Opinion
A131042
10-07-2011
SAYED BASHIR RAHIMI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN FRANCISCO TAXI COMMISSION et al., Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(San Francisco City and County
Super. Ct. No. CPF-09-509191)
The San Francisco Taxi Commission (Commission) revoked the taxi medallion and "A-card" taxi driver permit held by appellant Sayed Bashir Rahimi. The San Francisco Board of Appeals (Board) upheld the revocation. Rahimi unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandate and/or administrative mandamus in the superior court seeking to set aside the orders (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1085, 1094.5). On appeal, Rahimi argues that the trial court erred in denying him mandamus relief, either ordinary or administrative, because both the Commission and the Board "applied an illegal and unconstitutional presumption in their decision-making process." We affirm.
The public passenger vehicle driver's permit required to operate a taxi is referred to as an "A-card." (See S.F. Transportation Code, § 1102, subd. (a).)
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
I. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
"The regulation of the taxicab industry is a traditional subject of the police power of cities and counties." (Cotta v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1560 (Cotta); see also Veh. Code, § 21100, subd. (b) ["[l]ocal authorities may adopt rules and regulations by ordinance or resolution" regarding "[l]icensing and regulating the operation of vehicles for hire and drivers of passenger vehicles for hire"].) "California courts have consistently held that taxicab drivers do not obtain any vested right in the grant of permission to operate taxicabs on the public roadways. Rather, that permission may be altered at the discretion of the issuing authority." (Cotta, at p. 1560.)
The Full-Time Driving Requirement
"In the June 1978 primary election, the San Francisco electorate adopted Proposition K, entitled 'Ordinance Providing for the Regulation of Taxicabs and Other Motor Vehicles for Hire.' "(Newsham v. Board of Permit Appeals (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 930, 932 & fn. 2 [noting that the provisions of Prop. K are codified as appen. F to the Charter of the City & County of San Francisco].) Under Proposition K, an applicant for a taxicab permit must apply to the Police Commission. (Prop. K, § 2, subd. (a).) Proposition K further provides that "[t]he Police Commission, in determining whether or not public convenience and necessity exist for the issuance of a permit, may consider such facts as it deems pertinent, but must consider whether: [¶] (a) The applicant is financially responsible and will maintain proper financial records. [¶] (b) The public will not be adequately or properly served unless the application is granted. [¶] (c) The applicant has complied with all provisions of the Municipal Code, including pertinent motor vehicle laws. [¶] (d) The applicant will be a full-time driver, within the meaning of Section 2(b) of this Ordinance, of the taxicab or other motor vehicle for hire." (Prop. K, § 3.)
"Police Commission" is synonymous with the Commission, for our purposes. (S.F. Police Code, § 1076, subd. (q); see also S.F. Charter, § 4.133(b).) In December 2008, after the Commission proceedings in this case were complete, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors abolished the Commission and transferred its functions, powers, and duties to the Municipal Transportation Agency. (S.F. Police Code, Art. 16, § 1075.1.)
Section 1081, subdivision (f), of the San Francisco Police Code also provides: "Every permittee . . . shall be a full-time driver . . . ." The full-time driving requirement is further spelled out in section 2, subdivision (b), of Proposition K, which provides: "No permit shall be issued unless the person applying for the permit shall declare under penalty of perjury his or her intention actively and personally to engage as permittee driver under any permit issued to him or her for at least four hours during any 24 hour period on at least 75 percent of the business days during the calendar year. No more than one permit shall be issued to any one person."
Section 1138 of the San Francisco Police Code requires taxicab drivers to "keep an accurate and legible waybill" to establish compliance with the full-time driving requirement. Section 1095, subdivision (a), of the Police Code also requires "a sworn statement showing full compliance with all provisions of the Municipal Code" to be filed each year. Finally, section 1077, subdivision (a), of the Police Code gives the Commission authority to "adopt such rules and regulations to effect the purposes of this Article as are not in conflict therewith."
Permit Revocation Proceedings Before the Board
Section 1090, subdivision (a), of the San Francisco Police Code gives the Commission discretionary authority to suspend or revoke a taxicab permit "for good cause after a noticed hearing." As relevant to this case, "good cause" exists when "[t]he permittee ceased to be a full-time driver" or when "[t]he permittee . . . knowingly made false statements to . . . the Police Commission . . . ." (Ibid.)
Section 4, subdivision (a), of Proposition K also provides for permit revocation "for good cause."
In 2002, the Commission adopted "Standards for Permit Revocation" (the revocation standards), which provide, in relevant part: "When the full-time driving requirement ('the driving requirement') has been violated, the Commission has discretion to revoke the violator's permit. The Commission shall exercise its discretion in a manner consistent with the underlying purposes of Proposition K, including most particularly the basic principle, central to Proposition K and this rule, that permitholders be full-time drivers rather than absentees. [¶] This rule provides a framework to govern adjudications of cases in which the Commission finds a violation of the driving requirement. As a guide to its exercise of discretion in such cases, the Commission shall follow the standards stated in this rule. . . . [¶] I. Structure of Rule [¶] A. Step 1: Determining The Number Of Violations. This rule is keyed to the number of times the permitholder violated the driving requirement during the seven calendar years preceding the calendar year in which the Commission hears the case. . . . Because compliance with the driving requirement is measured on a calendar year basis, there can be only one violation per calendar year. . . . [¶] B. Step 2: Determining What Presumption, If Any, Applies. This rule states presumptions that apply in specific cases. The Commission shall take seriously all presumptions stated in this rule. It is not intended that the Commission casually or routinely override presumptions. If it overrides a presumption, the Commission shall adopt findings that identify the presumption and specifically explain why it overrode the presumption. To emphasize the importance of the presumptions, none is characterized merely as a presumption; each is a 'strong' presumption or an 'extremely strong' presumption. [¶] . . . [¶] C. Step 3: Weighing Facts And Circumstances. In every case, the Commission shall weigh the facts and circumstances relevant to the violation(s). Where a presumption applies, however, the weighing of facts and circumstances does not begin with an empty scale. Depending on the presumption, the scale is weighted in favor of or against revocation, and is weighted strongly, or extremely strongly, in the direction the presumption points."
When one violation is found, a strong presumption against revocation is generally applied. When two violations are found, there is generally no presumption applied. As relevant to this case, the revocation standards also provide: "IV. Three Violations [¶] A. Strong Presumption Favoring Revocation. In cases involving three violations of the driving requirement, there is a strong presumption favoring revocation, except as specified in subsection IV(B). [¶] B. Extremely Strong Presumption Favoring Revocation. In the following cases, there is an extremely strong presumption favoring revocation. [¶] . . . [¶] 3. Egregious Noncompliance With The Driving Requirement. In one of the three years in which the permitholder violated the driving requirement, the permitholder (a) drove no more than one-fourth of the shifts necessary to satisfy the driving requirement, or (b) drove no more than one-half of the shifts necessary to satisfy the driving requirement and evidenced a willful disregard for that requirement. 'Willful disregard' means that the permitholder made no effort to drive full-time during the year in question, and has offered no minimally plausible explanation for the failure to make an effort to drive full-time. [¶] 4. Noncompliance With The Driving Requirement, Coupled With Another Serious Violation of Law Or Serious Misconduct. The permitholder also committed another serious violation of law or some other serious misconduct. The other violation or misconduct may relate to the violation of the driving requirement, or may be unrelated; and it may have occurred in a calendar year different than those in which the driving requirement was violated." To override an extremely strong presumption, "the Commission must have an absolutely compelling justification. It is intended that the Commission will override this presumption only in the rarest of circumstances; that this presumption approaches being a conclusive presumption but falls just short, thus preserving the Commission's discretion in a truly extraordinary case." Board Review
Section 4.106 of the San Francisco Charter provides in pertinent part: "(b) The Board shall hear and determine appeals with respect to any person who has been denied a permit or license, or whose permit or license has been suspended, revoked or withdrawn . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (d) After a hearing and any necessary investigation, the Board may concur in the action of the department involved, or by the affirmative vote of four members . . . overrule the action of the Department."
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rahimi received his taxi medallion in 1998. In March 2008, the Commission filed an administrative complaint against Rahimi, alleging that he had repeatedly violated the full-time driving requirement, had sexually harassed female passengers and police officers, had made false statements, and had committed perjury.
The administrative complaint was heard by a Commission hearing officer, in April 2008. In her written decision, issued in September 2008, the hearing officer found that Rahimi: (1) violated the full-time driving requirement in five of the last seven years (in 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007); (2) made false statements to the Commission in connection with his annual statements in 2005 and 2006; (3) committed perjury at a 2007 disciplinary hearing; (4) violated the waybill requirement in 2005, 2006, and 2007; and (5) "ha[d] already been disciplined" for his harassment of female passengers.
The hearing officer applied the revocation standards to the facts of Rahimi's case. Specifically, the hearing officer wrote in her administrative hearing decision: "As a guide to exercising its discretion in determining whether or not to revoke a medallion, the Commission mandates that certain standards be followed: (1) Determine the number of violations, (2) Determine which presumption, if any, applies, and (3) Weigh facts and circumstances relevant to the violations. [¶] . . . [¶] The hearing officer finds that there are two separate grounds which establish an extremely strong presumption in favor of revocation: (1) Egregious noncompliance with the driving requirement for the calendar years 2003, 2005, and 2006 . . . and (2) Three violations of the driving requirement coupled with another serious violation of the law or serious misconduct. . . . [¶] In weighing the facts and circumstances of this case, there are no credible and compelling mitigating circumstances that explain the violations." Ultimately, the hearing officer recommended that Rahimi's medallion and A-card be revoked.
The Commission heard the matter on September 23, 2008, and accepted the hearing officer's recommendations. In its notice of decision dated September 24, 2008, the Commission set forth eight separate findings, which echoed those of the hearing officer. The Commission also noted that the "extremely strong presumption in favor of revocation" was applicable and found that there were "no credible and compelling mitigating circumstances that explain the violations." Accordingly, the Commission revoked Rahimi's taxi medallion and A-card.
Rahimi appealed to the Board. At the Board hearing, Rahimi's counsel did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings against Rahimi, but merely asserted that the disciplinary charges against him had already been adjudicated in a prior administrative hearing. Rahimi's lawyer also did not object to, or otherwise mention, the fact that the hearing officer and Commission had applied the revocation standards in recommending and determining, respectively, that Rahimi's medallion and A-card be revoked. The Board voted five to zero to uphold the revocation of Rahimi's taxi medallion and A-card. The Board's order provides: "[T]he revocation of the subject A-card and subject medallion by the Taxi Commission is UPHELD."
In March 2010, Rahimi filed his second amended petition for writ of administrative mandamus and/or ordinary mandate, in which he challenged both the Board's decision and the Commission's decision. Rahimi sought relief on purely legal grounds. He contended that the revocation standards applied by the hearing officer and Commission are unauthorized and illegal, in that there is no legislation "that empowered or authorized the Commission to adopt such presumptions." Rahimi also contended that even though the Board did not itself apply those standards in its de novo consideration of the matter, its decision was rendered impermissible by the lower agency's application of those standards.
The trial court heard the petition on May 26, 2010. On August 5, 2010, the trial court filed a statement of decision and denied Rahimi's motion in its entirety. Judgment was entered in respondents' favor and Rahimi filed a timely notice of appeal. We granted Rahimi's petition for writ of supersedeas and stayed enforcement of the trial court's judgment pending our resolution of the appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
Rahimi contends that the trial court erred in denying mandamus, either ordinary or administrative, because both the Commission and the Board "applied an illegal and unconstitutional presumption in their decision-making process." Specifically, he argues that Proposition K did not authorize the Commission to adopt the revocation standards. And, even if it did, Rahimi asserts the standards are unconstitutional, in reliance on United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220. We need not address the merits of Rahimi's arguments or determine whether he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to these arguments. Rahimi's objection to the Commission's presumption is a moot point because there is no evidence in the record that suggests the Board relied on the revocation standards. A. Standard of Review
Rahimi's petition for a writ of mandate took a two-pronged approach. In Rahimi's first cause of action, he sought review of the Commission's actions by ordinary mandamus, pursuant to section 1085. In his second cause of action, Rahimi sought relief from the Board's decision via administrative mandamus, under section 1094.5.
" 'Judicial review of most public agency decisions is obtained by a proceeding for a writ of ordinary or administrative mandate. (. . . §§ 1085, 1094.5.) The applicable type of mandate is determined by the nature of the administrative action or decision. [Citation.] Usually, quasi-legislative acts are reviewed by ordinary mandate and quasi-judicial acts are reviewed by administrative mandate.' [Citation.]" (Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority v. Rea (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313.) Section 1085 provides: "A writ of mandate may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . ." A petitioner can obtain writ relief, pursuant to section 1085, upon a showing of " '(1) A clear, present and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent . . . ; and (2) a clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty . . . .' [Citation.]" (Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 539-540.)
In contrast, "[t]he inquiry for the issuance of a writ of administrative mandamus [(§ 1094.5)] is whether the agency in question prejudicially abused its discretion; that is, whether the agency action was arbitrary, capricious, in excess of its jurisdiction, entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or without reasonable or rational basis as a matter of law. [Citations.] A prejudicial abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law, if its decision is not supported by findings, or if its findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. We may neither substitute our views for those of the agency whose determination is being reviewed, nor reweigh conflicting evidence presented to that body. [Citations.] [¶] On appeal, we are governed by the same abuse of discretion standard in pursuing essentially the same task as that of the trial court. Like the trial court, we review the agency's actions and decisions to determine whether they were in compliance with the procedures required by law and were supported by findings which themselves were supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire administrative record. In so doing, our review is de novo, and not bound by the trial court's conclusions. The decisions of the agency are nevertheless given substantial deference and presumed correct. The parties seeking mandamus bear the burden of proving otherwise, and the reviewing court must resolve reasonable doubts in favor of the administrative findings and determination. [Citations.]" (San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 656, 673-674.) B. Analysis
With respect to Rahimi's first cause of action, we agree with respondents that we cannot grant effective relief even if the Commission, in applying the revocation standards, violated "a clear, present and ministerial duty." "A case is moot when the decision of the reviewing court 'can have no practical impact or provide the parties effectual relief. [Citation.]' [Citation.] 'When no effective relief can be granted, an appeal is moot and will be dismissed.' [Citations.]" (MHC Operating Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 204, 214.) However " '[i]f a pending case poses an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the court may exercise an inherent discretion to resolve that issue even though an event occurring during its pendency would normally render the matter moot.' [Citations.]" (Id. at pp. 214-215.)
The Commission's decision is effectively moot. (See Luxor Cab Co. v. Cahill (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 551, 556 ["[o]nly the decision of the Board is subject to judicial review by mandamus, not the order of the inferior administrative body"]; California Water Impact Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1464, 1486 ["in general, interim determinations are not subject to mandamus review"].) "It is well settled that in passing upon license or permit matters, the [San Francisco] board of permit appeals is an administrative tribunal invested by the city charter with broad quasi-judicial powers to hear and determine an entire controversy, to draw its own conclusions from conflicting evidence, and exercise its own independent judgment to affirm or overrule the agency or official exercising permit power at the primary level [citation]." (Luxor Cab Co. v. Cahill, at p. 556.) The Board's power of review has been described as "de novo." (Guinnane v. San Francisco City Planning Com. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 732, 739; City and County of San Francisco v. Board of Permit Appeals (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1099, 1104.) Rahimi recognizes as much and concedes that the Board did, in fact, exercise its de novo review powers in this case after the Commission reached its final decision. Thus, even if mandamus relief was appropriate vis à vis the Commission, the Board's later decision would still stand.
We decline to exercise our discretion to decide whether the Commission exceeded its authority when it adopted the revocation standards. Our resolution of this question would be unlikely to provide guidance for future disputes because the Commission has since been abolished and Rahimi concedes that the disputed presumptions are no longer applied.
Rahimi's second cause of action fares no better. With respect to his challenge to the Board's decision, Rahimi only contends that because the Board "upheld" the revocation ordered by the Commission, the Commission's reliance on the revocation standards was somehow incorporated into the Board's decision. We cannot agree. The revocation standards only apply, on their face, to the Commission's exercise of discretion. Neither the transcript of the Board's hearing, nor any of the other documents in the record, suggest that the Board discussed the substance of the revocation standards, much less purported to rely on or apply those standards, in making the final revocation decision. During the hearing, the Board only referred to the hearing officer's factual findings—primarily the finding that Rahimi had committed perjury. That the Board ultimately "upheld" the Commission's revocation decision does not mean that it adopted the Commission's reasoning as its own. (Cf. People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 351, fn. 11 [" 'we review the ruling, not the court's reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm' "].)
Rahimi's claim that the Board relied on the revocation standards is completely unsupported by the record. Rahimi raises no other challenge to the Board's decision. Accordingly, Rahimi has failed to meet his burden to show that the Board abused its discretion. (See San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.)
IV. DISPOSITION
As set forth in our prior order of February 17, 2011, the stay of the judgment previously issued will dissolve upon issuance of the remittitur in this appeal.
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Bruiniers, J.
We concur:
Simons, Acting P. J.
Needham, J.