Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Wilfried J. Schneider, Jr., Judge, Super. Ct. No. J222112.
Maria G. Niciforos for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Ramona E. Verduzco, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
KING, J.
In this petition for writ relief, R.A. (father) asks us to set aside the juvenile court’s order denying him reunification services and setting a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for his daughter. He contends that the juvenile court erred when it found it would not be in the child’s best interest to offer him reunification services. He also contends that the court abused its discretion when it failed to order the child be placed with any of his family members. We disagree with both of these assertions, and, accordingly, deny the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS
The child who is the subject of this dependency proceeding was born in June 2008 at Arrowhead Regional Medical Center in Colton. She came to the attention of the Department of Children’s Services (department) when hospital staff reported that the mother tested positive for methamphetamine at the time of delivery, although the child tested negative. Further investigation revealed that the mother had a long history of substance abuse and had failed to reunify with two other children. Mother reported that the child’s father’s first name was Robert, but she did not know his last name or his whereabouts. He was not named on the birth certificate.
Father was located in custody in county jail and did appear at the detention hearing on June 16, 2008. His mother and grandmother also appeared and father’s attorney asked that they be assessed for placement. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detention and the child was placed with her maternal great-grandmother.
The matter was continued to July 18, 2008, for a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.
The report prepared for the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing recommended that no reunification services be provided to either parent. This recommendation was based on father’s status as an alleged father as well as his failure to contact the department after being released from custody despite knowledge of the proceedings.
Father was not present at the July 18, 2008, hearing although his grandmother and two aunts were. A contested jurisdictional hearing was scheduled for August 18 to be followed by a contested dispositional hearing on August 25.
Father was not present at the August 18, 2008, hearing. His attorney explained that she thought father had been released from local custody but discovered he was incarcerated at Tehachapi State Prison. Because of this confusion, she needed to prepare an order to transport father. The court granted a continuance of the pretrial settlement conference and jurisdictional hearing to September 24, and the dispositional hearing to September 25.
Also on August 18, 2008, father’s attorney requested a paternity test, and assuming paternity was established, requested paternal grandmother be requested for placement.
Father requested a continuance in September because the paternity test was not available. Over the objections of the department and the child’s attorney, the court continued the matter to October 20, 2008.
The case was again continued from October 20 to November 20, 2008, because the social worker was unavailable and the paternity test was still pending. The department confirmed that the child had been moved from the maternal great-grandmother’s home and placed with her half-sibling in a concurrent placement home. Although paternal grandmother and paternal great-grandmother had been visiting the child every weekend up until the move, the court determined that further visits would not be authorized until paternity was confirmed.
The November 20, 2008, hearing was also continued due to court congestion and further delay in obtaining the paternity test results because of the prison facility’s failure or refusal to release them. Because father was scheduled to be released the following week, the department recommended that he make arrangements for testing upon his release.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was heard on December 15, 2008. The results of the paternity test were received shortly before this hearing and confirmed that father was the child’s biological father. The department recommended, however, that it would not be in the child’s best interests to offer services to the father. The social worker noted that father had not participated at all in the child’s life for the past five months because of his incarceration. In addition, he had not lived with or supported mother during her pregnancy. Father was never married to mother and was not listed on the birth certificate. Father informed the social worker that when he and mother separated, he knew she was two months pregnant and that the child might be his. However, he did not believe he needed to look for her or support her. He did say that he attempted to telephone her one time. When the social worker questioned him further, father stated that it was not his job to track her down and he did not want to be seen as a stalker. He added that mother’s girlfriend did not want him in the picture.
The social worker opined that it was unlikely that father could reunify within the legal time frames even if offered services, noting he was currently incarcerated and had never been steadily employed and had never supported himself. Although he was present at the detention hearing, father did not request a paternity test nor ask for services even after meeting with the social worker. Thereafter, he never contacted the department by phone or mail to request information about his child. The social worker suspected that father’s interest in reunification was due to pressure placed on him by the paternal great-grandmother who was interested in having the child placed with her. Father told the social worker he believed that the child would be moved immediately to his grandmother’s home if it were shown he was the biological father. The social worker explained that even if the court ordered services, there would not be a change in the child’s placement because she was in a concurrent planning home with a sibling. To this, father responded, “you mean that I have been wasting my time.”
The juvenile court made findings that jurisdiction existed under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). With regard to disposition, the court found clear and convincing evidence that the child should be removed from the custody of the parents. It further found that father was the biological father, but it would not be in the child’s best interests to offer him reunification services.
DISCUSSION
Father’s first contention is that the juvenile court erred in finding that it would be detrimental to the child to offer him reunification services. Because father was determined to be the biological father, not the presumed father, he has no right to custody or reunification. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 451.) The juvenile court may provide services to a biological father if it determines that the provision of services will benefit the child. For a child younger than three years of age, reunification services shall not exceed six months from the date the child enters foster care. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The child here entered foster care shortly after her birth in June 2008. Father did not even establish his paternity until almost six months later, and during most of this time he was incarcerated and made no effort to establish contact with her. He never even called the social worker to inquire about her. Father had to admit at the December hearing that he had never even seen his daughter. These circumstances demonstrate that there is no likelihood that father could assume custody and care of this child within the foreseeable future. Thus, the juvenile court’s determination that the child would not be benefitted from the provision of services is sound.
Next, father asserts that the juvenile court should have ordered an assessment of certain of his family members for placement of the child, and that it erred in not affording them preferential consideration for placement as required by section 361.3. Under section 361.3, whenever a new placement of a dependent child must be made, preferential consideration must be given to suitable relatives who request placement. (§ 361.3, subds. (a), (d); In re Antonio G. (2007) 159 Cal.App.4th 369, 377.) “ ‘Preferential consideration’ means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated.” (§ 361.3, subd. (c)(1).)
However, father overlooks the fact that his paternity was not established until December 2008, and, thus, his relatives were not entitled to preferential consideration until that time. Moreover, at the time of the detention hearing, the child was placed with a relative—the maternal great-grandmother. When the child was later moved, it was to an adoptive home. While the preference for relative placement applies at the dispositional hearing and thereafter whenever a new placement of the child must be made, it does not apply to an adoptive placement. (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 854-855 [placement for adoption did not constitute a new placement within the meaning of the relative placement preference].) By December 2008, when the status of father’s relatives had been determined, the preference for relative placement no longer applied because the possibility of reunification no longer existed. At this point, the overriding concern of dependency proceedings is not the interest of extended family members but the interest of the child. (Id. at p. 855.)
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied.
We concur: RICHLI, Acting P. J., GAUT, J.