Opinion
No. 78-835
Decided January 4, 1979.
From judgment which reversed Department of Revenue's order suspending plaintiff's driver's license for his failure to comply with the Financial Responsibility Act, the Department appealed.
Reversed
1. AUTOMOBILES — Financial Responsibility Act — License Suspension — Reinstatement Possible — After One Year — Other Prerequisites — Not Met — Controversy — Not Moot. Where driver's license has been suspended under the Financial Responsibility Act, it may be reinstated after one year has elapsed since the accident occurred which resulted in the suspension, but there are also other prerequisites to such reinstatement, and thus where suspended driver had not complied with these other prerequisites to reinstatement, the controversy concerning the suspension of his license was not moot merely because the one year period had elapsed.
2. Financial Responsibility Act — License Reinstatement Hearing — No Requirement — Determine — Each Driver's Relative Negligence — Must Determine — Possible Potential Plaintiff — Under Comparative Negligence — Conclusion — "Free From Fault." In hearing conducted pursuant to Financial Responsibility Act to determine whether driver involved in accident is entitled to have his license reinstated, the hearing officer is not required to make a determination as to each driver's relative negligence; instead, the hearing officer must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that at least one potential plaintiff exists who was less negligent than the licensee, and if there is, then under the terms of our comparative negligence statute, such a person might recover in an action against the licensee, but if there is not, then comparative negligence would bar recovery from the licensee, and he would be deemed "free from fault" within the meaning of the Financial Responsibility Act.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of Adams, Honorable Jean J. Jacobucci, Judge.
Richard M. Borchers, for plaintiff-appellee.
J. D. MacFarlane, Attorney General, David W. Robbins, Deputy Attorney General, Edward G. Donovan, Special Assistant Attorney General, Terre Lee Rushton, Assistant Attorney General, for defendant-appellant.
The district court reversed the Department of Revenue's order suspending plaintiff's driver's license for his failure to comply with the Financial Responsibility Act, § 42-7-101, et seq., C.R.S. 1973. The Department appeals, and we reverse.
Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident in which another person was killed. The Department therefore notified plaintiff, pursuant to § 42-7-301, C.R.S. 1973, that unless plaintiff filed security and proof of financial responsibility, his license would be suspended. Under § 42-7-302(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 1973, these filing requirements do not apply to operators who are found to be "free from fault" for the accident in question. Plaintiff's sole contention at the hearing before the Department was that he was free from fault within the meaning of this exemption. The hearing officer found otherwise, and revoked plaintiff's license.
The district court held that, because of this state's adoption of comparative negligence, the hearing officer was required to make specific findings on each potential party's negligence, and to assign percentage figures to each party. See § 13-21-111, C.R.S. 1973. We disagree.
Before discussing this question, we must address plaintiff's contention that the case has become moot because more than one year has elapsed since the accident. It is true that a license may be reinstated under the Financial Responsibility Act one year after the accident in question, but only if:
"evidence satisfactory to the director has been filed with him that during such period no action for damages arising out of such accident has been instituted, and such person has filed or then files and maintains proof of financial responsibility for the future as provided in section 42-7-408."
Section 42-7-303(1)(b), C.R.S. 1973.
[1] Here, however, nothing in the record indicates that plaintiff's license has been reinstated, or that plaintiff has filed any of the required documents under this section. Under these circumstances, the controversy is not moot.
[2] Turning to the merits, we hold that the district court erred in requiring the Department's hearing officer to make specific percentage findings as to each driver's relative negligence. In In re Questions Submitted by the U.S. District Court, 179 Colo. 270, 499 P.2d 1169 (1972), our Supreme Court held that "free from fault" under § 42-7-302(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 1973 (then C.R.S. 1963, 13-7-16(1)(b) (1965 Cum. Supp.)), means "that there is not a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against the person whose conduct is being considered." That case did not discuss the effect of comparative negligence on the finding of "free from fault," and we agree with plaintiff and the district court that a hearing officer must take comparative negligence into account when deciding whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being entered against a licensee. But we do not agree that this requires specific percentage findings on each party's negligence.
The Financial Responsibility Act was never intended to be a substitute for a detailed adjudication on the merits. In re Questions, supra. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). Instead, the hearing officer must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that at least one potential plaintiff exists who was less negligent than the licensee. If so, then under the terms of our comparative negligence statute, such a person might recover in an action against the licensee. Section 13-21-111(1), C.R.S. 1973. If not, then comparative negligence would bar recovery from the licensee, and he would be deemed "free from fault" within the meaning of § 42-7-302(1)(e)(III), C.R.S. 1973. A specific apportionment of the negligence is not necessary, just as a specific finding of negligence was not necessary before the adoption of comparative negligence. In re Questions, supra.
Because we are unable to tell from the record whether the Department's hearing officer understood the implications of the comparative negligence statute, or indeed, whether he considered comparative negligence at all, we reverse the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court with directions that it remand to the hearing officer for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE COYTE and JUDGE KELLY concur.