Opinion
Case Number 01 C 4798
February 28, 2002
ORDER
Jose Luis R. and his mother Janette H. (collectively, "plaintiffs") sued Joliet Township High School District 204 ("Joliet Township") for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted defendant's motion. Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township High School District 204, 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2002). Plaintiffs now move for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).
Judgment was docketed on January 15, 2002. Although the certificate of service filed with plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration does not indicate a mailing date, Joliet Township claims it received a copy of plaintiffs' motion on January 30, 2002. Therefore, plaintiffs served a copy of their motion within 10 days after judgment was docketed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a). Based on the timing of service, the court must review plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Russell v. Delco Remy Division of General Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rule 59(e) generally requires a lower threshold of proof than Rule 60(b)).
"[M]otions to reconsider are not at the disposal of parties who want to 'rehash' old arguments." C.H Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. National Products Corp., No. 01 C 6348, 2002 WL 99735, at *1 (ND. Ill. Jan. 25, 2002). A Rule 59(e) motion is appropriate only when:
the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to reconsider would be controlling or significant change in the law or facts since the submission of the issue to the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990). Indeed, the court's orders are not "mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure." Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Industries, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Plaintiffs claim the court patently misunderstood them in deciding the cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs first argue that the hearing officer's comments during the proceeding indicated judicial approval of the settlement. The court considered and rejected this argument in ruling on the summary judgment motions. Jose Luis R., 2002 WL 54544, at *3. Absent any consideration by the hearing officer of whether the terms of the settlement agreement were lawful, fair, reasonable and adequate, plaintiffs cannot establish that the hearing officer approved or sanctioned the parties' agreement. Id.
Plaintiffs next argue that the hearing officer's retention of jurisdiction provided the judicial approval and oversight necessary to transform the settlement agreement into a consent decree. However, the hearing officer did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. Rather, the hearing officer retained "jurisdiction over a subsequent [due process] hearing that involves the same parties and is requested within one year from the date of withdrawal of the previous request [for a due process hearing]." See 105 ILCS 5/14-8.02a(f). In any event, retention of jurisdiction to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement does not change a private settlement into a consent decree enforceable through contempt. See D. Patrick, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 8 F.3d 455, 460-61 (7th Cir. 1993).