students on plaintiff's behalf, and plaintiff was able to take a make-up exam. Plaintiff did not report any other academic problems or issues to Residence Life staff.
At the end of the school year, Rutgers advised plaintiff that she had failed to maintain the required GPA for the term. Plaintiff was afforded three options to address her poor academic performance: (1) she could sit out the next academic year and reapply for readmission for the fall 2010 semester; (2) she could complete six credits during the summer session provided she attained a 2.5 GPA in those courses; or (3) she could submit a letter of appeal if she believed that "extreme extenuating circumstances . . . [affected] her academic performance." Plaintiff did not exercise any of these options and, in August 2009, Rutgers notified plaintiff that her enrollment for the upcoming 2009-10 academic year had been terminated. Plaintiff thereafter enrolled in a county community college where she obtained an associates' degree. She then enrolled in a nursing program.
On March 9, 2011, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against defendant and Rutgers. In count one, she alleged that defendant "mentally, physically, and sexually harassed" her during the 2008-09 academic year. In counts two and three of the complaint, plaintiff asserted that Rutgers was "responsible for [defendant's] actions" and "took no remedial action, and, failed to address the problems raised in an adequate manner violating its own policies in this regard, causing [p]laintiff to suffer and endure continual harassment." Although counts two and three sounded in tort, plaintiff never filed a Notice of Tort Claim within the ninety-day time limit set forth in the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59-1-1 to -12.3, and specifically in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. Finally, in count four of her complaint, plaintiff alleged that Rutgers and defendant violated the LAD.
Following the completion of discovery, Rutgers filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, plaintiff filed a certification in which, for the first time, she alleged that, during the fall semester, defendant "began to exhibit behavior that concerned me and others, which included his punching a hole in the second floor wall of the dormitory . . . and also when he punched the glass window of a door . . . ." However, plaintiff did not assert that any of this conduct was directed at her. Plaintiff also stated that defendant had sent her boyfriend a Facebook message in the fall, stating that she was "hooking up with" another student. Again, plaintiff did not mention this message in her deposition or in any of her discussions with Rutgers' staff concerning the January 26, 2009 messages or the March 10, 2009 dining hall incident.
Following oral argument, the motion judge rendered an oral opinion, granting Rutgers' motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's complaint against it. With regard to plaintiff's LAD claim, the judge stated that plaintiff was required to "demonstrate that but for [her] protected status, . . . the conduct would not have occurred, that the conduct was severe or pervasive, and that the conduct changed the conditions [and] caused a hostile or abusive environment . . . ." The judge found that "[p]laintiff has not shown that the conduct here was severe or pervasive. There are three incidents [the two messages defendant left for plaintiff on January 26, 2009, and the incident in the dining hall on March 10, 2009]. I don't think that a reasonable jury could classify those, even if they are accepted as having been true, as being severe or pervasive."
However, even if the defendant's conduct was harassing in nature, the judge explained, "I can't say that any reasonable person could conclude that [Rutgers] did not act reasonably after it learned about these incidents. Multiple officials communicated with . . . plaintiff regarding . . . the conduct that she should employ in response" to defendant's actions. The judge also found no basis for plaintiff's claim that her academic performance was related to defendant's alleged harassment of her.
Thus, the judge concluded that defendant's "behavior was insufficiently severe or pervasive as a matter of law to constitute the kind of sexual harassment, which would have created a hostile educational environment for the plaintiff." He also found that Rutgers' "conduct was reasonable in all respects following their notice of these incidents and cannot be the basis of liability." Finally, the judge dismissed plaintiff's tort claims against Rutgers because she failed to file a timely notice of claim, as required by the TCA. This appeal followed.
The judge subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, plaintiff settled her claims against defendant and, therefore, he is not participating in this appeal.
II.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the motion judge incorrectly dismissed her LAD claim because defendant's conduct "was sufficient to constitute sexual harassment as a matter of law." Plaintiff asserts that, when she reported the alleged harassment to Rutgers, it "failed to act promptly, took no remedial action, and failed to act in a reasonable manner violating its own policies." Plaintiff also argues that she "complied with the claim requirements of the" TCA and, therefore, the judge erred in dismissing her tort claims against Rutgers. We disagree.
Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo, applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 477-78 (2013). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must consider "whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 540. While the trial court's legal conclusions are owed no deference, Nicholas, supra, 213 N.J. at 478, this court should affirm the judgment if it finds that the trial court's conclusions of law were correct. Henry v. New Jersey Dept. of Human Servs., 2 04 N.J. 320, 330 (2010).
In Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, 132 N.J. 587, (1993), our Supreme Court
delineated the standards of proof that are necessary in order to bring a discrimination claim premised on acts of sexual harassment. To demonstrate a discriminatory hostile environment caused by sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that "the complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's gender; and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive."
[Godfrey v. Princeton Theological Seminary, 196 N.J. 178, 181 (2008) (quoting Lehmann, supra, 196 N.J. at 603-04).]Although Lehmann concerned a case of alleged sexual harassment at the plaintiff's place of employment, the Supreme Court has applied these same standards in reviewing claims of sexual harassment in non-workplace settings, such as institutions of higher learning. Godfrey, supra, 196 N.J. at 196 (seminary students alleging sexual harassment by an alumnus who was a tenant in seminary housing); see also N.J.S.A. 10:5-4 (declaring that "[a]ll persons shall have the opportunity to obtain . . . all the accommodations, advantages . . . and privileges of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination because of [one's sex]").
Under the "severe or pervasive" requirement, a court must consider "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a merely offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with [a student's] work performance." Heitzman v. Monmouth County, 321 N.J. Super. 133, 147 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23, 114 S. Ct. 367, 371, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, 302-03 (1998)). The LAD was not intended to serve as a "general civility code for . . . conduct." Ibid. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002, 140 L. Ed. 2d 201, 207 (1998)). To be actionable, the alleged conduct must be extreme; mere rudeness or insensitivity is insufficient. Ibid. While individuals have a right to be free from harassment, they are "not entitled to a perfect workplace, free of annoyances and colleagues [they find] disagreeable." Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Serv., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 441, 452 (D.N.J. 1997).
"When evaluating the severity or pervasiveness of the harassing conduct, 'the cumulative effect of the various incidents' must be considered." Godfrey, supra, 196 N.J. at 196 (quoting Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 607). In addition, "when determining whether conduct has created a hostile . . . environment, the harassing conduct itself must be evaluated, 'not its effect on the plaintiff.'" Id. at 197 (quoting Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 606).
The motion judge concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the three incidents at issue here, taken cumulatively, were severe or pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment within the intendment of the LAD. We agree.
The rude and vulgar remark defendant wrote on plaintiff's dorm room message board on January 26, 2009, and the similar one he posted on her Facebook page that same day, may have been annoying and even offensive to plaintiff, but they were not physically threatening or severe. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, these two remarks were in no way similar to the abhorrent racial epithet the defendant made to a sheriff's officer who was his subordinate in Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 502-03 (1998) (holding that the supervisor's use of a single racially-charged slur to a subordinate was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
The March 10, 2009 incident at the dining hall did involve physical contact between defendant and plaintiff, as he slapped a piece of bread from her hand during an argument. Defendant's conduct was not overtly sexual, and was never repeated because Rutgers took immediate action to address defendant's actions that day. Under these circumstances, we agree with the motion judge that the cumulative effect of these three incidents was not sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to constitute sexual harassment under the LAD.
After she was deposed, plaintiff submitted a certification in opposition to Rutgers' motion for summary judgment. In this certification, plaintiff asserted for the first time that defendant had been harassing her since the beginning of the school year in 2009 and that she had been fearful of him for months leading up to the January 26, 2009 messages. The allegations made in this certification were directly contradictory to plaintiff's deposition testimony and in her reports to various Rutgers officials, most notably, the police officers who interviewed her. Until she submitted the certification, plaintiff had consistently stated that she did not feel sexually harassed by anything defendant did during the first semester and that the only incidents of harassment were the three described above.
The motion judge discounted the allegations set forth for the first time in plaintiff's belated certification, as do we. See Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 172 N.J. 185, 194 (2002) (permitting a judge reviewing a motion for summary judgment to reject an affidavit that contradicts the affiant's prior deposition testimony where the contradiction is unexplained and unqualified by the affiant). Here, plaintiff failed to explain the dramatic inconsistencies between her certification and her earlier deposition testimony and contemporaneous reports to the Rutgers police. Therefore, plaintiff's last minute certification was insufficient to defeat Rutgers' motion for summary judgment.
In any event, even if we could conclude that defendant's conduct was "severe and pervasive" enough to create an environment of sexual harassment, we concur with the motion judge's finding that Rutgers took immediate and appropriate steps to address the situation once plaintiff brought it to the University's attention on January 29, 2009. As the Supreme Court observed in L.W. v. Toms River Reg'l Schs. Bd. of Educ., "[i]n the school setting, the Lehmann standard requires that a school district may be found liable under the LAD for student-on-student sexual . . . harassment that creates a hostile educational environment when the school district knew or should have known about the harassment, but failed to take action reasonably calculated to end the harassment." Supra, 189 N.J. 381, 407 (2007) (applying prohibition against sexual harassment to public school setting); see also Aguas v. State, ___ N.J. ___ (2015) (holding that, in the employment context, an employer may defend against a claim of hostile work environmental sexual harassment by demonstrating that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and to promptly correct sexually harassing behavior, and the employee failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer).
Here, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever notified Rutgers of defendant's conduct prior to January 29, 2009, when she and her father went to the University Police Department. On that date, Officer Ruditsky took a complete report. The next day, Officer Rager called plaintiff to advise her of her options, which included the filing of a criminal complaint against defendant, or pursing an internal student conduct proceeding against him. The Director of the Rutgers Office of Sexual Assault Services and Crime Victim Assistance followed up with plaintiff a couple of days later to see how she was doing and to offer further information and assistance. Plaintiff did not initiate any action against defendant.
Defendant reported the March 10, 2009 incident to the University Police after he was accosted in his dorm room. That same evening, Residence Life staff were available to help plaintiff and defendant secure separate accommodations for the night. The next day, Rutgers relocated defendant to another residence hall on a different campus and warned him to have no further contact with plaintiff. Defendant abided by this direction.
The Assistant Director of Residence Life also spoke to both plaintiff and her father and outlined their options. When plaintiff was reluctant to pursue a student conduct complaint against defendant, a Residence Life staff member agreed to act as the complainant and a proceeding was commenced against defendant. As a result, Rutgers placed defendant on disciplinary probation for the next nine months, and no further incidents occurred between plaintiff and defendant.
Thus, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, Rutgers took prompt remedial action to address defendant's conduct once plaintiff reported the incidents. Accordingly, we discern no basis for disturbing the motion judge's decision granting Rutgers' motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiff's LAD claims.
Finally, the motion judge also properly dismissed plaintiff's tort claims against Rutgers because she failed to comply with the notice requirements of the TCA. A plaintiff must submit a notice of claim to the public entity within ninety days of the claim's accrual and notice must be given "in order for a complaint to be lodged against the public entity." Velez v. City of Jersey City, 180 N.J. 284, 289-90 (2004) (quoting Beauchamp v. Amedio, 164 N.J. 111, 121 (2000)); N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. The ninety-day limitation "compel[s] a claimant to expose his intention and information early in the process in order to permit the public entity to undertake an investigation while witnesses are available and facts are fresh." Lutz v. Twp. of Gloucester, 153 N.J. Super. 461, 466 (App. Div. 1977).
Tort claims against Rutgers are governed by the TCA. Fine v. Rutgers, 163 N.J. 464, 468 (2000).
--------
A claim presented by the claimant shall include the following:
a. The name and post office address of the claimant;
b. The post-office address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices to be sent;The "notice requirements . . . are a jurisdictional precondition to filing suit." Ptaszynski v. Uwaneme, 371 N.J. Super. 333, 343 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Bonitsis v. New Jersey Inst. of Tech., 363 N.J. Super. 505, 516 (App. Div. 2003)).
c. The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted;
d. A general description of the injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim;
e. The name or names of the public entity, employee or employees causing the injury, damage or loss, if known; and
f. The amount claimed as of the date of presentation of the claim, including the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with the basis of computation of the amount claimed.
[N.J.S.A. 59:8-4.]
Here, plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim within the ninety-day time limit set forth in N.J.S.A. 59:8-8. She also did not file a motion for permission to file a late claim notice although, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9, she had one year in which to do so after the 2008-09 academic year ended on May 13, 2009. Instead, plaintiff waited until March 9, 2011, nearly two years after any of the incidents involved in this matter, and then filed her lawsuit.
In an attempt to excuse these deficiencies, plaintiff contends that, because she provided information to the University Police and to Residence Life staff about the incidents, she "substantially complied" with the TCA's notice requirements. We cannot agree. While plaintiff informed Rutgers of the three incidents in January and March 2009, she provided no notice that she was asserting a tort claim against the University for defendant's actions or any estimate of her claimed damages. See N.J.S.A. 59:8-4. Providing that information is one of the important purposes of filing a tort claim notice, so the agency has timely notice that it needs to investigate the incident, can attempt to resolve the claim, and can prepare a defense. See Velez, supra, 180 N.J. at 290. Thus, plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice of claim, or a timely motion for leave to file a late claim notice, were fatal to her tort claims against Rutgers. See McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 469 (2011); Ptaszynski, supra, 371 N.J. Super. at 343.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION