Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of Ventura, Super. Ct. No. 56-2009-00336547-CU-HR-SIM, Roger L. Lund, Judge.
Law Offices of Eric Anvari, Eric Anvari for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent
COFFEE, J.
Mindith Rahmat appeals orders awarding attorney fees to Charla R. Miller. Rahmat contends that the trial court erred by awarding Miller attorney fees that are not authorized by Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, or any other statute. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure Code unless otherwise stated.
BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2009, Rahmat filed a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against Charla Miller. The trial court granted the TRO and scheduled a hearing for a permanent order; that hearing was continued until April 14, 2010. On April 14, counsel for both parties advised the court that they had reached a settlement that would be presented to the court later, in written form. The court continued the matter to April 28, 2010.
After the April 14 proceedings, Eric Anvari, counsel for Rahmat, advised Ron Bamieh, Miller's counsel, that Rahmat had started "to have a change of heart on certain aspects of the settlement." Anvari continued to encourage Rahmat to settle. At 4:01 p.m. on April 27, 2010, Anvari advised Bamieh's office that Rahmat was willing to sign the stipulation with two changes: "1. Stay away order should say it is a permanent order as soon as the judge signs it. [¶] 2. She wants a long introductory paragraph that shows it was her that was seeking TRO against Ms. Miller." Anvari's email also stated, "I can add these things to the order. But have to rush out to meet someone in Beverly Hills. I can do it tonight and get my client's signature on it electronically. [¶] Please let me know your thoughts." At 4:30 p.m., Bamieh emailed Anvari a reply that said: "No long introductory paragraph no objection to 1." Bamieh's office did not receive a signed stipulation or settlement in response to his email before their office closed on April 27. Bamieh, who was in trial on another matter, asked Michelle Evans, an attorney in his office, to prepare for the April 28 hearing. Meanwhile, after meeting with a client other than Rahmat, Anvari sent the "draft of changes" with Rahmat's signature to Bamieh's office, at 1:00 a.m. on April 28.
On April 28, 2010, the parties signed a stipulation with "permanent mutual stay away orders, " and the trial court conducted proceedings as scheduled. Evans explained that her April 28 appearance was required because Rahmat was trying to renege for so long, and Bamieh's office "had no way of knowing that the agreement was signed at 1:00 in the morning." Evans requested that the court award attorney fees in the amount of $1,000.00, for the time that she spent preparing for, traveling to, and appearing at the April 28 proceedings. The court granted her request.
On May 12, 2010, the trial court signed the parties' written stipulation and permanent stay away order. Paragraph 5 of that document states: "Parties agree that upon the court's signature of this Stipulation and Order... the Temporary Restraining Order... will be dismissed."
On May 17, 2010, the trial court issued a written order awarding Miller attorney fees in the amount of $1,000, "pursuant to Family Code [sections] 2030, 2032, 271 and Code of Civil Procedure [section] 527.6."
On May 28, 2010, Anvari filed Rahmat's motion for "clarification and correction" of the order awarding Miller attorney fees. Rahmat's motion argued that section 527.6 could not support the award where there was no prevailing party, and the award was not authorized by Family Code sections 2031, 2032, or 271. On June 22, 2010, Miller filed a response opposing the motion and seeking additional attorney fees in the amount of $1,950, for services relating to Rahmat's motion. Miller's response cited section 1008, the statute applicable to the kind of request Rahmat was making, which is generally called a motion for reconsideration. Miller noted that Rahmat did not cite section 1008 in her motion.
On June 23, 2010, the trial court heard Rahmat's motion. Armani argued that no fees could be awarded under section 527.6 because there was no prevailing party, as the TRO was dismissed pursuant to the parties' settlement. The court reminded Anvari that "[t]he bigger problem here was there would have been no need to appear if the settlement would have been served within a timely manner, by 5 o'clock the day before the hearing." The court recalled that the "settlement offer... papers were signed and received at, like, 1:00 o'clock in the morning the night before the hearing. That was the basis for... granting the attorney's fee order."
In ruling on Rahmat's motion, the court commented as follows: "I think if this is a [1008] motion, which it most closely resembles, I have no other option but to deny it for two reasons, I believe. I think it is untimely when it was filed. Secondarily, I don't think there's any new or existing law that was unknown to me at the time I made the order. [¶] Therefore, the motion for clarifying, correcting the Court's ruling and awarding attorney's fees against petitioner is denied." The court also awarded attorney fees pursuant to 527.6 as the prevailing party in the motion, payable to Bamieh's office in the amount of $1,950, in addition to the $1,000.00 in attorney fees awarded on April 28, 2010.
DISCUSSION
Rahmat argues that the trial court erred by awarding Miller attorney fees because there was no statutory basis for the award. We disagree.
We first reject Rahmat's contention that the trial court erred in awarding Miller attorney fees under section 527.6, the general "anti-harassment" statute. Section 527.6, subdivision (i), permits the trial court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in an anti-harassment lawsuit. The determination of the prevailing party for purposes of section 527.6, subdivision (i) lies within the trial court's discretion. (Elster v. Friedman (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1443.)
Rahmat argues that Miller was not the prevailing party because there was no prevailing party. We do not interpret the term "prevailing party" in a rigid manner. (Heather Farms Homeowners Assn. v. Robinson (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1574.) The definition of a prevailing party may encompass a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered. (Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777.) In this case, the TRO against Miller was dismissed.
Rahmat makes a related claim that section 527.6, subdivision (i) "does not apply to announce [that] a defendant that settles out by obtaining a symmetrical injunction [is] a 'prevailing party.'" Although the parties here stipulated that each party would be bound by the stay away order, "[i]t is irrelevant that they were symmetrically bound by the injunction" (Elster v. Friedman, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1444) for purposes of determining the prevailing party who is entitled to attorney fees. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Miller was the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees pursuant to section 527.6, subdivision (i). Our conclusion regarding section 527.6, subdivision (i) eliminates the need to discuss Rahmat's contentions regarding the Family Code provisions cited in the court's May 17, 2010 order.
Finally, Rahmat argues that the trial court erred by awarding Miller additional attorney fees pursuant to section 527.6, subdivision (i) for services relating to the "clarification" motion because that motion "had nothing to do with the underlying issues of [c]ivil [h]arassment." This argument is not persuasive. That motion arose from the section 527.6 proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.