Opinion
CV-2018-0061
05-24-2019
NICHOLAS W. RAGO Plaintiff, v. AMANDA E. SEDGEWICK Defendant.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF: MATTHEW HOWELL ESQ CLARK & HOWELL LLC ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PAIGE STREETER ESQ LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF: MATTHEW HOWELL ESQ CLARK & HOWELL LLC
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PAIGE STREETER ESQ LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS
John O. Neil, Jr. Justice, Superior Court
Defendant Amanda Sedgewick brings a six-count counterclaim against Plaintiff Nicholas Rago for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings (Count I), Tortious Interference (Count II), Defamation (Counts III & IV), Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count V), and Punitive Damages (Count VI). Rago now moves to dismiss, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Counts II, III, and IV of Sedgewick's counterclaim.
I. Background
Plaintiff filed a Complaint seeking recovery for defamation, wrongful use of civil proceedings, and intentional infliction of emotional distress on March 29, 2018. The claims relate to the statements and actions of Amanda Sedgewick, which took place during the course of the parties' divorce. (See generally, Pl, 's Compl.) Specifically, Rago alleged Sedgewick made false allegations against him in a March 31, 2016 Complaint for Protection from Abuse and in police reports, and that on other occasions she falsely accused him of "domestic violence" and/or "abuse." (See Compl. ¶¶ 25, 29, 32, 46, 65.)
On April 18, 2018, Ms. Sedgewick moved to dismiss Rago's Complaint. By Order dated July 30, 2018, the Court stayed all deadlines pending the resolution of Sedgewick's Motion to Dismiss. On January 19, 2018 the Court entered an Order denying Sedgewick's Motion to Dismiss.
On February 14, 2019, Sedgewick answered the Complaint and asserted a number of affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Among the allegations in the counterclaim, Sedgewick asserts that in December of 2016 "Rago interfered with [her] employment relationship through fraud and intimidation by contacting [her] employer and divulging personal information, false allegations, and questioning her mental hcalth[;]" that in a "December 2016 letter to Sedgewick's employer" Rago "falsely alleged that Sedgewick committed a crime or crimes, claimed she was unable to perform her duties as a resident in a mental health program, and divulged personal information about Sedgewick[;]" and that in a "November 2016 Setter to Sedgewick's neighbor" Rago "falsely alleged that Sedgewick committed a crime or crimes and divulged personal information about Sedgewick." (Countercl. ¶¶ 44, 47, 53.)
Sedgewick indicates in her Opposition to Plaintiffs Partial Motion to Dismiss that Rago's counsel consented to an extension of the deadline for filing an answer to the Complaint until February 14, 2019. (Sea Def.'s Opp, at 4, n, 2.) Rago does not dispute that characterization of the facts and does not contend the Answer and counterclaim, were untimely on that basis.
On March 5, 2019, Rago moved to dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of Sedgewick's counterclaim as time-barred barred by the two-year statute of limitations for bringing claims for defamation. Sec 14 M.R.S. § 753. Rago notes that the defamation counterclaims accrued when the letters were sent, in November and December of 2016, respectively, and that the counterclaim for tortious interference is based on the same (allegedly defamatory) December 2016 letter(s) to Sedgewick's employer that formed the basis for counterclaim Count III. (Pl's Mot. Dismiss, at 2.) Therefore, Rago argues, the statute of limitations for bringing those claims lapsed in November and December of 2018.
II. Discussion
A. 12(b)(6) Standard
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the complaint is viewed "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Ramsey v. Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 6, 54 A.3d 710. While the allegations contained in the complaint are considered true and admitted, Richardson v. Winthrop Sch Dep't 2009 ME 109, ¶ 5, 983 A.2d 400 (citation omitted), the court "is not bound to accept the complaint's legal conclusions[, ]" Bowen v. Eastman, 645 A.2d 5, 6 (Me. 1994) (citation omitted). Dismissal is warranted only when the court is satisfied that it is "beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of the claim." Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 2009 ME 51, ¶ 15, 970 A.2d 310 (citation omitted).
B. Analysis
The parties do not dispute that the two-year statute of limitations for bringing defamation claims based on the letters from November and December of 2016 ran as of November and December of 2018, after the filing of Sedgewick's Motion to Dismiss Rago's Complaint and before the entry of the Order denying Sedgewick's Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the issue becomes whether the statute of limitations was tolled such that Sedgewick's defamation claims are not time-barred. Sedgewick argues the statute of limitations was tolled by virtue of M.R. Civ. P. 12(a) and 14 M.R.S. §865.
Sedgewick takes nothing from her argument based on section 865, which provides: "All the provisions hereof respecting limitations apply to any counterclaim by the defendant except a counterclaim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim to (he extent of the demand in the plaintiff's claim. The lime of such limitation shall be computed as if an action had been commenced therefor at the time the plaintiffs action was commenced." 14 M.R.S. § 865 (emphasis added). The Law Court has clarified that the emphasized language indicates the only counterclaims covered by section 865 are those "asserted ... in defensive reduction of the amount of defendant's liability to plaintiff." See Union Trust Co. v. Hardy, 400 A, 2d 384. 392 (Me. 1979). Here, Sedgewick's defamation counterclaims are not asserted "in defensive reduction" of the amounts claimed by Rago in his claims, and therefore section 865 does not apply to those counterclaims.
While there are no Maine cases interpreting the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure in this particular tactual context - -where the statute of limitations ran on various counterclaims after the defendant filed a motion to dismiss-'"the majority of federal courts [hold] that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled for compulsory counterclaims for the period of time allowed for filing such claims under the federal rules of civil procedure." Mr. R. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25080, at *8 (D. Me. Feb. 20, 2001} (rev'd on other grounds, 321 F, 3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003)); 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1419 ("the institution of plaintiffs suit tolls or suspends the running of the statute of limitations governing a compulsory counterclaim, ").
A compulsory counterclaim is "any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.'''' M.R. Civ. P, 13(a)(1) (emphasis added), To determine "whether the facts of a controversy constitute a transaction or occurrence," the Court must "consider whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." Morse Bros, Inc. v. Mason, 2001 MB 5, ¶ 5, 764 A.2d 267 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Sedgewick's defamation claims relate to the veracity of the November and December, 2016 letters; those letters, in turn, accuse Sedgewick of making false allegations of abuse against Rago to the police and in her March 31, 2016 Complaint for Protection from Abuse, The alleged falsity of Sedgewick's allegations of abuse against Rago form die basis of Rago's defamation claims against Scdgewick. Moreover, the general gist of Rago's complaint and Sedgewick's counterclaims evince both parties' desire to litigate the wrongfulness of the other party's conduct during the course of their contentious divorce proceedings, These facts are substantially related in time, space, origin, and motivation, and the claims would form a convenient trial unit
Under M, R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1) the rule adopted by a majority of federal jurisdictions, Counts II, III, and IV of Sedgewick's counterclaim constitute timely, compulsory counterclaims. Accordingly, the entry shall be:
"Plaintiffs Partial Motion to Dismiss is DENIED."
The Clerk is requested to enter this Order on the docket for this case by incorporating it by reference. M, R. Civ. P. 79(a).
SO ORDERED.