The judgment in this case, after the $1,500 had been remitted to avoid a new trial, did not exceed $2,500. Such being the case, under the rule established in Railroad Company v. Grant ( 98 U.S. 398), our jurisdiction has been taken away. The motion to dismiss will be granted, each party to pay his own costs; and it is
When the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute, the repeal of the statute takes away the jurisdiction, and causes pending at the time fall, unless saved by provision of the statute. United States v. Boisdore, 8 How. 113; Baltimore P.R.R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398; United States v. Tymen, 11 Wall. 88; Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 88; McNulty v. Batty, 10 How. 79; Ex parte McCradle, 7 Wall. 514; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 675; Murphy v. Utter, 186 U.S. 109; Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 124; Colt v. Young, 2 Blatchf. 473; United States v. Barr, 4 Sawy. 255; United States v. Hague, 22 F. 706; United States v. Van Vliet, 23 F. 35; Manley v. Olney, 32 F. 709; Birdseye v. Sheffer, 37 F. 825; Aspley v. Murphy, 50 F. 377; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern R.R. Co., 89 F. 194; Fairchild v. United States, 91 F. 298; Strong v. United States, 93 F. 258; Emblen v. Lincoln Land Co., 94 F. 713; 102 F. 562; United States v. Jacobus, 96 F. 262; United States v. Kelley, 97 F. 461; Cincinnati Brewing Co. v. Betteman, 102 F. 17; McClain v. Williams, 10 S.D. 336; Raush v. Morrison, 47 Ind. 416; Atty. Genl. v. Wharton, 25 La. Ann. 32; Waimsley v. Nichols, 36 La. Ann. 801; Church v. Weeks, 38 Mo. App. 579; Olcott v. Maclean, 10 Hun, 282; State v. Bank
If a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all such cases fall with the law. Morey v. Lockhart, 123 U.S. 56; Wilson v. Nebraska, 123 U.S. 286; Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U.S. 679; and Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, affirmed. Richmond Danville Railroad Co. v. Thouron, 134 U.S. 45, affirmed.
A repeal of the law giving the appellate court jurisdiction prevents a judgment though the case has been argued and submitted for decision. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264. So does an amendment which excludes the pending case. Baltimore P. Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 25 L. Ed. 231. See, also, Merchants' Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall. 541, 18 L.Ed. 540. There is no vested right in a pending appeal. This Act operates only prospectively, but it is effective to abolish the appeals to which it relates whether already taken and pending at its date or not. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. HOLMES, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
Bond Melton, for the administratrix. — Citing: In re Poff's Guardianship, 7 Ind. T. 59; Hays v. Barringer, 7 Ind. T. 697; 1 Suth. Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) § 285; Lamb v. Schlotter, 54 Cal. 319; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506; Baltimore, P. R. Ry. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398; Exchange Bank v. Peters, 144 U.S. 570, 12 Sup. Ct. 767; Commonwealth v. Leach, 24 Pa. 55. KANE, J.
What we stated in an earlier case remains true here: "[W]hen, if it had been the intention to confine the operation of [the jurisdictional repeal] . . . to cases not pending, it would have been so easy to have said so, we must presume that Congress meant the language employed should have its usual and ordinary signification, and that the old law should be unconditionally repealed." Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398, 403 (1879). The Court claims that I "rea[d] too much into" the Bruner line of cases, ante, at 577, n. 7, and that "the Bruner rule" has never been "an inflexible trump," ante, at 584.
This rule — that, when a law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases, all cases fall with the law — has been adhered to consistently by this Court.Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 514 (1869); Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 401 (1879); Sherman v. Grinnell, 123 U.S. 679, 680 (1887); Gurnee v. Patrick County, 137 U.S. 141, 144 (1890); Gwin v. United States, 184 U.S. 669, 675 (1902). See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).
221 N.Y. 283, supra, there remained only the problem of determining the amount of the award which should be made and the manner of making it, and the reference of such a question, especially in eminent domain proceedings, to a commission, or board, or sheriff's jury, or other non-judicial tribunal, was so common in England and in this country prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution that it has been held repeatedly that it is a form of procedure within the power of the State to provide and that when opportunity to be heard is given it satisfies the requirements of due process of law, especially when, as in this case, a right of review in the courts is given. Custiss v. Georgetown Alexandria Turnpike Co., 6 Cranch, 233; Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569; United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519; Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 688; and Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593. No one has a vested right in any given mode of procedure ( Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398, 401; Gwin v. United States, 184 U.S. 669, 674) and so long as a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided due process of law is not denied by a legislative change. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439.
We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that no right had accrued or claim arisen under the judgment of the District Court within the meaning of § 465. Besides, as also pointed out by the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Act of March 14, 1916, is general and absolute. It takes away the power to condemn the right of way of a railroad company by telegraph companies and it does not save proceedings commenced before its applicable date. Such reservation is usual, if intended ( Railroad Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398) and is illustrated by Pannell v. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co., 113 Ky. 630. The contention that if the repealing act be construed to apply to the pending litigation it is an interference by the legislature with judicial proceedings and, therefore, void under the constitution of the State, challenges to particular attention. It is sustained, the Company asserts, by the decisions of the State.
Section 860, Rev. Stat., was repealed before the trial and does not apply; but neither it nor § 7a-9 of the Bankruptcy Act gave any privilege against the use of the fact of self-contradiction as part of the proof of perjury. Section 860 was repealed without a saving clause before petitioner's testimony was used against him, and therefore afforded no protection. Balt. c. R.R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U.S. 143, 150; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574; Kans. P.R. Co. v. Twombly, 100 U.S. 78, 81; McNulty v. Batty, 10 How. 72; Re Hall, 167 U.S. 38; South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433; Wilkinson v. Nebraska, 123 U.S. 286; Cf. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457. There is no such immunity.