Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Dallas S. Holmes, Judge. Super. Ct. Nos. SCVSS120196, RIC424052 JCCP4476.
Callahan, Thompson, Sherman & Caudill, LLP, Robert W. Thompson and Kellie S. Christianson for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, LLP, Hallen D. Rosner and Christopher P. Barry for Real Parties in Interest.
OPINION
Richli, Acting P.J.
In this matter we have reviewed the petition, the response filed by the real parties in interest and the reply. We have determined that the resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law and that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
FACTS
Real parties in interest (real parties) sued petitioner Raceway Ford (Raceway) alleging numerous causes of action based on laws proscribing certain acts against consumers, unfair competition and deceptive business practices. A court trial was held from March 3, 2010, through March 9, 2010, and resulted in the issuance of a “statement of decision” by minute order of the trial court dated April 16, 2010. The statement of decision was in favor of Raceway on all causes of action except that a single plaintiff was granted rescission on a single cause of action. On April 30, 2010, Raceway filed a request for entry of judgment. On May 3, 2010, and May 5, 2010, real parties filed objections to the request for entry of judgment and statement of decision, respectively, and requested a hearing under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(k). On May 13, 2010, the trial court issued a minute order denying a hearing as requested, denying the objections and ordering that the statement of decision would stand as the decision of the court. On June 8, 2010, Raceway filed a second request for entry of judgment. On June 15, 2010, the trial court denied real parties’ motion for leave to file a third amended complaint to conform to proof adduced at trial. The trial court also denied an oral request by real parties for a stay of proceedings until after the Court of Appeal in San Diego issued a ruling on a similar action. The trial court, recognizing that Raceway was entitled to a judgment, directed counsel to submit a proposed judgment to the court. The parties did not submit a proposed judgment prior to the issuance of Nelson v. Pearson Ford Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 983 (Nelson) by the Court of Appeal in San Diego on July 15, 2010.
On July 29, 2010, Raceway filed a third request for entry of judgment. Real parties opposed the entry of judgment based upon the Nelson ruling, which reached a decision contrary to that rendered by the trial court in its statement of decision in this action. On September 29, 2010, the trial court continued the hearing on the motion for 45 days to allow the Supreme Court to rule on the possible depublication of Nelson. On December 10, 2010, the trial court determined that it had no choice but to follow the binding precedent of an appellate court and ordered its previous statement of decision withdrawn, stated that it was now finding for the plaintiffs under the authority in Nelson, and set a trial to determine the proper remedy for January 28, 2011. This petition followed.
DISCUSSION
Raceway asserts that the trial court was required to enter judgment in conformity with its statement of decision prior to the issuance of the Nelson decision. It is correct. California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(a) states that “[o]n the trial of a question of fact by the court, the court must announce its tentative decision by an oral statement entered in the minutes, or by a written statement filed with the clerk.” Rule 3.1590(c) provides that “[t]he court in its tentative decision may: [¶] (1) State that it is the court’s proposed statement of decision, subject to a party’s objection under (g).... “ This is essentially the procedure followed by the trial court in this action.
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(g) provides “[a]ny party may, within 15 days after the proposed statement of decision and judgment have been served, serve and file objections to the proposed statement of decision or judgment.” On May 5, 2010, real parties in interest timely served their objections to the statement of decision. Rule 3.1590(k) states that “[t]he court may order a hearing on proposals or objections to a proposed statement of decision or the proposed judgment.” (Italics added.) Here the court chose not to allow a hearing and simply overruled the objections.
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(l) provides that where a written judgment is required, “the court must sign and file the judgment within 50 days after the announcement or service of the tentative decision, whichever is later, or, if a hearing was held under (k), within 10 days after the hearing. The judgment constitutes the decision on which judgment is to be entered under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.” (Italics added.) Section 664 requires that “[i]f the trial has been had by the court, judgment must be entered by the clerk, in conformity to the decision of the court, immediately upon the filing of such decision. In no case is a judgment effectual for any purpose until entered.”
The question is whether the use of the word “must” in California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(l) means that it was mandatory for the court to enter a judgment in favor of Raceway in conformity with the statement of decision no later than June 10, 2010 (50 days after the tentative/statement of decision was served plus 5 days mailing). In California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145, the court held that time limits in statutes are usually directory unless a clear contrary intent is expressed. It noted that time limits have been held mandatory if a penalty is provided for failure to act, if the action is invalidated by the failure to act, and if the consequences of finding a mandatory action would defeat or promote the purpose of the enactment. (Ibid.) In this case there is no penalty for failure to comply with the rule, and it would be contrary to the interests of the parties to invalidate a judgment because it was not entered in a timely fashion. However, even for a directory time limit, the remedy was held to be an action in mandamus to compel the performance of an act that the law specially enjoins. (Id. at p. 1146-1148, 1156.) That is precisely the remedy sought here.
Real parties urge two points in opposition: (1) that the trial court complied with the rules of court; and (2) that the trial court was entitled to change its mind until judgment was entered. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(m) allows the court to extend any of the times provided by the rule, but such extension must be by written order for good cause shown. Real parties contend that the minute order dated September 29, 2010, complies with this rule because it shows that the trial court continued the hearing on Raceway’s motion for entry of judgment in order to determine whether the Supreme Court would depublish the Nelson decision. The most obvious problem with real parties’ argument is that the trial court was required to enter a judgment by June 10, 2010. Therefore, even if we were to accept the fact that the September 29, 2010, minute order constitutes a “written order” as contemplated by the rule (a proposition that is not at all certain), that extension was not made until 111 days after the judgment was required to be entered.
The second assertion suffers from the same logical lapse. While it is certainly true that the trial court retains absolute discretion to change its mind completely until a judgment is entered (see Gideon v. Superior Court (1956) 141 Cal.App.2d 640, 642), the issue before us is whether the trial court had the discretion to delay entering judgment beyond the time permitted by the Rules of Court. In the absence of a written order based upon good cause shown, entered prior to the expiration of the required time, we hold that the trial court did not have such discretion.
DISPOSITION
The stay ordered by this court on January 11, 2011, pending determination of the writ on its merits is LIFTED. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing the Superior Court of Riverside County to vacate its December 10, 2010, order in which it vacated its April 16, 2010, statement of decision, and to instead enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to June 10, 2010, in conformity with the April 16, 2010, statement of decision.
Petitioner is DIRECTED to prepare and have the peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served and the original filed with the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties. Petitioner to recover its costs.
We concur: Hollenhorst, J., Miller, J.