Opinion
J-S80031-18 No. 2101 EDA 2018
02-21-2019
R.A. v. A.F. Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Dated June 13, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Domestic Relations at No(s): No. A06-2018-60978-A-37 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and NICHOLS, J. MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:
Appellant A.F. appeals from the order granting Appellee R.A.'s request for a final protection order under the Protection From Abuse (PFA) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. Appellant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the entry of a PFA order. We affirm.
The facts underlying this matter are well known to the parties and are aptly summarized in the trial court's opinion. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/10/18, at 1-3. Accordingly, we need not reiterate them here. In sum, on June 6, 2018, Appellee filed a PFA petition against her ex-husband, Appellant. On June 13, 2018, the parties appeared for an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Jeffrey G. Trauger. Appellee and Appellant had counsel, and both testified at the hearing.
Appellee testified through an interpreter at the proceedings in this matter.
At the conclusion of the June 13, 2018 hearing, the trial court entered a three-year PFA order against Appellant. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court issued a responsive Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion in support of the trial court's conclusion at the hearing, where the court had stated that "based upon the totality of the circumstances as testified to . . . this is a [matter falling under 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(5)] under the statute, and that a protection from abuse order is warranted as specified under Pennsylvania law." N.T., 6/13/18, at 129.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following question for our review:
Whether the trial court erred in granting a [PFA] Order because there was insufficient evidence to find that [A]ppellee was in reasonable fear of bodily injury as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a)(5) simply by virtue of the fact that a tracking device was installed in the BMW that the parties jointly leased which was repossessed for nonpayment of lease payment, where [A]ppellee did not testify that she was in fear of bodily injury because of the tracking device, or that she was even aware of its installation prior to the hearing date, and where [A]ppellee offered no testimony or evidence of any threats by [A]ppellant to cause [A]ppellee physical harm, but instead claimed that [A]ppellant threatened to post embarrassing content about her on the internet, and that her "primary fears" related to her immigration status because of the legal documents that she signed in connection with her divorce from [A]ppellant?Appellant's Brief at 5.
In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also raised an issue regarding whether venue was appropriate in Bucks County. This issue has been abandoned on appeal.
Appellant asserts that "there was insufficient evidence to find that [A]ppellee was in reasonable fear of bodily injury . . . simply by virtue of the fact that a tracking device was installed in the BMW." Id. at 18. Appellant argues that the fact that a tracking device was installed in the vehicle "alone appears to be the lynchpin that [caused] the court [to] believe[] there was a 'course of conduct' that placed [A]ppellee in reasonable fear of bodily injury." Id. at 21. However, according to Appellant, Appellee was not aware before the hearing that the tracking device had been installed, and therefore, this fact could not be the basis for the entry of a PFA order against him. Id.
Following our review of Appellant's arguments and the record, we conclude that the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Jeffrey G. Trauger properly addresses the arguments raised in this appeal. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/10/18, at 4-8. The court's factual findings are supported in the record, and the court appropriately analyzed the totality of the circumstances. The trial court did not rely solely on the fact that a tracking device had been installed in Appellee's car as a basis to enter a final PFA order. Instead, Appellee testified that she was afraid of the Appellant and provided details regarding multiple incidents that caused her fear. See , e.g., N.T., 6/13/18, at 13-14.
As the trial court noted at the evidentiary hearing on June 13, 2018, its conclusion that a PFA order was warranted was based on its credibility determinations and all of the circumstances presented in the case. See N.T., 6/13/18, at 129. Therefore, we discern no error in the court's conclusion that sufficient evidence was presented justifying a PFA order against Appellant, and we affirm of the basis of the trial court's discussion of this issue.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/21/19
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