He was naturally left-handed. The verdict of $20,000 for such injury was excessive and shows upon its face that such verdict was the result of bias and prejudice. Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 344 Mo. 277, 100 S.W.2d 311; Rose v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 315 Mo. 1181, 289 S.W. 914; Henry v. Ill. Central Ry. Co., 282 S.W. 423; Wolfe v. Payne, 294 Mo. 170, 241 S.W. 915; Young v. Lusk, 268 Mo. 625, 187 S.W. 849; Rodney v. St. Louis-S.W. Ry. Co., 127 Mo. 676; Leighton v. Davis, 260 S.W. 986; Radler v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011; Freeman v. Term. Railroad Assn., 341 Mo. 288, 107 S.W.2d 36. (6) The verdict of the jury was excessive and should the court rule the other assignments of error against appellant, a remittitur should be required. Cole v. Uhlmann Grain Co., 344 Mo. 277, 100 S.W.2d 311; Rose v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 315 Mo. 1181, 289 S.W. 913; Henry v. Ill. Central Ry. Co., 282 S.W. 423; Wolfe v. Payne, 294 Mo. 170, 241 S.W. 915; Young v. Lusk, 268 Mo. 625, 187 S.W. 849; Rodney v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 127 Mo. 676; Leighton v. Davis, 260 S.W. 986; Radler v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011; Freeman v. Term. Railway Assn., 341 Mo. 288, 107 S.W.2d 36.

Hardin v. Railroad Co., 334 Mo. 1169; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 94, 74 L.Ed. 724; Western, etc., Railroad Co. v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496, 73 L.Ed. 473; Baltimore O. Railroad Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 69 L.Ed. 419; Koonse v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 322 Mo. 813; Line v. Erie Railroad Co., 62 F.2d 659; Henry v. Ry. Co., 332 Mo. 1072; Grange v. Ry. Co., 334 Mo. 1040. (2) The verdict is not excessive, but is no more than a fair and reasonable award for the injuries suffered by plaintiff, the loss of earnings and diminution of earning capacity thereby entailing, and the pain and suffering that plaintiff has endured and will endure by reason of the wrongful act of defendant's servants. Radler v. Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 968; Martin v. Ry. Co., 329 Mo. 729; Margulis v. Natl. Enameling Stamping Co., 324 Mo. 420; Woods v. Ry. Co., 8 S.W.2d 922; Gately v. Ry. Co., 332 Mo. 1. BRADLEY, C.

Even though appellant was properly before the court on this point, the evidence was admissible. Where objection is not made until after answer and there is no motion to strike answer, party cannot complain on appeal. Brackett v. Black Masonry Contracting Co., 32 S.W.2d 290; Garvey v. Piel, 43 S.W.2d 775; Boyd v. Kansas City, 237 S.W. 1009; Raindge v. Ry. Co., 206 S.W. 395; Radler v. Ry. Co., 51 S.W.2d 1011. Evidence admissible even though discovered one or two days subsequent to accident. Bailey v. Kansas City, 87 S.W. 1185; Morrow v. Mo. Gas Elec. Serv. Co., 286 S.W. 117. (b) The court did not err in admitting the photographs in evidence over the objection of appellant to the effect that the evidence was too remote.

Compare State v. Penn, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 281. we distinguish this situation from that where the question is answered before the objection is made, and when made the objection is specifically directed to the question only and not the answer. See Russell v. Union Electric Co. of Mo., 238 Mo.App. 1074, 191 S.W.2d 278, and Radler v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011. Steeley v. Kurn, 348 Mo. 1142, 157 S.W.2d 212, contains language seemingly contrary to the above result.

At the time of the accident all of the extensor tendons were severed and had to be resutured, except one which was transplanted into the other tendons. It was the doctor's opinion that plaintiff had 35% permanent disability in the use of his right hand and that because his hand would continue to tire easily, plaintiff's ability to do manual labor was limited. Defendant has cited, as the cases on which it mainly relies to support its contention that the judgment is excessive, Mattice v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, Mo., 270 S.W. 306, Jones v. Thompson, 353 Mo. 730, 184 S.W.2d 407, and Radler v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011. We have, of course, examined those cases and others and have taken them into account in reaching our conclusion herein.

The sustaining of an objection to a question does not have the effect of striking out the answer in the absence of a motion to strike the testimony given. Russell v. Union Electric Co., 238 Mo. App. 1074, 191 S.W.2d 278; Steeley v. Kurn, 348 Mo. 1142, 157 S.W.2d 212, 213; Radler v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011, 1013. Even though the answers of the witness were conclusions, the testimony remains in the case where there is no motion to strike and the credibility of such testimony is for the jury.

More to the point are the cases involving the loss of a hand or arm. Mattice v. Terminal R.R. Assn. of St. Louis, 270 S.W. 306; Radler v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011; Caldwell v. Payne, 246 S.W. 312, l.c. 318 (11). In the Payne case this court held a $15,000 judgment, for the loss of an arm of a forty-one year old man, "not so excessive as to show that the jury failed to fairly weigh and consider the evidence and instructions relative to the amount of the verdict."

In this situation the answer was evidence for the consideration of the jury. [Radler v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011; Boyd v. Kansas City, 291 Mo. 622, 237 S.W. 1001.] For the error noted, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

We reduced the allowance to $15,000. [See, also; Radler v. Ry., 330 Mo. 968, 51 S.W.2d 1011; Wolfe v. Payne, 294 Mo. 170, 241 S.W. 915; Sullivan v. Ry., 321 Mo. 697, 12 S.W.2d 735; Morris v. Atlas Portland Cement Co., 323 Mo. 307, 19 S.W.2d 865; Spencer v. Ry., 317 Mo. 492, 297 S.W. 353; Midwest Natl. Bank Trust Co. v. Davis, 288 Mo. 563, 233 S.W. 406.] Respondent cites the case of Schroeder v. Wells (Mo.), 298 S.W. 806, in which we sustained an award of $17,000 for injuries to a 35 year old carpenter, resulting in the loss of the use of his left arm. Respondent also cites many cases from other jurisdictions. From an examination of all the cases cited, we conclude that the judgment in the instant case is excessive to the extent of $5,000.

[See Fritz v. St. Louis, I.M. S. Railroad Co., 243 Mo. 62, 148 S.W. 74, l.c. 78; McKeighan v. Kline's, Inc., 339 Mo. 523, 98 S.W.2d 555, l.c. 560 (6, 7); Warner v. St. Louis M.R. Railroad Co., 178 Mo. 125, 77 S.W. 67, l.c. 69; Watkins v. Bird-Sykes Bunker Co., 322 Mo. 830, 16 S.W.2d 38, l.c. 43 (2, 3).] The evidence of plaintiff that the footboard slipped toward the drawbar, was direct evidence of a fact. If the footboard slipped, then, under all the evidence, there can be but one reasonable inference, that there was something out of order which permitted the footboard to slip. [Kimberling v. Wabash Railroad Co., 337 Mo. 702, 85 S.W.2d 736, l.c. 739.] Evidence of an immediate inspection after the injury, by the engineer, who found that the board was not loose, was proper for the jury's consideration but not binding on them. The situation is similar to a number of cases decided by this court. [See Henry v. Cleveland, C., C. St. Louis Railroad Co., supra; Radler v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 51 S.W.2d 1011, 330 Mo. 968.] In the Henry case this court said: