Opinion
A25A0204
08-28-2024
CALE RAGLAND v. THE STATE.
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
In 2007, Cale Ragland pled guilty to aggravated child molestation and was sentenced to 25 years in prison, followed by probation for life. In 2024, Ragland filed a motion to vacate his sentence, arguing that his sentence for aggravated child molestation was void because it did not impose a split sentence. The trial court denied the motion and Ragland filed this direct appeal.
Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence only during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later. Frazier v. State, 302 Ga.App. 346, 348 (691 S.E.2d 247) (2010). Once this statutory period expires, as it has here, a trial court may modify a sentence only if that sentence is void - i.e., only if it imposes a punishment that the law does not allow. Id. See also Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669, 670 (604 S.E.2d 483) (2004) ("When the sentence imposed falls within the statutory range of punishment, the sentence is not void and is not subject to post-appeal modification..."). Thus, a defendant may not appeal an order denying a motion to modify his sentence unless he can raise a colorable claim that the sentence is, in fact, void. Frazier, 302 Ga.App. at 348.
Ragland has not raised a colorable void sentence claim because his sentence for aggravated child molestation is authorized by statute. See OCGA § 16-6-4 (d) (1).
Accordingly, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.