Summary
In Ragon v. Thrasher, 194 Tenn. 463, 253 S.W.2d 31, the Supreme Court upheld an Act of the Legislature which provided for a Council-Manager form of Government for Hamilton County.
Summary of this case from Weakley Co. Mun. Elec. System v. VickOpinion
Opinion filed July 11, 1952. Rehearing denied December 5, 1952.
1. COUNTIES.
Under Private Act commonly referred to as the Hamilton County Council-Manager Act, the County Manager is an employee rather than a county officer, and therefore the provision for his appointment by the council does not violate the constitutional provision for election of county officers by the County Court or the people (Priv. Acts 1941, c. 156; Const. art. 11, sec. 17).
2. STATUTES.
The Private Act commonly referred to as the Hamilton County Council-Manager Act had only one subject, and that was to reorganize the government and administration of Hamilton County, and it did not violate constitutional provision requiring but one subject, even though there were other provisions in Act necessary to accomplishment of single purpose of administration of county (Priv. Acts 1941, c. 156; Const. art. 11, sec. 17).
3. STATUTES.
Private Act commonly referred to as Hamilton County Council-Manager Act, even though having for its purpose the changing of the agency to govern and administer the affairs of the county, did not, as contended, contravene general statutes providing a quarterly county court form of government for remainder of counties of state (Priv. Acts 1941, c. 156).
FROM HAMILTON.GRAHAM VAN DERVEER, of Chattanooga, for complainants.
ROBERT P. FRIERSON and THOMAS S. MYERS, both of Chattanooga, and ALBERT WILLIAMS, of Nashville, for defendants.
Action wherein complainants, as taxpayers and members of the County Court of Hamilton County, assailed the constitutionality of the Private Act commonly referred to as the Hamilton County Council-Manager Act. The Chancery Court, Hamilton County, ALVIN ZIEGLER, Chancellor, sustained defendants' demurrer, and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, PREWITT, Justice, held that the Act was valid.
Affirmed.
Complainants as taxpayers and members of the County Court of Hamilton County assailed the constitutionality of Chapter 156, Private Acts of 1941, commonly referred to as the Hamilton County Council-Manager Act, on numerous grounds, including contravention of general statutes, delegation of powers, appointment by the council of county officers rather than by election by the county court or the people, and that the body of the Act is broader than the caption.
The defendants interposed a demurrer which was sustained by the Chancellor.
The purpose of the Act in question is to reorganize the government and administration of Hamilton County. The county has been acting under this statute for more than ten years.
It might be stated at this point that similar acts enacted for the same purpose and with like provisions have been in force for years and their validity has been upheld by the Court. Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 148 S.W. 229; Troutman v. Crippen, 186 Tenn. 459, 212 S.W.2d 33; Crewse v. Beeler, 186 Tenn. 475, 212 S.W.2d 39; Donathan v. McMinn County, 187 Tenn. 220, 213 S.W.2d 173; House v. Creveling, 147 Tenn. 589, 250 S.W. 357; Hicks v. Rhea County, 189 Tenn. 383, 225 S.W.2d 544.
It is insisted that the Chancellor erred in holding that the County Manager is an employee rather than a county officer. We think that under the Act, the County Manager is an employee and therefore the provision for his appointment by the council does not violate Article XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, providing that a county officer shall be elected by the County Court or the people.
It is further insisted that the Chancellor erred in holding that the caption of the Act does not embrace more than one subject.
The Act has only one subject and that is "to reorganize the government and administration of Hamilton County". The other provisions in the Act are necessary to the accomplishment of the single purpose of the administration of Hamilton County. Crewse v. Beeler, supra; Hunter v. Conner, 152 Tenn. 258, 269, 277 S.W. 71; Hicks v. Rhea County, supra.
It is also insisted that the Act is invalid because it contravenes general statutes which provide a quarterly county court form of government for the remainder of the counties of the state by divesting rights and powers out of the county court. The purpose of the present Act is to change the agency to govern and administer the affairs of the county. Such change does not contravene any general statute. Troutman v. Crippen, 186 Tenn. 459, 212 S.W.2d 33.
We have considered all the assignments of error and find them without merit. The decree of the Chancellor is affirmed.