Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-CV-1253
08-17-2022
FARIDA B. RAHMAN, Plaintiff, v. FRED A. PIERANTONI, Judge, Defendant.
(MARIANI, J.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, Farida B. Rahman, commenced this action by lodging a pro se complaint with the clerk for filing, together with supporting exhibits and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. (Doc. 1; Doc. 2.) We have entered a separate order granting the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
The pro se complaint in this action asserts a federal civil rights claim against Hon. Fred A. Pierantoni III, a state common pleas judge who presided over a civil action brought by the plaintiff against another individual who is not a party to this federal civil action, Rahman v. Wright, No. 2015-410 (Luzerne Cty. (Pa.) C.C.P. filed Jan. 15, 2015). The gist of the plaintiff's claim is that the state court judge entered certain orders in that underlying state civil action that were adverse to the plaintiff, which purportedly violated her federal constitutional rights. It is not entirely clear what relief she seeks from this court, but the form of relief is immaterial to disposition of her federal civil rights claim.
A plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides that a court “shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint is “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). To determine whether it is frivolous, a court must “assess an in forma pauperis complaint from an objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly baseless factual contention.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)). This statutory provision further permits a court, in its sound discretion “to dismiss an in forma pauperis claim if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial.” Deutsch, 67 F.3d at 1089; see also Denton, 504 U.S. at 33-34 (“[F]rivolousness is a decision entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in forma pauperis petition.”).
This action should be dismissed as legally frivolous. The plaintiff's claim against Judge Pierantoni is clearly barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.” Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam). “[S]o long as (1) the judge's actions are taken in his judicial capacity (determined by the nature of the acts themselves) and (2) the judge has some semblance of jurisdiction over the acts, he will have immunity for them.” Mikhail v. Kahn, 991 F.Supp.2d 596, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 76869 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Indeed, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871)). “This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly ....” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). “Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347).
Based on the allegations of the pro se complaint and the documentary exhibits submitted in support thereof, the plaintiff's claim exclusively concerns judicial acts taken by Judge Pierantoni in his role as presiding judge in a state civil action brought by Rahman, and no acts alleged were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12-13; Gallas, 211 F.3d at 768-69; Mikhail, 991 F.Supp.2d at 660. Thus, any claim by the plaintiff for damages against this state court judge must be dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. Any claim for injunctive relief against the judge similarly must be dismissed. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (generally prohibiting injunctive relief against judicial officers); Ball v. Butts, 445 Fed. App'x 457, 458 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that a request for injunctive relief “was subject to dismissal [for failure to state a claim] because such relief is not available against ‘a judicial officer for an act . . . taken in such officer's judicial capacity'”); Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 303-04 (“In 1996, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that ‘injunctive relief shall not be granted' in an action brought against ‘a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.'”).
Under the circumstances presented, the plaintiff's claim is clearly based on an indisputably meritless legal theory and thus should be dismissed as legally frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (noting that claims against defendants who are clearly immune from suit are “based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory”); Ball, 445 Fed. App'x at 458 (dismissing appeal as frivolous based on judicial immunity).
Accordingly, we recommend that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 17, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Failure to file timely objections to the foregoing Report and Recommendation may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.