Railroad Co. v. Grant

92 Citing cases

  1. Railroad Company v. Trook

    100 U.S. 112 (1879)   Cited 4 times
    In Railroad Co. v. Trook, 100 U.S. 112, cited for the appellee, as in District of Columbia v. Gannon, 130 U.S. 227, the judgment in special term was for damages in an action sounding in tort, which bore no interest, either by the general law, or by the judgment of affirmance in general term.

    The judgment in this case, after the $1,500 had been remitted to avoid a new trial, did not exceed $2,500. Such being the case, under the rule established in Railroad Company v. Grant ( 98 U.S. 398), our jurisdiction has been taken away. The motion to dismiss will be granted, each party to pay his own costs; and it is

  2. Hendrix v. United States

    219 U.S. 79 (1911)   Cited 23 times

    When the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute, the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction, and causes pending at the time fall, unless saved by provision of the statute. United States v. Boisdore, 8 How. 113; Baltimore P.R.R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398; United States v. Tymen, 11 Wall. 88; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 88; McNulty v. Batty, 10 How. 79; Ex parte McCradle, 7 Wall. 514; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 675; Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 109; Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 124; Colt v. Young, 2 Blatchf. 473; United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 255; United States v. Hague, 22 F. 706; United States v. Van Vliet, 23 F. 35; Manley v. Olney, 32 F. 709; Birdseye v. Sheffer, 37 F. 825; Aspley v. Murphy, 50 F. 377; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern R.R. Co., 89 F. 194; Fairchild v. United States, 91 F. 298; Strong v. United States, 93 F. 258; Emblen v. Lincoln Land Co., 94 F. 713; 102 F. 562; United States v. Jacobus, 96 F. 262; United States v. Kelley, 97 F. 461; Cincinnati Brewing Co. v. Betteman, 102 F. 17; McClain v. Williams, 10 S.D. 336; Raush v. Morrison, 47 Ind. 416; Atty. Genl. v. Wharton, 25 La. Ann. 32; Waimsley v. Nichols, 36 La. Ann. 801; Church v. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 579; Olcott v. Maclean, 10 Hun, 282; State v. Bank

  3. Gurnee v. Patrick County

    137 U.S. 141 (1890)   Cited 20 times

    If a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all such cases fall with the law. Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56; Wilson v. Nebraska, 123 U.S. 286; Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U.S. 679; and Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, affirmed. Richmond Danville Railroad Co. v. Thouron, 134 U.S. 45, affirmed.

  4. United States v. Hammond

    99 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1938)   Cited 13 times

    A repeal of the law giving the appellate court jurisdiction prevents a judgment though the case has been argued and submitted for decision. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264. So does an amendment which excludes the pending case. Baltimore P. Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 25 L. Ed. 231. See, also, Merchants' Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, 18 L.Ed. 540. There is no vested right in a pending appeal. This Act operates only prospectively, but it is effective to abolish the appeals to which it relates whether already taken and pending at its date or not. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. HOLMES, Circuit Judge (dissenting).

  5. In re Feland's Estate

    26 Okla. 448 (Okla. 1910)   Cited 3 times

    Bond Melton, for the administratrix. — Citing: In re Poff's Guardianship, 7 Ind. T. 59; Hays v. Barringer, 7 Ind. T. 697; 1 Suth. Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) § 285; Lamb v. Schlotter, 54 Cal. 319; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506; Baltimore, P. R. Ry. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398; Exchange Bank v. Peters, 144 U.S. 570, 12 Sup. Ct. 767; Commonwealth v. Leach, 24 Pa. 55. KANE, J.

  6. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld

    548 U.S. 557 (2006)   Cited 255 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding the military commission procedures established by an executive order invalid

    What we stated in an earlier case remains true here: "[W]hen, if it had been the intention to confine the operation of [the jurisdictional repeal] . . . to cases not pending, it would have been so easy to have said so, we must presume that Congress meant the language employed should have its usual and ordinary signification, and that the old law should be unconditionally repealed." Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, 403 (1879). The Court claims that I "rea[d] too much into" the Bruner line of cases, ante, at 577, n. 7, and that "the Bruner rule" has never been "an inflexible trump," ante, at 584.

  7. Bruner v. United States

    343 U.S. 112 (1952)   Cited 127 times
    Determining that 1 U.S.C. § 109 does not save an action that was pending at the time Congress divested the District Court of jurisdiction over that action because "Congress has not altered the nature or validity of petitioner's rights or the Government's liability but has simply reduced the number of tribunals authorized to hear and determine such rights and liabilities."

    This rule — that, when a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law — has been adhered to consistently by this Court.Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869); Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 401 (1879); Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U.S. 679, 680 (1887); Gurnee v. Patrick County, 137 U.S. 141, 144 (1890); Gwin v. United States, 184 U.S. 669, 675 (1902). See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).

  8. Crane v. Hahlo

    258 U.S. 142 (1922)   Cited 116 times
    Stating that the Contract Clause applies to "contracts" as that term is known in the usual and popular sense "signifying an agreement of two or more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do certain acts. Mutual assent [express or implied] to its terms is of its very essence"

    221 N.Y. 283, supra, there remained only the problem of determining the amount of the award which should be made and the manner of making it, and the reference of such a question, especially in eminent domain proceedings, to a commission, or board, or sheriff's jury, or other non-judicial tribunal, was so common in England and in this country prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution that it has been held repeatedly that it is a form of procedure within the power of the State to provide and that when opportunity to be heard is given it satisfies the requirements of due process of law, especially when, as in this case, a right of review in the courts is given. Custiss v. Georgetown Alexandria Turnpike Co., 6 Cranch, 233; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 688; and Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593. No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure ( Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 401; Gwin v. United States, 184 U.S. 669, 674) and so long as a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided due process of law is not denied by a legislative change. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439.

  9. Western Union Tel. Co. v. L. N.R.R. Co.

    258 U.S. 13 (1922)   Cited 47 times
    In Western Union Tel. Co., supra, pursuant to a statutory grant, petitioner sought to condemn an easement along a railroad right-of-way for the purpose of erecting a telegraph line.

    We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that no right had accrued or claim arisen under the judgment of the District Court within the meaning of § 465. Besides, as also pointed out by the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Act of March 14, 1916, is general and absolute. It takes away the power to condemn the right of way of a railroad company by telegraph companies and it does not save proceedings commenced before its applicable date. Such reservation is usual, if intended ( Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398) and is illustrated by Pannell v. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co., 113 Ky. 630. The contention that if the repealing act be construed to apply to the pending litigation it is an interference by the legislature with judicial proceedings and, therefore, void under the constitution of the State, challenges to particular attention. It is sustained, the Company asserts, by the decisions of the State.

  10. Cameron v. United States

    231 U.S. 710 (1914)   Cited 81 times
    In Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710, 720-24, 34 S.Ct. 244, 58 L.Ed. 448 (1914), the Supreme Court, in holding that truthful immunized testimony by the defendant in one proceeding was protected by a statutory grant of immunity from use to prove perjury in another proceeding, indicated that the testimony might be used "for any legitimate purpose in establishing" the perjury in the same proceeding, 231 U.S. at 721, 34 S.Ct. at 247.

    Section 860, Rev. Stat., was repealed before the trial and does not apply; but neither it nor § 7a-9 of the Bankruptcy Act gave any privilege against the use of the fact of self-contradiction as part of the proof of perjury. Section 860 was repealed without a saving clause before petitioner's testimony was used against him, and therefore afforded no protection. Balt. c. R.R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 150; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574; Kans. P.R. Co. v. Twombly, 100 U.S. 78, 81; McNulty v. Batty, 10 How. 72; Re Hall, 167 U.S. 38; South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433; Wilkinson v. Nebraska, 123 U.S. 286; Cf. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457. There is no such immunity.