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Rachlin v. Drath

Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Feb 2, 1965
132 N.W.2d 581 (Wis. 1965)

Opinion

January 5, 1965 —

February 2, 1965

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha county: WILLIAM E. GRAMLING, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.

For the appellants there were briefs by Orth, Riedl Orth, attorneys, and Harold M. Frauendorfer of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Charles A. Riedl.

For the respondents there was a brief by Ermenc Kamps of Milwaukee, and oral argument by John Q. Kamps.


In November of 1959 appellants, Robert and Betty Drath, purchased the Windy Crest Registered Kennels and two adjacent vacant lots, all located in the city of Brookfield, Waukesha county. Respondents owned residences situated very near the kennels. All of the respondents, except the Kunkels, owned and occupied their respective homes previous to the acquisition of the kennels by the appellants, but while the kennels were being operated by the former owner, Edward Maus. The Kunkels purchased their property early in 1959 but did not move into the home until November of that year. Respondents' lots were all zoned residential, while the kennels were a nonconforming use located in a business zone.

The kennels have facilities for boarding 65 dogs. During the summer months the kennels are usually filled to capacity, while in the winter fewer dogs are boarded. For the most part the dogs are kept inside, but they are let out in a runway four times a day for fifteen to twenty minutes.

In June of 1960 respondents informed the appellants that the operation of the kennels was creating a nuisance and asked them to remove it. Respondents commenced action on September 8th to abate the nuisance, allegedly caused by the barking and howling of the dogs, accumulation of manure, and the presence of rodents. By judgment entered March 11, 1963, the court decided that the noise emanating from the kennels constituted a nuisance, and decreed that it be abated. The judgment further recited, "That after six months from January 24th, 1963 . . . the court will take further testimony to determine whether the said nuisance has in fact been abated." The court also found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the accumulations of dog excrement or the presence of rats amounted to a nuisance. On June 1, 1964, the court found the nuisance still existed, and ordered the sheriff of Waukesha county to "abate and remove" it. Appellants appeal from the order and ask review of the March 11, 1963, judgment insofar as it found that there was a nuisance.

Further facts will be stated in the opinion.


Three issues are presented on this appeal:

(1) Is the order of June 1, 1964, appealable?

(2) Does this appeal include a review of the judgment of March 11, 1963?

(3) Is the finding by the trial court in its June order (based on its decision of January 13, 1964) that the kennels are "still operated as a nuisance" against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence?

(1) Is the order of June 1, 1964, appealable? By its judgment of March 11, 1963, the trial court decreed that a private nuisance (by reason of noise) existed and ordered it to be abated. That judgment ordered the taking of testimony in six months to ascertain whether the nuisance had been abated. The June 1, 1964, order found that the nuisance had not been abated and ordered the sheriff to abate the nuisance by removing as may be necessary any and all dogs boarded at the kennels. The June order was appealable as being an order within the provisions of sec. 274.33 (2), Stats., which provides as follows:

"A final order affecting a substantial right made in special proceedings, without regard to whether the proceedings involve new or old rights, remedies or proceedings and whether or not the right to appeal is given by the statute which created the right, remedy or proceedings, or made upon a summary application in an action after judgment."

(2) Does this appeal include a review of the judgment of March 11, 1963? Appellants, on their appeal from the June 1, 1964, order, seek a review of the trial court's finding of the existence of a nuisance as entered in its judgment of March 11, 1963. There are three reasons for denying any such review.

First, the March 11th judgment was final. In granting the requested relief — i.e., that the nuisance be abated — the judgment fully determined the rights of the parties. No unresolved questions remained in regard to whether or not there was a nuisance. Although the judgment required the taking of testimony six months later on the limited issue of whether or not the nuisance had been abated, this reservation in no way affected the finality of the judgment. Inasmuch as the judgment was entered March 11, 1963, and the notice of appeal was not served until July 13, 1964, the time for appeal of that judgment has clearly lapsed, and appellants are not entitled to a review of the earlier judgment on their appeal from the June order.

Sec. 270.53 (1), Stats. "A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action."

Sec. 274.01 (1), Stats. "Except as otherwise provided the time within which a writ of error may be issued or an appeal taken to obtain a review by the supreme court of any judgment or order in any civil action or special proceeding in a court of record is limited to 3 months from service of notice of entry of such judgment or order or, if no notice is served, to 6 months from date of entry. . . ."

Second, even assuming as appellants contend that the March 11th judgment was interlocutory, appeal must be taken from this judgment within the period specified by sec. 274.01, Stats. and this was not done.

Kickapoo Development Corp. v. Kickapoo Orchard Co. (1939), 231 Wis. 458, 285 N.W. 354; Richter v. Standard Mfg. Co. (1937), 224 Wis. 121, 271 N.W. 14, 271 N.W. 914

Third, contrary to appellants' contention, respondents have not waived any objection to the jurisdiction of this court by participating in a review of the merits of the case. Respondents have not joined in a review of the merits without objection. Not only did they move to dismiss the appeal, but reasserted their grounds for dismissal in the present appeal in addition to presenting arguments on the merits. The most respondents did without objection was to participate in the settling of the bill of exceptions, and this does not constitute a waiver of jurisdiction.

Relying on Estate of Burns (1964), 23 Wis.2d 175, 127 N.W.2d 239; Baumgarten v. Jones (1963), 21 Wis.2d 467, 124 N.W.2d 609.

Denied without prejudice September 22, 1964.

Kitchenmaster v. Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.(1946), 248 Wis. 335, 21 N.W.2d 727.

For the reasons stated, our review on this appeal is confined to the June 1, 1964, order and we may not review the merits of the trial court's determination as embodied in the March 11, 1963, judgment that there was a nuisance.

(3) Is the finding by the trial court in its June order (based on its decision of January 13, 1964) that the kennels are "still operated as a nuisance" against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence? We have reviewed the record made at the hearing in September, 1963, on whether or not the nuisance was abated as of then and find that the trial court's finding that the kennels are "still operated as a nuisance" is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Although the defendants testified that "legally, morally and ethically we have done everything we can to control them [the dogs]" there was testimony that the excessive noise persisted. Several of the plaintiffs and another witness testified to hearing regular howling, barking, growling, and crying by the dogs during many days and almost daily from Memorial Day to Labor Day. There was testimony that this noise was nerve-wracking, embarrassing, limited entertainment, and that the same disturbed the plaintiffs in their sleep and caused them "actual, material, physical discomfort." Although there were witnesses who testified that the noises from the kennels had not annoyed them, their testimony does not constitute the great weight or clear preponderance of the evidence.

Schneider v. Fromm Laboratories, Inc. (1952), 262 Wis. 21, 26, 53 N.W.2d 737.

By the Court. — Order affirmed.


Summaries of

Rachlin v. Drath

Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Feb 2, 1965
132 N.W.2d 581 (Wis. 1965)
Case details for

Rachlin v. Drath

Case Details

Full title:RACHLIN and others, Respondents, v. DRATH and wife, Appellants

Court:Supreme Court of Wisconsin

Date published: Feb 2, 1965

Citations

132 N.W.2d 581 (Wis. 1965)
132 N.W.2d 581

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