R. R. v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. State in Interest of K.V.N

    116 N.J. Super. 580 (App. Div. 1971)   Cited 19 times

    State ex rel. Emerson v. Erickson, 159 Minn. 287, 198 N.W. 1000 (Sup.Ct. 1924); State v. Rosenfield, 111 Minn. 301, 126 N.W. 1068 (Sup.Ct. 1910). See Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969), application for writ of error refused; R.R. v. State, 448 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969), application for writ of error refused, appeal dismissed 400 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 35, 27 L.Ed.2d 37 (1970). The disposition of juvenile offenders under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C.A. ยงยง 5005 et seq., to terms which may result in commitment for a period of time longer than that which an adult could receive for the same offense has been held consistently not to be violative of the equal protection clause, due process clause, or the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment).

  2. In re Brown

    439 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1971)   Cited 23 times

    And while both these aspects of juvenile proceedings are characteristically informal and flexible, the Supreme Court's declaration that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone" expresses its determination to prevent the degeneration of this informality and flexibility into unguided caprice. R.R. v. Texas, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 448 S.W.2d 187 (1969), app. dis. 400 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 35, 27 L.Ed. 2d 37 (1970). In re Gault, supra, at 13.

  3. In re D. L. S.

    520 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)

    We cannot assume that appellant would receive no treatment or rehabilitation from the Texas Youth Council. R.R. v. State,448 S.W .2d 187 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 35, 27 L.Ed.2d 37; Smith v. State, Supra. Her commitment to the Texas Youth Council is not cruel and unusual punishment within the constitutional prohibition. Appellant's second point is overruled.

  4. State in Interest of K.V.N

    112 N.J. Super. 544 (N.J. Super. 1970)   Cited 1 times

    In other words, assuming that the theoretical purpose is reasonable, the juvenile has the burden of showing that the classification is unreasonable in practice. See also, R.R. v. Texas, 448 S.W.2d 187 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969), app. dism, 400 U.S. 808, 91 S.Ct. 35, 27 L.Ed.2d 37 (1970). Counsel for the juvenile contends that the classification is theoretically unreasonable and also claims that the State should have the burden of substantiating the claimed justification for the difference in treatment.