Moreover, Flagg Bros. is distinguishable, Luria argues, because a debtor-creditor relationship existed in Flagg Bros. whereas Luria and Economy had no such relationship. The district court in this case found a constitutional violation in Economy's resort to the distraint provisions of Article III of the Pennsylvania Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, which had been declared unconstitutional in Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.Pa. 1975) (three-judge court). It found state action by interpreting the teachings of Parks, discerning therein a distinction between rights conferred by statute and rights conferred by common law.
Luria Bros. Co. v. Allen, 452 F. Supp. at 736. The decision thereafter quotes from Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152, 155 (W.D.Pa. 1975). It is this language, as well as the reference to Ragin, which indicated, albeit only implicitly, an alternative basis for finding state action to be present.
Also closely in point are cases considering on the merits challenges to landlords', innkeepers', and mechanics' possessory lien laws. See, e. g., Culbertson v. Leland, supra; Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.Pa. 1975); Blye v. Globe Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170, 300 N.E.2d 710 (1973); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D.Fla. 1975); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Frick Brothers Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976). The Seventh Circuit cases, Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974) (garagekeepers' lien) and Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan National Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 1143, 47 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976) (innkeepers' lien), were in my view incorrectly decided to the extent that they predicate their holdings on the absence of state action in a non-contractual setting.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania distraint statute, 68 Pa.Stat.Ann. ยง 250.302, has been held to be facially unconstitutional by a number of federal courts. Id. (citing Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152, 156-157 (W.D.Pa. 1975) (three-judge court); Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1265, 1266 (E.D.Pa. 1975); Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., 355 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.Pa. 1973)). The bankruptcy court then turned to the Third Circuit's opinion in Luria Bros. Co., Inc. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1982), and summarized that case as follows:
The Constitutionality of distraint under the Pennsylvania Landlord Tenant Act of 1951, 68 P.S. ยง 250.302, et seq. has previously been tested in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and found to be wanting. Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.Pa. 1975). Ragin held that the Pennsylvania statute, which authorizes the landlord to distrain a tenant's personal property for unpaid rent without notice or hearing and, upon the tenant's failure to replevy the goods within five days, to have the sheriff or constable sell such property at public sale upon six days' notice, violates the requirements of due process.
Furthermore, numerous courts have found state action in invalidating statutes authorizing self-help remedies for landlords and innkeepers which involves no action whatsoever by state officials. Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D.Fla. 1975); Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.Pa. 1975) (Three-Judge Court); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.Fla. 1972) (Three-Judge Court). In James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974), the court concluded that Mississippi's self-help repossession statute did not involve state action and distinguished the decision in Hall v. Garson, noting:
A significant number of Pennsylvania federal court decisions have already expressly declared the Pennsylvania distraint levy process facially unconstitutional. See Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152, 156-57 (W.D.Pa. 1975) (three-judge court); Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1265, 1266 (E.D.Pa. 1975); and Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., 355 F. Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.Pa. 1973). It is difficult to logically explain why confession of judgment did not meet the same fate as distraint, i.e., was declared facially unconstitutional, as the constitutional issues presented by the utilization of both procedures are identical.
Numerous decisions have held the distraint provisions to be unconstitutional and unenforceable because they violated a tenant's rights to procedural due process. See Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.Pa. 1975); Litton Business Systems v. Paul L'Esperance, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D.Pa. 1975); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.Pa. 1972), vacated (this aspect of District Court order as overly broad) and remanded on other grounds, 496 F.2d 1153 (3rd Cir. 1974); Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D.Pa. 1972); and Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.Pa. 1970). The viability of the distraint provisions today, however, is open to question in light of two recent conflicting decisions from the Third Circuit and the Pennsylvania Superior Court โ the difference resulting from a determination of when state action is involved to invoke the procedural protections afforded by the due process clause.
Our holding is consistent with out-of-state cases striking down similar statutes that permitted distraint of the property of a residential tenant. See, e.g., Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972) (invalidating a Texas statute); Stroemer v.Shevin, 399 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.Fla. 1973); Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D.Pa. 1975); Adams v. Joseph F. SansonInvestment Co., 376 F. Supp. 61 (D.Nev. 1974); Shaffer v.Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Blocker v.Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d 56 (1971). In New Jersey, the relevant statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:33-1, was amended in 1971 ( L.1971, c. 228, ยง 1) to eliminate distraint against residential tenants.
In reaching this conclusion, we do not write on a clean slate. A significant number of courts have reached and decided the merits of procedural due process challenges to garageman's lien foreclosure acts, striking down statutes virtually indistinguishable from those at issue here (see Parks v "Mr. Ford", 556 F.2d 132; Hernandez v European Auto Collision, 487 F.2d 378; Caesar v Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645; Mason v Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420, mod 364 F. Supp. 452; Straley v Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902; Cockerel v Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491; Ford v Dean's O.K. Tire Store, CCH Poverty L Rep, par 16,856; Adams v Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal.3d 146, supra; Whitmore v New Jersey Div. of Motor Vehicles, 137 N.J. Super. 492; Ann., 64 ALR3d 814; cf. Blye v Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, supra; Cox Bakeries of N.D. v Timm Moving Stor., 554 F.2d 356, supra; Culbertson v Leland, 528 F.2d 426; Johnson v Riverside Hotel, 399 F. Supp. 1138; Ragin v Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152; Isbel v County of Sonoma, 21 Cal.3d 61; Barry Props. v Frick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15). Although the holdings of a number of the Federal cases cited above have been undermined by the "State action" determination of the Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. v Brooks ( 436 U.S. 149, supra), their substantive determinations remain unimpaired, viz., that ex parte foreclosure of an artisan's lien is constitutionally infirm inasmuch as it affords no opportunity to be heard prior to the final deprivation of a significant property interest.