Opinion
06 Civ. 2797 (SCR) (JFK).
December 17, 2009
FOR PLAINTIFF, COLETTE D. RAGIN: Christopher D. Watkins, Esq., Michael H. Sussman, Esq., Sussman Watkins, Goshen, New York.
FOR DEFENDANTS, NEWBURGH ENLARGED CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, ANNETTE SATURNELLI, RUNSTON LEWIS: John S. Diaconis, Esq., Lewis R. Silverman, Esq., Jeremy P. Spiegel, Esq., Rutherford Christie, LLP, New York, New York.
Opinion Order
Plaintiff, Colette D. Ragin ("Ragin" or "Plaintiff"), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and New York State Executive Law § 296 (the New York Human Rights Law, the "HRL") against Dr. Annette Saturnelli ("Saturnelli") and Runston "Pops" Lewis ("Lewis") in their individual capacities and against the Newburgh Enlarged City School District ("NECSD" and, together with Saturnelli and Lewis, the "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges that, in violation of her right to equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and New York state law, (1) Defendant Lewis engaged in quid pro quo sexual harassment against her, and (2) Defendants Saturnelli and NECSD discriminated against her because of her race. Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This motion is before me with the consent of the Honorable Stephen Robinson, before whom the motion was originally filed. See Rule 13 of the Local Rules for the Division of Business among District Judges.
I. Factual Background
Ragin is an African-American female who began working as the principal of Horizons-on-Hudson Elementary School ("Horizons") on January 3, 2005. She alleges the following series of facts to support her claims of sex and race discrimination. Unless otherwise noted, Defendants dispute all allegations.
A. Ragin's Interaction with Board of Education President Lewis
Shortly after Ragin began her employment, Saturnelli — the Superintendent of Schools — called her to a meeting where she introduced Plaintiff to Defendant Lewis, then the President of the Board of Education of NECSD. Ragin claims that after Saturnelli left the room during the meeting, Lewis asked Plaintiff a series of personal questions and made several comments Ragin deemed inappropriate. Based on Lewis' comments and body language, Ragin felt that he was coming on to her, which made her feel uncomfortable. At the same meeting, Lewis told her that he knew people in her neighborhood and had considerable influence in the school district.At a principals' meeting in January 2005, Lewis made verbal advances toward Ragin and downplayed her objection to his advances by stating that they were both single and both adults. After she returned to her seat, Lewis stared at her throughout the meeting.
In late January 2005, Lewis invited Ragin to his birthday party. After she did not attend, Lewis told her she owed him a dinner date and asked her to call him to arrange the date. He also told Ragin that he turned into an "animal" at night. (Ragin Aff. ¶ 3). Plaintiff did not call Lewis or go to dinner with him. He then obtained her telephone number from her secretary, left a message on her home answering machine at approximately midnight on a Sunday evening, and followed up with another message on her cell phone. A recorded message from Ragin's home answering machine was played at Lewis' deposition, and he testified that he could not recall whether he left said message.
During an encounter at NECSD's Central Office in late July 2005, Lewis told Ragin to call him to meet for dinner. Thereafter, Plaintiff sent Lewis a certified letter dated July 28, 2005 explaining her desire to keep their communication "on a professional level" and requesting that he contact her only during regular business hours. (Ragin Aff. ¶ 5; Watkins Aff., Ex. 1).
Soon after sending this letter, in August 2005, the president of the local NAACP branch invited Ragin to attend an event he described as an "NAACP function" to help her professionally. When she arrived at the function, however, she realized that it was actually an event sponsored by Lewis' "Pop's Pets and Pals" group. Lewis, while allegedly intoxicated, met her at the door and complained about the letter Plaintiff had sent him in July. Lewis asked her, "Don't you know who I am?" and asserted that he was the person who supported all of the black administrators from the school district in attendance. She then reiterated her desire to keep their relationship professional, to which Lewis responded, "Professional, what are you talking about?" (Ragin Aff. ¶ 7; Ragin Dep. at 137:10-15).
At the same event, Lewis insisted Plaintiff remain by his side, going so far as to pull her to him when she eased away. Lewis told Ragin he would forgive her for sending the letter and would help her out, alluding to a "problem" she had with Saturnelli and a group of white teachers at her school. Lewis then had her stand while he introduced her to the crowd and announced his support for her as principal at Horizons. Thereafter, he insisted she dance with him. At his deposition, Lewis testified that he had been drinking and had no recollection of whether Plaintiff attended the function or the nature of their interaction. (Lewis Dep. at 95:22-96:16).
In October 2005, Lewis invited Plaintiff to attend a function being held in his honor. Ragin claims Lewis led her to believe that other black administrators would be there when, in fact, she was the only principal in attendance. At this November 2005 event, Lewis — again while allegedly intoxicated — kissed Plaintiff while grabbing her waist in what she claims was a sexual manner.
Plaintiff brought her concerns regarding Lewis' behavior to the attention of Deputy Superintendent Patricia O'Connor and Assistant Superintendent Olivia Henderson. According to O'Connor, after she informed Saturnelli of Ragin's concerns, Saturnelli responded that Lewis "shouldn't be doing that," but Saturnelli took no action to address his behavior. (O'Connor Dep. at 17:25-20:23).
In November 2005, during a Board of Education presentation, Lewis yelled at Ragin regarding the fact that Horizons was mostly populated with non-white students. Shortly thereafter, Assistant Superintendent Marsha Sobel ("Sobel") issued Plaintiff a "Quarterly Progress Report" which, among other things, noted the "white flight" from Horizons as a problem Ragin needed to address. (Watkins Aff., Ex. 3 at 2).
B. Ragin's Tenure at Horizons
Shortly after starting her employment at Horizons, a small contingent of white teachers, as well as Plaintiff's white assistant, Dawn Grieco, complained about Plaintiff to Saturnelli — who is also white. According to O'Connor, this contingent did not view Plaintiff as "warm and fuzzy" enough. (O'Connor Dep. 29:10-29:24). Ragin describes Grieco as being openly hostile toward her, going so far as to place Plaintiff's photograph on a dartboard near her desk.
In July 2005, Saturnelli suggested that she was going to terminate Ragin and directed the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources, Wilbert "John" Knight, to inform Plaintiff of a meeting to discuss disciplinary action. Through their depositions, O'Connor and Knight confirmed Plaintiff's testimony in this regard, but Saturnelli flatly denies the allegations. Plaintiff claims that a few days after Knight called her, Plaintiff's union representative informed her there would not be a meeting.
On January 27, 2006, Saturnelli directed Knight to find evidence that would justify Plaintiff's termination. Specifically, she asked Knight to verify whether Ragin possessed a permanent New York State Certification in the areas listed on her resume, whether she had taken required Child Abuse and SAVE workshops, whether her fingerprints were cleared, and whether she was a United States citizen. (Watkins Aff., Ex. 5; Knight Dep. 45:2-48:3). Although no negative or untruthful information was uncovered from this background check, on January 31, 2006, Saturnelli placed Ragin on disciplinary suspension with pay pending a meeting by the Board of Education of NECSD.
On February 13, 2006, in response to Ragin's request for an explanation for her suspension, Saturnelli provided three reasons for recommending that the Board terminate Ragin's employment: (1) exploiting a professional relationship for personal gain by engaging a SAVE room teacher (a teacher for disruptive students) to serve as Ragin's personal driver, causing that teacher to arrive after the start of school on eight separate occasions; (2) waste and mismanagement in the form of giving one of two music teachers assigned to her building only three instructional assignments for the 2005-2006 school year; and (3) failing to call to Saturnelli's attention the underutilization of the same music teacher, preventing the Board of Education and Saturnelli from making a resource allocation decision in accordance with the law.
Ragin disputes the characterization of her behavior in each of Saturnelli's reasons for termination. Ragin claims that, with the full prior knowledge and approval of both Saturnelli and Sobel, she made arrangements to carpool with the SAVE room teacher who was having car troubles and benefited from the arrangement. Ragin asserts that while the teacher technically arrived after the start of school (8:40am) on eight occasions, not once did that teacher miss any class time as a result, as her first class started at 10:00am.
As to Saturnelli's second and third proffered reasons for termination, Ragin claims that in August 2005, she submitted schedules of teachers — including the aforementioned music teacher — to Assistant Superintendent Sobel. According to Ragin, Sobel reviewed and approved the schedule and did not raise an issue with Ragin regarding the underutilization of any music teacher.
On March 6, 2006, the Board of Education voted to terminate Ragin's employment, effective the close of business, April 14, 2006. By letter of April 3, 2006, Ragin resigned her position as principal with the district.
C. Claims of Disparate Treatment
Ragin alleges that two Caucasian male principals — Peter Copeletti and Ed Mucci — received more favorable treatment from Saturnelli and NECSD than Plaintiff received. According to O'Connor, she received numerous complaints about Copeletti, mostly concerning his lack of responsiveness to parents. O'Connor brought these complaints to Saturnelli's attention, but no disciplinary action was taken against Copeletti, who is Saturnelli's nephew through marriage. (O'Connor Dep. 85:25-87:9). Due to performance issues, Mucci was placed on a professional development plan but faced no disciplinary action. Instead, he was given tenure. Ragin further claims that neither Mucci's nor Copeletti's school was meeting the No Child Left Behind standards, while Ragin's school did.
D. The Instant Action
On April 11, 2006, Ragin commenced the instant action for sex discrimination against Lewis based on quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of § 1983 and the HRL, and for race discrimination against Saturnelli and NECSD in violation of §§ 1981 and 1983 and the HRL, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and an order directing NECSD to re-employ Plaintiff as a principal.
II. Discussion A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine issue exists for summary judgment purposes "where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could decide in the non-movant's favor." Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 2007)). Thus, when determining whether such issues do exist, the court must "construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant." Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate when the non-moving party has no evidentiary support for an essential element on which it bears the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 743 (2d Cir. 2003) (alterations in original).The United States Supreme Court has stated that "trial courts should not `treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of fact.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993)). As in any other case, "an employment discrimination plaintiff faced with a properly supported summary judgment motion must `do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.' . . . She must come forth with evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to still find in her favor." Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff in a discrimination suit must offer "concrete particulars" to substantiate the claim. Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985).
The Court exercises caution when determining whether to grant summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case where, as here, the employer's intent is at issue. Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). Since "direct evidence of [discriminatory] intent will only rarely be available, . . . `affidavits and depositions must: be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination.'" Id. at 137 (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, a plaintiff in a discrimination case "must provide more than conclusory allegations" to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id.
B. Claims Under §§ 1981 and 1983
Plaintiff asserts a claim for sex discrimination based on quid pro quo sexual harassment under § 1983 against Lewis and race discrimination claims pursuant to §§ 1981 and 1983 against Saturnelli and NECSD. Defendants argue that neither the § 1983 quid pro quo claim nor the § 1981 race discrimination claim is cognizable.1. Stating a Claim Under § 1981
Section 1981 provides that
[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for violations of the rights guaranteed under § 1981 in a claim against a state actor. Id.; accord Sullivan v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 281 F. Supp. 2d 689, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). To the extent Ragin seeks to vindicate any independent rights for race discrimination under § 1981, she must do so via claims made under § 1983 because both Saturnelli — in her capacity as Superintendent — and NECSD are state actors. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 736 (1989).
Plaintiff's brief aptly notes that, while "[t]here is some question as to whether § 1981(c), added to § 1981 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, creates an implicit private right of action against state actors under § 1981, thereby statutorily overruling Jett," Roper v. Hynes, No. 05 Civ. 7664, 2006 WL 2773032, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006) (Pauley, J.), courts in this Circuit have not deviated from Jett's holding in the absence of controlling authority to the contrary from the Court of Appeals. See Whaley v. City Univ. of N.Y., 555 F. Supp. 2d 381, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Edwards v. Town of Huntington, No. 05 Civ. 339, 2007 WL 2027913, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007); Roper, 2006 WL 2773032, at *12; Bond v. City of Middletown, 389 F. Supp. 2d 319, 327-28 (D. Conn. 2005); Perry v. Metro. Suburban Bus Auth., 319 F. Supp. 2d 338, 341-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Hill v. Taconic Developmental Disabilities Servs. Office, 283 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Sullivan, 281 F. Supp. at 708; Roddini v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 4640, 2003 WL 435981, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2003); Mack v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 225 F. Supp. 2d 376, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Therefore, "[b]ecause § 1981 provides no broader remedy against a state actor than § 1983 and since they merge into one another, the court need provide no further analysis on this point. The § 1981 claim is treated exactly like that § 1983 claim, becomes merged into it and is considered as a single claim." Booker v. Bd. of Educ., 238 F. Supp. 2d 469, 475 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (quoting Pearson v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 952 F.2d 1274, 1278 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1992)).
2. Stating § 1983 Claims Against the Individual Defendants
Since Plaintiff's § 1981 and § 1983 claims merge, all of Plaintiff's remaining federal claims are analyzed under § 1983, which states, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) the defendant's conduct or actions deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the Constitution. See Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 315 (2d Cir. 2004).
a. Color of State Law
Generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his or her official capacity or while exercising his or her responsibilities pursuant to state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 50 (1988). "The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the color of law requirement, concluding that `misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken `under color' of state law.'"United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2006) ("The relevant question when determining whether an action was under color of law is not whether the [action] was part of the defendant's official duties but, rather, whether the [action] was made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state [or federal] law." (citations and internal quotations omitted).
It is clear that the president of a state school district's board of education is a state actor who, as a voting member of the board, has the power to, among other things, cast a vote when determining whether to terminate a school district principal, as well as to influence the votes of other board members. Similarly, the superintendent of schools is a state actor who advises the board and has the power to recommend terminating a principal. Thus, when persons in these positions misuse their authority in the course of performing such duties, they necessarily act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has raised triable issues of fact as to whether Lewis and Saturnelli abused the authority given to each of them as Board President and Superintendent, respectively.
b. Deprivation of Rights — Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
Once it is determined that the defendant acted under color of state law, a plaintiff seeking relief against an employer for sexual harassment in the workplace can proceed under two theories: hostile work environment and quid pro quo harassment. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64-65.
Quid pro quo harassment occurs when "submission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual] conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual." Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2)). To establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, a plaintiff must "present evidence that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct, and that her reaction to that conduct was then used as the basis of decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment." Id. Actionable unwelcome sexual conduct includes "[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) and adopting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines' definition of sexual harassment).
In order to bring a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, the plaintiff must also show that the harasser was the plaintiff's supervisor. Lange, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 423. Under the Second Circuit's expansive definition, a supervisor is not just a person with the authority "to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee," Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 126 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998)), but also includes employees who have the power and authority to affect the plaintiff's day-to-day work activities. Id. ("The question in such cases is . . . whether the authority given by the employer to the [alleged supervisor] enabled or materially augmented the ability of the latter to create a hostile work environment for his or her subordinates.").
Additionally, in a "refusal" case such as this one — where the plaintiff claims to have rejected the alleged sexual advances — a plaintiff must show that she suffered an adverse employment action as a result of her refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual advances.Carrero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 579 (2d Cir. 1989). That is, a plaintiff must provide enough evidence to indicate that the supervisor "used the employee's acceptance or rejection of his advances as the basis for a decision affecting the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of the employee's job." Karibian, 14 F.3d at 778;see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (finding that a tangible employment action usually "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits"). Where a plaintiff lacks direct evidence that the offending supervisor threatened or warned the plaintiff that her failure to comply with his sexual advances would result in an adverse employment action, she still may survive summary judgment by providing circumstantial proof that "an adverse employment action followed closely in time after the employee rejected or complained about the supervisor's sexual advance." Adeniji v. Admin. for Children's Servs., 43 F. Supp. 2d 407, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
c. Deprivation of Rights — Race Discrimination
To state a prima facie case for race discrimination, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) she falls within a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse employment action was taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.See Whaley, 555 F. Supp. at 397-98. The plaintiff must also allege some causal link between racially motivated behavior by the defendant and an adverse employment action. Callahan v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 132, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The plaintiff need not demonstrate a connection to a government policy or custom. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
3. § 1983 Claims Against Municipalities
A defendant school district cannot be held liable in a § 1981 or § 1983 action solely on the basis of respondeat superior. Mack v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 225 F. Supp. 2d at 382. A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only when there is a deprivation of rights pursuant to a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). For a municipality to be liable for the actions of its employees or agents, they must be executing a government policy or custom, "whether made by its lawmakers or those whose edicts or acts are fairly said to represent official policy." Id. at 694. For purposes of § 1983, school districts are considered to be local governments and are subject to similar liability as local governments under Monell. Id. at 696-97.
C. Application of the McDonnell Douglas Analysis to Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims 1. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims Against the Individual Defendants
The Court applies the three-step burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) in analyzing whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case for race or sex discrimination under § 1983. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506. Under this framework, the employee first bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
Second, after Plaintiff establishes the existence of a prima facie case, there is a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee, thus shifting the burden to the employer "to articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The defendant bears the burden of producing evidence "which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509. "This burden is one of production, not persuasion; it `can have no credibility assessment.'" Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141 (quotingHicks, 509 U.S. at 509 (1993)).
Third, if the employer carries its burden, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the legitimate reasons offered by the employer were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). A "plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by illuminating `such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons' that would raise doubt in the factfinder's mind that the employer did not act for those reasons." Bogdan v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 02 Civ. 09587, 2005 WL 1161812, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2005) (quoting Brierly v. Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 59 F. Supp. 2d 275, 291 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). While this burden of production may shift, the plaintiff always bears the burden of proving intentional discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507.
a. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case for Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Under § 1983
Defendants contend Plaintiff has failed to establish her quid pro quo claim, arguing: (1) Lewis was not Ragin's supervisor and therefore could not alter her job conditions; (2) Lewis' conduct fails to rise to the level of actionable harassment; and (3) there was no link whatsoever between Ragin's rejection of Lewis' alleged advances and any decision affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of her job.Under the Second Circuit's broad definition of "supervisor," the alleged facts support Ragin's claim that Lewis could, and did, "recommend tangible employment decisions" affecting her, ultimately in the form of supporting her termination. See, e.g., Bennett v. Progressive Corp., 225 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Even if [the harassing defendant or his superior] could not unilaterally terminate [plaintiff], sufficient facts have been alleged that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that either [person] could recommend [plaintiff's] firing, and that such recommendation would be followed."); Hill v. Children's Village, 196 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that even where harassing supervisor did not have the unilateral power to fire plaintiff, the supervisor need not act alone in making the tangible employment decision as long as the supervisor obtains the "imprimatur of the enterprise and use[s] its internal process" (quotingEllerth, 524 U.S. at 763)). Here, while Lewis does not appear to have had the unilateral power to fire Ragin, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Lewis recommended her termination which in fact led to her firing.
Citing Ellerth, Defendants next argue that, in order for the unwanted sexual conduct to be actionable, "the conduct must be severe or pervasive," 524 U.S. at 754, a standard they assert Lewis' behavior does not meet. Yet the Court in Ellerth explicitly made clear that the "severe and pervasive" standard applied only to claims alleging a hostile work environment and not claims for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Id.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Ragin, Plaintiff was subjected to unwanted sexual conduct that violated her constitutional right to equal protection. Far from Defendants' characterization of Lewis' behavior as "mere social advances," (Def. Br. at 10), Lewis' behavior included allegedly inappropriately kissing and grabbing Ragin's waist in a sexual manner while intoxicated, making unwanted verbal advances toward her, and advising her that he would support her in the school district in return for a personal relationship, all despite Ragin's insistence that their relationship remain professional only. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff has carried her burden of establishing that Lewis' conduct is actionable.
Ragin also has provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find a causal link between her rejection of Lewis' alleged sexual advances and her suffering a tangible employment action. Shortly after Ragin voiced to O'Connor her concerns regarding the alleged kissing and grabbing incident, Ragin claims that Lewis yelled at her over the fact that Horizons was populated with mostly non-white students. (Ragin Aff. ¶ 10). Soon after that incident, on November 22, 2005, Ragin received the "Quarterly Progress Report." According to Ragin, such a report was not issued to other principals in the district. (Ragin Aff. ¶ 10). Ragin, in turn, was terminated. Based on these allegations, a reasonable jury could conclude that the strong temporal relationship between Ragin's refusal to submit to Lewis' advances, his criticism of her, and NECSD's issuing Plaintiff the "Quarterly Progress Report" demonstrates a causal link between Ragin's rejection of Lewis' advances and an adverse employment action. See Whaley, 555 F. Supp. at 401 (concluding that close temporal proximity may establish causality). The Court finds that Ragin has satisfied the minimal showing required to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Although Ragin technically resigned, she has established an adverse employment action. The Board of Education's March 6, 2006 vote terminating Ragin's employment, as well as its letter dated March 7, 2006 informing the Plaintiff of this action, constitute a significant change in employment status and provide enough evidence for Plaintiff to show a tangible employment action. Furthermore, Defendants apparently conceded as much prior to litigation; in the NECSD's Notice of Protest to unemployment benefits dated April 19, 2006, "Misconduct Discharge" is checked off as the reason for the objection. (See Pl. Ex. 6).
b. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case for Race Discrimination Under § 1983
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to establish elements three and four of her prima facie case — i.e., that she suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.
As previously explained, although Defendants disagree, it is clear that Plaintiff suffered a direct adverse employment action when the school board voted to terminate her employment. Since Defendants do not contest the fact that Ragin belongs to a protected class and that she was qualified to be principal at Horizons, the remaining issue to resolve at the prima facie stage is whether Plaintiff can establish an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by the Defendants.
Given the "minimal" showing necessary to establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001), and in light of the facts at hand — namely, Plaintiff's rebuttal of Saturnelli's proffered reasons for termination, the context of "white flight" in the "Quarterly Progress Report," and Knight's background check — Plaintiff has set forth enough evidence to prove that she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Therefore, she has established her prima facie case.
c. Defendants' Non-Discriminatory Reason for Terminating Plaintiff's Employment
Defendants argue that, far from a pretext for discrimination, the Board of Education voted to terminate Ragin based on Saturnelli's recommendation and the three reasons provided in her letter to Ragin dated February 13, 2006. Having so argued, the Defendants articulated legitimate reasons for terminating Ragin sufficient to meet their burden of production.
d. Pretext for Discrimination
Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to call into question Saturnelli's proffered reasons for her termination. A reasonable jury could conclude that Saturnelli's claim of basing Plaintiff's termination, in part, on the driving arrangement contradicts evidence Plaintiff provided that Saturnelli had approved of that very arrangement. A reasonable jury might also doubt that the teacher schedule and the unreported underutilization of a music teacher actually were reasons for termination, based on the fact that Ragin claims to have submitted the schedule to Assistant Superintendent Sobel — Ragin's direct supervisor and Saturnelli's subordinate — who approved it.
Plaintiff also asserts that she received the "Quarterly Progress Report" from Sobel soon after rebuffing Lewis' advances at the Board of Education presentation in November 2005. Similar to the criticism Plaintiff alleges Lewis leveled at her, this report noted: "Ms. Ragin has had a large number of white families leave the school. Ms. Ragin must find a way to retain and attract more white families into Horizons." (Watkins Aff. Ex. 3 at 2). A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the close temporal proximity between Ragin's refusal to submit to Lewis' advances, his criticism of her and the racial make-up of her student population, and NECSD's issuing Plaintiff the "Quarterly Progress Report" highlighting "white flight" demonstrates a discriminatory motive that Defendants' proffered reasons cannot mask.
Further suggesting pretext is the evidence that Saturnelli instructed Knight to perform a background check on Plaintiff days before informing Plaintiff that Saturnelli planned to recommend termination. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that since Saturnelli had not requested such a background check until more than a year after Ragin was hired and shortly before her termination, Saturnelli was in search of a neutral reason for Plaintiff's termination. Because Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants intended to discriminate against her, Defendants' motion as to this claim is denied.
2. Plaintiff's § 1983 Claims Against NECSD
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence to support a finding of a deprivation of rights pursuant to an official policy of NECSD.
Plaintiff alleges that NECSD has hired several African-American females as principals in the five years preceding the complaint, but each was terminated before attaining tenure, reflecting a district-wide policy and practice of intentionally discriminating against qualified female African-American principals. Furthermore, Plaintiff points to two Caucasian probationary principals — Copeletti and Mucci — whom she alleges received more favorable treatment from Saturnelli and NESCD than Plaintiff received despite each Caucasian principal's school not meeting the No Child Left Behind standards. A reasonable trier of fact could determine that this evidence supports a finding that it was the district's policy to racially discriminate against blacks such as Ragin. Therefore, this Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claim for racial discrimination against NECSD.
D. The Individual Defendants' Qualified Immunity Defense
Defendants argue that the individual defendants — Saturnelli and Lewis — are entitled to qualified immunity as to all claims asserted against them by Plaintiff and, therefore, those claims should be dismissed.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil liability when performing discretionary duties "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The threshold question in determining whether qualified immunity applies to protect officials from damages is whether a favorable view of the plaintiff's alleged facts shows that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Thus, in determining whether a governmental employee is entitled to immunity, the court accepts as true the allegations of plaintiff's complaint. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 122 (1997). If, while construing the facts in favor of the plaintiff, no constitutional right was violated, then no further inquiry is necessary. Id. If, however, the court determines that such a reading of the facts demonstrates that the official's conduct violated a constitutional right, the court next asks whether the right was clearly established — that is, whether the contours of the right are so clear that a reasonable government official would have understood that his or her action violated that right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity only if he or she can demonstrate that, even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant acted unreasonably in light of clearly established law. Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).
A district court may not grant qualified immunity as a matter of law where, as here, the right in question — equal protection — is clearly established and there are disputes as to the underlying material facts.
Although a conclusion that the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law may be appropriate where there is no dispute as to the material historical facts, if there is such a dispute, the factual questions must be resolved by the factfinder. "Though immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court, . . . that is true only in those cases where the facts concerning the availability of the defense are undisputed; otherwise, jury consideration is normally required."Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)).
Here, the material facts concerning the alleged quid pro quo sexual harassment and the alleged race discrimination in connection with Ragin's termination are very much in dispute. Construing those facts in Plaintiff's favor, Defendants' actions violated her constitutional right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This right to be free from sex and race discrimination in public employment is clearly established. Therefore, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants acted unreasonably. The individual Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity and this Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this basis.
E. Plaintiff's State Law Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's discrimination claims brought under the HRL, Executive Law § 296, must be dismissed for failure to file a notice of claim.
New York Education Law § 3813 provides that in order to maintain a claim against a School Board, a School District or its employees, a plaintiff must first serve a notice of claim on defending parties as required under the New York General Municipal Law §§ 50-e and 50-i. This requirement applies to discrimination claims brought pursuant to New York Executive Law § 296.Augustin v. Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of Newburgh, et al., 616 F. Supp. 2d 422, 445-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Taylor v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 908 F. Supp. 1165, 1175 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (internal citations omitted)). There is no dispute that, here, Plaintiff never filed a notice of claim, nor has she sought leave to file a late notice of claim. Plaintiff argues that courts within this Circuit and District have split on the issue of whether the notice of claim requirement applies to § 296 claims. A review of recent case law, however, reveals that federal courts in this district routinely grant summary judgment with regard to § 296 claims on the basis of failure to file a notice of claim. Id. at 446; see, e.g., Collier v. City of N.Y., No. 07 Civ. 532, 2009 WL 464937, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009); Santiago v. Newburgh Enlarged City Sch. Dist., 434 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Marrero v. City of N.Y., No. 02 Civ. 6634, 2004 WL 444548, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2004).
The § 3813 notice of claim requirement applies only to those actions seeking to enforce private rights, as opposed to those seeking vindication of the public interest. Putkowski v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). "Although all actions brought to enforce civil rights can be said to be in the public interest," only "actions that seek relief for a similarly situated class of the public" are exempt from the notice of claim requirement. Bloom v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ. Teachers' Ret. Sys., No. 00 Civ. 2728, 2003 WL 1740528, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Here, Plaintiff seeks enforcement of a private right, as she requests relief in the form of monetary damages and re-employment with the District. Thus, the notice requirement of § 3813 applies to Plaintiff's § 296 discrimination claims and, therefore, this Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to Plaintiff's state law claims brought under New York Executive Law § 296.
F. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are limited to cases in which the defendant has engaged in intentional discrimination and has done so "`with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.'" Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). "Malice and reckless indifference refer to `the [defendant's] knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination.'" Farias v. Instructional Systs., Inc., 259 F.3d 91, 101 (2001) (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535). An award of punitive damages also requires a "positive element of conscious wrongdoing." Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 538 (quoting C. McCormick, Law of Damages 280 (1935)). "As an alternative to proving that the defendant was acting in violation of federal law, `egregious or outrageous acts may serve as evidence supporting an inference of the requisite `evil motive.''" Farias, 259 F.3d at 101 (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 538).Defendants contend that Plaintiff's demand for punitive damages under §§ 1981 and 1983 should be dismissed because both Saturnelli and Lewis acted reasonably and appropriately under the circumstances. On the present record, however, it cannot be said that Ragin has not raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Defendants acted with the requisite malicious motive or intent with respect to the claims that have survived summary judgment. Therefore, this Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.
III. Conclusion
Because there are disputed issues of material fact surrounding the reasons for Ragin's termination and the events leading up to it, Defendants' motion as to Ragin's § 1983 quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, her race discrimination claims under §§ 1981 and 1983, and her claim for punitive damages are denied. Defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity of the individual Defendants is also denied. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment concerning Ragin's parallel state law claims, however, due to Plaintiff's failure to file the required notice of claim.