Radio Bible v. Hurst-Euless

12 Citing cases

  1. Willacy County Appraisal District v. North Alamo Water Supply Corp.

    676 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 16 times

    Hilltop Village v. Kerrville Independent School District, 426 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. 1968); Davies v. Meyer, 528 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1975, aff'd., 541 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1976)); City of Houston v. South Park Baptist Church of Houston, 393 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston 1965, writ ref'd.); Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd. n.r.e.). Appellants' first contention is that the trial court erred in rendering judgment for appellee North Alamo in that said judgment is dependent on the trial court's finding that appellee was a non-profit corporation engaged exclusively in acquiring, storing, transporting, selling or distributing water for public use, which finding goes against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence (See § 11.18(c)(1)(G)).

  2. Earle v. Grace Union Presbytery

    670 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 8 times   1 Legal Analyses

    See Davies v. Meyer, 541 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1976); Swearingen v. City of Texarkana, 596 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Also, in each of the above cited cases the fact finder found in favor of the taxing authority, and the appellant in each case had the difficult burden of setting aside the fact finding.

  3. Opinion No. JM-41

    Opinion No. JM-41 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Jun. 27, 1983)

    (Emphasis added). In determining the status of the Pacifica Foundation under these provisions, we must keep the following principles in mind: (1) statutes exempting property from taxation are to be strictly construed, with all doubts about construction resolved against exemption, see, e.g., Davies v. Meyer, 541 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. 1976); Hilltop Village, Inc. v. Kerrville Independent School District, 426 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex. 1968); (2) anyone claiming an exemption from taxation must, by strict proof, establish the existence of all facts necessary to create the exemption, see, e.g., Plantation Foods, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 437 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In support of its claim that section 11.18 applies, Pacifica Foundation states that it:

  4. Highland Church of Christ v. Powell

    644 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 5 times
    In Highland Church, the court allowed an exemption for the thirty-five percent of the building that the jury found to be used as an "actual place of religious worship."

    Those cases dealt with statutes containing no statutory definition of "religious worship," or a definition different from the definition presently contained in Section 11.20. See Davies v. Meyer, 541 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1976); Swearingen v. City of Texarkana, 596 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Civ.App. — Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Also, in each of the above cited cases the fact finder found in favor of the taxing authority, and the appellant in each case had the difficult burden of setting aside the fact finding. Here, the fact finder found against the taxing authorities, and the Highland Church of Christ need only show that there is some evidence to support the special issues which the trial court disregarded.

  5. Opinion No. MW-357

    Opinion No. MW-357 (Ops. Tex. Atty. Gen. Jul. 29, 1981)

    Moreover, the right to enjoy an exemption can only be established by strict proof of all facts necessary to create the exemption. Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Ind. School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App.-Ft. Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The determination as to whether or not the building in question would be subject to ad valorem taxes is a fact question which cannot be answered by an attorney general's opinion.

  6. Swearingen v. City, Texar

    596 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980)   Cited 16 times   1 Legal Analyses

    In 1931, Article 7150 was amended to include property used by a church or a strictly religious society for the exclusive use as a dwelling place for the ministers of such church or society. In 1967, apparently in response to the decision in Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which had held that a building used to prepare, record and broadcast a weekly religious service by radio did not qualify as an actual place of religious worship, the legislature further amended Article 7150 by adding the following language: "1(a).

  7. Victor Equipment Co. v. Denton Independent School Dist.

    548 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)   Cited 3 times

    In addition, tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the exemption. Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App. Ft. Worth 1960, writ ref. n.r.e.); City of Amarillo v. Love, 356 S.W.2d 325 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1962, writ ref. n.r.e.). The second portion of article 7150f should therefore be construed as modifying the first portion and consequently exempts only consigned goods. . . .

  8. Amarillo Lodge No. 731 v. City of Amarillo

    473 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)   Cited 4 times
    Defining incident to

    Any educational and religious activities claimed by the Lodges as related to the claim for exemption have application only in the sense and to the extent that they may be incidental to or serve to enhance the Lodges' charitable and benevolent purposes and objectives. See St. Edwards' College v. Morris, 82 Tex. 1, 17 S.W. 512 (1891); Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Independent School District, 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd). It is recognized that Section 22 of Article 7150, specifically dealing with the activities of fraternal organizations, has not been previously construed by the appellate courts of Texas.

  9. Davis v. Congr Agudas Achim

    456 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 5 times
    In Davis, periodic rental of synagogue facilities to civic organizations was held to not destroy the exemption because the primary use of the building remained unchanged and the income was merely used to defray costs of maintenance.

    See San Antonio Conservation Society, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, Tex., 455 S.W.2d 743. (May 27, 1970), and McCreless v. City of San Antonio, 454 S.W.2d 393 (May 20, 1970). Defendant calls our attention to Radio Bible Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless I.S.D., 341 S.W.2d 467, 469 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.), where is was said that part of the holding in City of San Antonio v. Young Men's Christian Association, 285 S.W . 844 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1926, writ ref'd), was that a building must be 'exclusively used for religious worship (as distinguished from religious work)' in order to be tax exempt. The actual holding in Radio Bible Hour was to the effect that property used primarily for purpose of preparing, recording and disseminating religious programs was not 'an actual place of religious worship.'

  10. Plantation Foods, Inc. v. City of Dallas

    437 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969)   Cited 7 times

    Aycock v. City of Fort Worth, 371 S.W.2d 712 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Whaley v. Nocona Ind. School Dist., 339 S.W.2d 265 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd). We also agree with the principle, asserted in Radio Bidle Hour, Inc. v. Hurst-Euless Ind. School Dist., 341 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.), that "* * * the right to enjoy exemption from taxation can only be established by strict proof of the existence of all facts necessary to create the exemption." Moreover, it cannot be denied that many of the statements in the so-called "Controverting Affidavit' are not stated in such form as to render them admissible in evidence and that they are conclusions. It must also be admitted that appellant failed to show of record affirmatively that its officer who swore to the truth of the statements therein was competent to testify and that the statements were made on his personal knowledge, all as required by subdivision (e) of Rule 166 — A, T.R.C.P.