Radspinner v. Charlesworth

17 Citing cases

  1. DES LACS VALLEY LAND CORP. v. HERZIG

    2001 N.D. 17 (N.D. 2001)   Cited 15 times
    Explaining that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict the unambiguous language of a written contract

    The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law and precludes use of evidence of prior oral negotiations and agreements to vary the terms expressed in a written contract. Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D. 1985); Bye v. Elvick, 336 N.W.2d 106, 111 (N.D. 1983); Gajewski, at 626. [¶ 8] In Gajewski, 221 N.W.2d at 627, we concluded oral testimony was incompetent and inadmissible (1) to vary or contradict an executed and delivered quitclaim deed; (2) to prove the deed was security for repayment of a loan; and (3) to nullify the grant contained in the deed.

  2. Johnson Farms v. McEnroe

    1997 N.D. 179 (N.D. 1997)   Cited 24 times
    Stating "[i]f the trial court's reason for denying the request is because it was not made in affidavit form, that reason is not apparent from the decision and, in any event, would be a technical application of a rule that should be applied with a spirit of liberality"

    The trial court incorrectly concluded all terms of the parties' overall agreement merged into the initial deeds from the first transaction. [¶ 17] The McEnroes' reliance on Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109 (N.D. 1985), for the proposition a prior deed cannot be modified because of the parol evidence rule, is misplaced. This is not a case like Charlesworth where there was an actual attempt to vary the express terms of a deed.

  3. Great Plains Royalty Corp. v. Earl Schwartz Co. (In re Great Plains Royalty Corp.)

    Bankruptcy No. 68-00039 (Bankr. D.N.D. Mar. 18, 2015)

    Although courts often discuss the "admissibility" of parol evidence, it is important to note that the "parol-evidence rule is not a rule of evidence, but rather one of substantive law." Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D. 1985) (citing (Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143 (N.D. 1980); Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614 (N.D. 1974)). The North Dakota Supreme Court explained the parol evidence rule as follows:

  4. Fettig v. Estate of Fettig

    2019 N.D. 261 (N.D. 2019)   Cited 8 times
    Stating res judicata should not be rigidly applied

    We have stated that deeds are contracts and are generally construed in the same manner as contracts. Motter v. Traill Rural Water Dist. , 2017 ND 267, ¶ 10, 903 N.W.2d 725 ; Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard Oil Co. , 2011 ND 95, ¶ 7, 797 N.W.2d 770 ; Radspinner v. Charlesworth , 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D. 1985). [¶11] Generally, "[a] contract requires parties capable of contracting, consent of the parties, a lawful object, and sufficient consideration."

  5. Johnson v. Shield

    2015 N.D. 200 (N.D. 2015)   Cited 10 times

    See Royse v. Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children & Adults, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 542, 545 (N.D.1977); see also 4 C. Palo, Tiffany on Real Property § 972 (3rd ed. Supp. 2014). “[E]xceptions or exclusions of property should be set forth in the granting clause with the same prominence as the property granted, or, if placed elsewhere, should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt.” Royse, at 545; see also Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Fail, 2008 ND 114, ¶ 7, 751 N.W.2d 188; North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 113 (N.D.1985); Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N.D.1983). [¶ 9] Johnson argues this Court's decision in Mueller v. Stangeland, 340 N.W.2d 450 (N.D.1983), supports his position that the disputed language in the 1942 deed as a matter of law constituted a limitation on the warranty rather than a reservation of mineral interests in the grantors.

  6. Evenson v. Quantum Industries

    2004 N.D. 178 (N.D. 2004)   Cited 6 times
    In Evenson v. Quantum Industries, Inc., 687 N.W.2d 241, 244-45 (N.D. 2004), the plaintiff alleged that he was fraudulently induced to enter into a dealership agreement based on the defendant's oral representations that the product line would not be sold.

    The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument. The parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law and precludes the use of evidence of prior oral negotiations and agreements to vary or add to the terms expressed in the written contract. Syversen v. Hess, 2003 ND 118, ¶ 5, 665 N.W.2d 23; Des Lacs Valley Land Corp. v. Herzig, 2001 ND 17, ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d 860; Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D. 1985). All preliminary negotiations, conversations, and verbal agreements are merged into and superseded by the subsequent written contract. Syversen, at ¶ 5; Des Lacs, at ¶ 8; Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 626 (N.D. 1974).

  7. Erway v. Deck

    1999 N.D. 7 (N.D. 1999)   Cited 12 times
    Holding attorney fees are not allowed to a successful litigant unless expressly authorized by statute or agreement

    The Erways do not dispute they received a copy of the 1984 divorce decree during Stanley Deck's 1987 bankruptcy proceeding in California. Although the settlement agreement and divorce decree's award of all of Stanley Deck's North Dakota real property to June Deck may not have been adequate to transfer an interest in real property to her, see Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 114 (N.D. 1985), the agreement and decree provided the Erways with actual notice sufficient to provoke a prudent person to make further inquiry about the nature of June Deck's interest in the Stark County land. When the Erways filed their money judgment in Stark County, they had constructive notice of the facts an inquiry would have revealed, including the unrecorded grant deed.

  8. Felco v. Doug's North Hill Bottle Shop

    1998 N.D. 111 (N.D. 1998)   Cited 17 times
    Holding part performance of an oral agreement necessary to take the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds must be consistent "only" with the existence of the alleged oral contract

    Felco argues, and Doug's acknowledges, "[t]he execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be written or not, supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument." N.D.C.C. § 9-06-07; see Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109, 112 (N.D. 1985) (noting N.D.C.C. § 9-06-07 codifies the parol-evidence rule). Doug's argues, however, the December 1995 lease:

  9. Republican Com. v. Democrat Com

    466 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1991)   Cited 15 times
    Recognizing legislative amendments

    Although the trial court did not base its decision on this issue, we do not reverse a proper judgment merely because the trial court's reasoning in arriving at that judgment was incorrect if the result is the same under applicable reasons. E.g., Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109 (N.D. 1985). The judgment dismissing the election contest is sustainable on this issue.

  10. Vorachek v. Citizens State Bank of Lankin

    461 N.W.2d 580 (N.D. 1990)   Cited 18 times
    Describing difference between receiver and discovery monitor

    We have repeatedly said that we will not reverse a trial court's decision merely because the court's reasoning in arriving at its decision was incorrect if the results are the same under the applicable reasoning. E.g., Radspinner v. Charlesworth, 369 N.W.2d 109 (N.D. 1985). The Bank's argument that it "can provide the same information to the parties directly" and that the discovery rules "provide an orderly method for parties to request and obtain relevant information from each other" ignores the lack of cooperation in the discovery process and the history of discovery abuses in this case.