Opinion
2013 CA 1211
11-13-2014
CHARLES P. RABORN AND ADRIENNE A. RABORN v. SUSAN MARIA RABORN
Susan M. Raborn Baton Rouge, Louisiana In Proper Person Karl J. Koch Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant, Susan M. Raborn Steve LeBlanc Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees, Charles and Adrienne Raborn
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
No. 614,735
The Honorable Todd W. Hernandez, Judge Presiding Susan M. Raborn
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
In Proper Person Karl J. Koch
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
Susan M. Raborn
Steve LeBlanc
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees,
Charles and Adrienne Raborn
BEFORE: PARRO, KUHN, GUIDRY, PETTIGREW AND DRAKE, JJ.
DRAKE, J.
Appellant, Susan Raborn, appeals the stipulated judgment she entered into in open court with appellees, Dr. Charles Raborn and his wife, Adrienne Raborn, and a judgment denying an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We vacate the stipulated judgment as to Layne Raborn and affirm the judgment in all other respects. We further affirm the judgment denying the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellees filed a Petition for a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunctive Relief against their adult daughter, appellant, claiming that she "exhibited numerous instances of hostile behavior against the [appellees], in particular calling, yelling at, emailing and harassing them to continue her financial dependency on them." Appellees also asserted that on one occasion, Dr. Raborn accidently left his hearing aides at appellant's home, which she refused to return, until he came to personally retrieve them at her home. Once at appellant's home, an argument ensued over a check, and appellees alleged that appellant prevented Dr. Raborn from leaving against his will and that he was assaulted and battered by appellant. Appellees sought a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction pursuant to the provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 3610.
The verified petition was filed in the 19th Judicial District Court (19th JDC) on August 17, 2012, and the temporary restraining order was signed on August 21, 2012. On September 14, 2012, the parties, in open court, entered into a stipulated judgment, which permanently enjoined appellant and her daughter, Layne Raborn, from "coming near the [appellees] at their home, or wherever they may be found, calling, bothering, emailing, texting, bothering or harassing the [appellees] in any way." Appellees stipulated in the judgment that appellant had never perpetrated any violence against either of them, and the judgment further set forth a rental agreement between the parties. The stipulated judgment was signed by the trial court on April 1, 2013. On November 26, 2012, after the stipulated judgment was put on the record, but before the judgment was signed, appellant filed a declinatory exception pleading the objection of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court heard the exception on March 4, 2013, and rendered judgment on April 1, 2013, the same day the stipulated judgment was signed, denying the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction "for oral reasons assigned." The record before us contains the transcript of the hearing on the stipulated judgment on September 14, 2012, but does not contain the transcript of the March 4, 2013 hearing on the exception.
Layne Raborn was never made a party to these proceedings.
Appellant filed a motion to vacate the stipulated judgment on April 5, 2013, claiming lack of subject matter jurisdiction and that her consent was vitiated by duress, fraud, and ill practice. The trial court denied the motion to vacate on April 24, 2013. Appellant had also filed a motion to annul the judgment on April 8, 2013, which the trial court set for hearing on June 10, 2013. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on April 9, 2013, claiming the April 1, 2013 stipulated judgment was obtained by fraud and duress. The trial court denied the motion for new trial without a hearing on May 9, 2013. On May 10, 2013, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the April 1, 2013 stipulated judgment and the April 1, 2013 denial of the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Appellant claims that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, but instead the matter should have been brought in Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes, specifically, La. R.S. 46:2135. Appellees originally filed their petition in the 19th JDC, seeking a temporary restraining order, and thereafter an injunction, against appellant. Appellees claimed that they had supplemented appellant's income for most of her life and that over a long period of time appellant had exhibited hostile behavior which included "calling, yelling at, emailing and harassing them to continue her financial dependency on them." Appellees also asserted that appellant had assaulted and battered Dr. Raborn. Appellees attached an email to the petition from defendant, which they claim exhibited appellant's bizarre behavior.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine a particular class of actions or proceedings, based upon the object of the demand, the amount in dispute, or the value of the right asserted. La. C.C.P. art. 2. The jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action or proceeding cannot be conferred by consent of the parties. A judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void. La. C.C.P. art. 3.
Appellant claims that the stipulated judgment is void since the Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge had subject matter jurisdiction rather than the 19th JDC. Appellant relies upon Welborn v. 19th Judicial District Court, 07-1087 (La. 1/16/08), 974 So. 2d 1, 9, which held that the 19th JDC did not have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with the Family Court over actions brought under the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes and/or the Protection from Dating Violence statute when acts of abuse were alleged. See La. R.S. 46:2121-2143; La. R.S. 46:2151. As stated in Welborn,
The Louisiana Constitution establishes the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts: "Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution ..., a district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters." La. Const. art. V, § 16(A)(1). While "original jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters" is a broad grant, the clause "Except as otherwise authorized by this constitution" establishes that the constitution contemplates and permits the
legislature to divest the district courts of jurisdiction in certain types of matters. See Lee Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 La. L.Rev. 765, 811 (1977). Article V, section 18 of the constitution authorizes the legislature to grant jurisdiction to juvenile and family courts: "Notwithstanding any contrary provision of Section 16 of this Article, juvenile and family courts shall have jurisdiction as provided by law." La. Const. art. V, § 18; Hargrave, supra, at 811.974 So. 2d at 5.
Pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution, La. R.S. 13:1401(A) establishes the Family Court and vests it with exclusive jurisdiction in certain matters. See La. Const.art. V, § 18. Louisiana Revised Statute 13:1401(B) specifically states that "[t]he family court for the parish of East Baton Rouge has all such additional jurisdiction, power, and authority now or hereafter provided by law." The Protection from Family Violence Act, La. R.S. 46:2121-2143, was amended in 1982 to create "Part II. Domestic Abuse Assistance," La. R.S. 46:2131-2143. As part of Domestic Abuse Assistance, La. R.S. 46:2133(A) was enacted, which states, "Any court in the state of Louisiana which is empowered to hear family or juvenile matters shall have jurisdiction over proceedings appropriate to it under this Part." Welborn determined that when the legislature enacted La. R.S. 46:2133(A), "it expanded the Family Court's subject matter jurisdiction so that it may hear claims brought by 'household members' (and 'family members,' for that matter) under the Protection from Family Violence Act." Welborn, 974 So. 2d at 6. The supreme court determined that, when the legislature enacted La. R.S. 13:1401(A), vesting the Family Court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving family matters, it simultaneously divested the Judicial District Court of jurisdiction over these matters. Welborn, 974 So. 2d at 9; see also, La. Const. Art. 5, § 18; La. R.S. 13:1401(A), 46:2133(A), 46:2151.
This Court notes that the Family Court of East Baton Rouge Parish was originally established by Acts 1954, No. 738, effective November 2, 1954, as set forth in the provisions of Article VII, Section 53, Louisiana Constitution of 1921. Acts 1975, No. 89, § 1, effective September 12, 1975, established La. R.S. 13:1401 that continued the Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge as a statute in accordance with Article XIV, Section 16 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
Domestic abuse is defined in the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes as including, but not limited to, "physical or sexual abuse and any offense against the person as defined in the Criminal Code of Louisiana, except negligent injury and defamation, committed by one family or household member against another." La. R.S. 46:2132(3). '"Domestic abuse' also includes abuse of adults as defined in R.S. 15:1503 when committed by an adult child or adult grandchild." La. R.S. 46:2132(3). However, family arguments that do not rise to the threshold of physical or sexual abuse or violations of the criminal code are not in the ambit of the Domestic Abuse Assistance Statute. Rouyea v. Rouyea, 00-2613 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/28/01), 808 So. 2d 558, 561. In the present case, the petition does contain allegations of physical abuse. Therefore, this court must determine whether the 19th JDC retained jurisdiction over a case of alleged abuse between a parent and an adult child.
While the supreme court held in Welborn that the 19th JDC was divested of jurisdiction over "family matters" brought pursuant to the Protection from Family Violence Act and the Protection from Dating Violence Act, La. R. S. 46:2151, the present case involving parents and an adult child is distinguishable from Welborn.
The Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes define "family members" as:
[S]pouses, former spouses, parents and children, stepparents, stepchildren, foster parents, and foster children. "Household members" means any person of the opposite sex presently or formerly living in the same residence with the defendant as a spouse, whether married or not, who is seeking protection under this Part. If a parent or grandparent is being abused by an adult child, adult foster child, or adult grandchild, the provisions of this Part shall apply to any proceeding brought in district court.
La. R.S. 46:2132(4)(emphasis added).
Furthermore, La. R.S. 9:575 provides, "[a] parent or grandparent who is being abused by an adult child or adult grandchild may file a petition in the district court seeking protection pursuant to the laws governing domestic abuse assistance, R.S. 46:2131 et seq."(emphasis added). While La. R.S. 46:2133(A) appears to mandate jurisdiction "over proceedings appropriate to it under this Part," La. R.S. 46:2132(4) and La. R.S. 9:575 are more specific to the situation of a parent and adult child. Our supreme court has repeatedly found that, as a general rule of statutory interpretation, a specific statute controls over a broader, more general statute. Catahoula Parish Sch. Bd. v. Louisiana Mack Rentals, LLC, 12-2504 (La. 10/15/13), 124 So. 3d 1065, 1079. The specific statutes in this instance allow proceedings between a parent and an adult child to be brought in district court, but mandate that the provisions of the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes apply. Clearly, the legislature intended for abuse by an adult child to be within the jurisdiction of the district court and permitted the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes to apply. This is different than the facts in Welborn, which involved an unrelated "household member" or a "dating partner." Welborn, 974 So. 2d at 2. The situation in Welborn was specifically within the Protection from Family Violence Act and the Protection from Dating Violence Act. The legislature has specifically created an exception for parents and adult children. The jurisdiction lies with the district court, but the Domestic Abuse Assistance statutes are to apply. See La. R.S. 46:2132(4); 9:575. Therefore, the 19th Judicial District Court did have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, not the Family Court. Judgment Against Person not a Party
This court notes that La. R.S. 9:575 was enacted by Acts, 1993, No. 402, § 1, effective August 15, 1993, nearly forty years after the creation of the East Baton Rouge Parish Family Court.
The judgment signed by the trial court on April 1, 2013, renders judgment against appellant and Layne Raborn, the daughter of appellant and granddaughter of appellees. Appellant raises the issue of the judgment rendered against Layne Raborn. Nonparties cannot be bound by the judgment that some other party obtains. Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571 (La. 4/1/11), 61 So. 3d 507, 637. A judgment rendered against a party who is not named as a defendant is absolutely void. Wilson v. Champion Ins. Co., 607 So. 2d 1079 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1992); see Hebert v. Hebert, 96-2155 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/19/97), 700 So. 2d 958, 959 n.3.
Appellees argue that, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3605, an injunction applies to the person enjoined and his agents. Appellees argue that Layne Raborn is an agent of appellant. An agent is defined as one who acts for or in the place of another, by authority from the latter. Ward v. Pennington, 434 So. 2d 1131, 1137 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), writs denied, 438 So. 2d 572 and 438 So. 2d 576 (La. 1983). There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that Layne Raborn is an agent for appellant. While the answer of appellant reveals that Layne Raborn is the daughter of appellant and granddaughter of appellees, there is no allegation anywhere that Layne Raborn was acting on behalf of appellant. The district court erred in rendering judgment in appellees' favor against Layne Raborn, since appellees did not name Layne Raborn as a defendant in their suit. See Ricks v. Kentwood Oil Co., Inc., 09-0677 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/23/10), 38 So. 3d 363, 367; see also La. C.C.P. art. 2002; Guilbeau v. Roger, 443 So.2d 773, 774 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983), writ denied, 446 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1984). Thus, that portion of the judgment is vacated. Stipulated Judgment
Although a stipulated judgment is normally not appealable, it may be appealable if a party's consent is vitiated. La. C.C.P. art. 2085; Pittman v. Pittman, 01-2528 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So. 2d 369, 372, writ denied, 03-1365 (La. 9/19/03), 853 So. 2d 642. Contracts of compromise may be vitiated by error of fact bearing on the principal cause, and may be rescinded whenever there exists an error on the matter in dispute. Id. Furthermore, lack of consent may be found from a party's timely application for a new trial. See Polk v. Polk, 98-1788 (La. App. 3 Cir. 3/31/99), 735 So. 2d 737, 739. To determine whether appellant's consent was vitiated, the trial court would have to take evidence, which would require the granting of a motion for new trial after a final judgment. Pittman, 836 So. 2d at 372. However, in the present case, the district court did not grant a hearing on the motion for new trial.
The appellant did not specifically appeal the denial of the motion for new trial. When an appellant appeals from a final judgment, it is permissible for him to raise and the court to consider in connection with the appeal, complaints relating to the denial of a motion for new trial. See Dural v. City of Morgan City, 449 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984). Appellant claims that she should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on her motion for new trial. A motion for new trial does not require a contradictory hearing unless there is a clear showing, by affidavit, "of facts ... reasonably calculated to change the outcome or reasonably believed to have denied the applicant a fair trial." Pittman, 836 So. 2d at 372; see Evans v. Ivy, 428 So. 2d 886, 888 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1983).
Appellant filed a motion for new trial claiming that the judgment relied upon information that was "false, fraud, ill practice, coercion, [and] threats." She also claimed that she had new information that would prove the allegations of the petition to be false. Appellant further claimed that her counsel at the time was incompetent. Appellant argued not that the appellees coerced her into the consent judgment, but that her own attorney did. Consent can be vitiated even when duress has been exerted by a third person. La. C.C. art. 1961. However, appellant attached no affidavit of any facts which would be "reasonably calculated to change the outcome or reasonably believed to have the denied applicant a fair trial." Pittman, 836 So. 2d at 372.
Therefore, this court must determine if an appeal lies from the stipulated judgment or whether the record indicates that the consent of appellant was vitiated. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship. La. C.C. art. 3071. A compromise shall be made in writing or recited in open court, in which case the recitation shall be susceptible of being transcribed from the record of the proceedings. La. C.C. art. 3072. Recitations in open court by which the parties agreed to the stipulations offered by their respective attorneys constitute a binding compromise. Carlin v. Wallace, 002892 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 809 So. 2d 1017, 1021. It is well-settled that transactions or compromises are binding contracts between the parties thereto. Walton v. Walton, 597 So. 2d 479 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992).
In this matter the parties stipulated their agreement in open court. Appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing in which the stipulation was read in open court. After the stipulation was read, the following exchange took place:
The Court: Okay. All right. Mr. and Mrs. Raborn, is the stipulation that was read into the record by Mr. LeBlanc, is that your understanding of what you are agreeing to, this morning?
Plaintiffs: Yes, Sir.
Plaintiffs: Yes, Sir
The Court: Okay. All right Ms. Susan Raborn, is it your agreement also of the terms and conditions that were stipulated to by Mr. LeBlanc on the record, this morning?
Defendant: What—Are we going to—
Mr. Schutte: Can I explain one thing to her, Judge?There then ensued a short conversation about the payment of rent. Afterward, the trial court stated:
The Court: Sure.
Mr. Schutte: Judge, ... my client asks that we add ... just to make it clear—if there is going to be any communication with her—her daughter, she wants it to come through my office, ... That's the only thing ....
The Court: All right. Ms. Raborn, all the other terms and conditions that were read into the record by Mr. LeBlanc concerning the stipulation, you are agreeable to those terms?
Defendant: Yes, your Honor.
A compromise may be rescinded for error, fraud, and other grounds for the annulment of contracts. La. C.C. art. 3082. A compromise agreement may only be rescinded or set aside where one of the following has been shown: (1) error in the person, (2) error on the matter in dispute, or (3) fraud or violence (duress). See Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So. 2d 741, 748. The appellant bears the burden of proving the invalidity of the settlement agreement. Fascio v. Lee, 94-1149 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/23/95), 650 So. 2d 1236, 1238. Appellant failed to submit any acceptable evidence supporting her allegations of fraud or duress. Moreover, appellant was not without an option. Appellant could have refused to accept the offer and not have entered into the stipulated judgment. Later, if she felt the outcome were unjust, she would have the right to appeal. See Hoover v. Boucvalt, 99-0867 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/24/99), 747 So. 2d 1227, 1230-31 writ denied, 99-3610 (La. 2/18/00), 754 So. 2d 969.
Although appellant alleged that her consent was vitiated by fraud, she did not attach an affidavit to her motion for new trial regarding the facts she alleged. See Pittman, 836 So. 2d at 372. The law strongly favors compromise agreements between parties. Courts will not invalidate such settlements absent a strong showing that they violate good morals or the public interest because of error, bad faith, or fraud. City of Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 07-1153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/8/08), 984 So. 2d 746, 749, writ denied, 08-0939 (La. 6/20/08), 983 So. 2d 1284. Applying the law to the facts of this case, we conclude that the September 14, 2012 stipulation in open court was a valid compromise. The agreement was recited in open court and agreed to by all the parties. The parties all agreed that the stipulation evidenced their agreement. No one objected on the record to the terms of the stipulation, and it was fully disclosed to all parties and their attorneys. The record evidences that appellant fully acquiesced in the stipulation that constituted a valid compromise. See City of Baton Rouge, 984 So. 2d at 749.
We find nothing in the record before us on this appeal to substantiate appellant's claim that the stipulated judgment was obtained through fraud or ill practices. The allegations of fraud are only contained in appellant's motion for new trial without a supporting affidavit. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to permit a contradictory hearing on the motion for new trial. We agree that the trial court correctly denied the motion for new trial. Since there is no evidence that the consent of appellant was vitiated, the stipulated judgment is nonappeable. La. C.C.P. art. 2085. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment as to Layne Raborn, and affirm the judgment in all other respects. We further find the remaining errors asserted by appellant are moot. Motion to Strike Brief of Appellees
Appellant has filed a motion to strike the brief of appellees claiming that the brief allegedly includes facts not included in the record. Considering the disposition of this matter on procedural grounds, we conclude that the motion to strike is moot. See In re Westlake Petrochemicals Corp. Ethylene Plant Part 70, 99-1726 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/3/00), 769 So. 2d 1278, 1280.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the stipulated judgment against Layne Raborn is vacated, and that judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The judgment denying the exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction is also affirmed. Costs of the appeal are assessed against Susan Raborn.
MOTION DENIED; JUDGMENT VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; JUDGMENT ON THE EXCEPTION AFFIRMED. PARRO, J., dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion in this case. I believe the Welborn case stands for the proposition that when the legislature enacted LSA-R.S. 13:1401(A), the 19th JDC was divested of its jurisdiction as to "family matters," such as those involved in this case. The court clearly stated:
[W]hen the legislature enacted La.Rev.Stat. § 13:1401(A), vesting the Family Court with exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving divorce, paternity, child support, spousal support, partition of community property, etc., it simultaneously divested the 19th JDC of jurisdiction over these matters. We hold that the subject matters listed in La.Rev.Stat. § 13:1401(A) are what La.Rev.Stat. § 46:2133(A) refers to as "family matters" when it states, "[a]ny court in the state of Louisiana which is empowered to hear family ... matters shall have jurisdiction over proceedings appropriate to it under [part II of the Protection from Family Violence Act]." (emphasis added). Therefore, when La.Rev.Stat. § 46:2133(A) recites that "[a]ny court in the state of Louisiana which is empowered to hear family ... matters" shall have jurisdiction to hear the claims at issue, it is not referring to the 19th JDC because La.Rev.Stat. § 13:1401(A) has previously divested the 19th JDC of its authority to hear "family matters."Welborn v. 19th Judicial District Court, 07-1087 (La. 1/16/08), 974 So.2d 1, 9; see also LSA-Const art. V, § 18 and LSA-R.S. 46:2133(A). This case should have been dismissed without prejudice or transferred to the East Baton Rouge Parish Family Court.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.