Opinion
# 2016-045-053 Claim No. 127950 Motion No. M-88813 Cross-Motion No. CM-88879
12-23-2016
RACHEL LU FOODS CORP., SANTO E. CASTELLANO, REBECCA CASTELLANO v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Brian Kratenstein, Esq. Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Robert E. Morelli, Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Defendant's motion to dismiss claim wherein claimant, a corporation, alleges that it kept a machine at Stony Brook as part of an business incubator program which was stolen. Claimant brought cross-motion for summary judgment.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-045-053 |
| Claimant(s): | RACHEL LU FOODS CORP., SANTO E. CASTELLANO, REBECCA CASTELLANO |
| Claimant short name: | RACHEL LU FOODS |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | The caption has been amended, sua sponte, to reflect the State of New York as the proper defendant. |
|---|---|
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 127950 |
| Motion number(s): | M-88813 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-88879 |
| Judge: | GINA M. LOPEZ-SUMMA |
| Claimant's attorney: | Brian Kratenstein, Esq. |
| Defendant's attorney: | Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General By: Robert E. Morelli, Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | December 23, 2016 |
| City: | Hauppauge |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
The following papers were read and considered by the Court on this motion: Defendant's Notice of Motion; Defendant's Affirmation in Support with annexed Exhibits A-C; Claimant's Notice of Cross-Motion and Affirmation in Opposition with annexed Exhibits A-C; and Defendant's affirmation in Further Support and in Opposition to Claimant's Cross-Motion with annexed Exhibits A-D.
Defendant, the State of New York, has brought this motion pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), (2), (3), (5), (7) and (8) as well as Court of Claims Act (CCA) § 11 seeking an order dismissing the claim. In response claimants, Rachel Lu Foods Corp., Santo E. Castellano, Rebecca Castellano, have brought a cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3212 seeking an order directing that summary judgment be entered against defendant in the amount of $13,850.00.
Claimants allege in their claim that in January 2013 they entered into an exclusive agreement with defendant to store and safeguard all of claimants' baking and manufacturing equipment at the Stony Brook University Incubator facility. On January 6, 2016, defendant's manager notified claimants by email that defendant would continue to store and secure claimant's baking equipment until the end of February 2016.
On February 26, 2016, claimants went to retrieve their equipment when they discovered that the equipment was stolen from defendant's facility. Claimants allege that they later learned that it was not the policy of defendant to lock and secure all of the doors within the facility where claimants' equipment was stored.
"A party seeking dismissal on the ground that its defense is founded upon documentary evidence pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (1) has the burden of submitting documentary evidence that resolves all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively disposes of [claimants'] claim" (Mazur Bros. Realty, LLC v State of New York, 59 AD3d 401, 402 [2d Dept 2009][internal citations and quotations omitted]).
Defendant states that the Incubator is a facility run by the State through Stony Brook University which essentially serves as a shared, on-demand commercial kitchen and food packaging facility for small start-up food businesses on Long Island. Businesses submit applications to join the Incubator, and if they are accepted, are required to submit various documentation before they can use the shared kitchen and packaging spaces. This documentation includes a Facilities Use Permit, along with certificates of insurance, food safety training certificates, inspection certificates and licensing information from the State Department of Agriculture and Markets. Once approved and after all the required paperwork is processed, businesses are able to reserve time in the Incubator's kitchen and other facilities to prepare their food products and are charged a fee for the amount of time they use.
Beginning in February 2013, Rachel Lu Foods entered into a Facilities Use Permit to use the Incubator's facilities. The Facilities Use Permit was signed by Santo Castellano for Rachel Lu Food Corp.
Defendant argues that the storage of any items at the Incubator was explicitly set forth in the Facilities Use Permit as being at claimants' own risk. Defendant refers to section 8 (d) of the Facilities Use Permit which states that the "[p]ermittee assumes the risk of all of property and possessions left on the premises and waives any claims against the State of New York, SUNY and SUNY at Stony Brook for any damages or injury to such property and possessions." Section 12 subsection (e) of the Facilities Use Permit also states that the permittee agrees "to assume all risk of lost or stolen property, equipment, money and possessions from the premises or parking areas." Section 7 of the Facilities Use Permit is an indemnification and hold harmless clause whereby claimants agreed to indemnify defendant for, inter alia, any and all claims arising out of claimants' occupancy and use of the facility.
"A contract is to be construed in accordance with the parties' intent, which is generally discerned from the four corners of the document itself. Accordingly, when parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete document, their writing should . . . be enforced according to its terms" (Waterfront Joints, Inc. v Tarrytown Boat Club, Inc., 119 AD3d 553, 554 [2d Dept 2014] [internal citations and quotations omitted]).
In the case at bar, the plain terms of the Facilities Use Permit are unambiguous and enforceable against claimants (Futterman v West Shore Marina, Inc., 286 AD2d 367 [2d Dept 2001]). In response claimants have failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Claimants' cross motion seeking summary judgment is wholly without merit. Regardless of how claimants attempt to re-characterize their claim, it is clear that the terms of their written agreement with defendant require dismissal of their claim.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, claimants' cross motion is denied and the claim is hereby dismissed.
December 23, 2016
Hauppauge, New York
GINA M. LOPEZ-SUMMA
Judge of the Court of Claims