Opinion
NO. 03-16-00768-CR
02-01-2018
Fedencia Quiroga, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF RUNNELS COUNTY, 119TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 6535, THE HONORABLE BEN WOODWARD, JUDGE PRESIDING MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Fedencia Quiroga of delivery of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in an amount of less than one gram. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a) (person commits offense if she knowingly delivers controlled substance), .102 (methamphetamine included as Penalty Group 1 controlled substance). Appellant elected to have the trial court decide her punishment, see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.07(2)(b), and the trial judge assessed appellant's punishment at confinement for two years in a state jail facility, see Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(b) (categorizing offense as state jail felony if amount of controlled substance delivered is less than one gram); Tex. Penal Code § 12.35 (establishing punishment range for state jail felony). In a single point of error on appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
The jury heard evidence that Upton County Sheriff's Deputy Lorenzo Arredondo worked in an undercover capacity to assist in a narcotics investigation being conducted by the Runnels County Sheriff's Office. In the course of that investigation, Deputy Arredondo made contact with appellant on several occasions. He described these encounters in his testimony at trial.
Deputy Arredondo testified that on June 30, 2015, he was working undercover and was introduced to appellant by an individual named Raul Lopez who had agreed to help the deputy get some methamphetamine. Deputy Arredondo explained that he gave Lopez $100, and Lopez contacted appellant. The deputy said that Lopez drove them to appellant's home, and Lopez went inside. According to the deputy, he and Lopez then left and returned about 30 minutes later. Deputy Arredondo testified that while outside appellant's home, he observed appellant hand Lopez an item, and Lopez in turn gave it to Deputy Arredondo. The deputy described the item as a small Ziploc baggie containing a crystal substance that he believed was methamphetamine.
The deputy further testified that the next day, on July 1, 2015, he went to appellant's home without Lopez, expressing his interest in buying more methamphetamine. At that time, according to the deputy, appellant was not able to contact her methamphetamine source, so the two went to a nearby convenience store. Deputy Arredondo said that at the store, appellant made a call on his cell phone. He explained that he then gave appellant $100 and she asked him to meet her at her home. The deputy said that he drove to appellant's home and waited for her. When she arrived, she invited him inside. According to Deputy Arredondo, once inside, appellant handed him a small Ziploc baggie containing a crystal substance that he believed was methamphetamine. He said that he then gave appellant an additional $20 "for her assistance." The deputy testified that after leaving appellant's home, he placed the baggie in an evidence bag on which he wrote his initials, the date and time he purchased the narcotics, and appellant's name. He said that later that day, he turned the evidence over to Sergeant Carl Squyres with the Runnels County Sherriff's Office. At trial, Deputy Arredondo identified State's Exhibit 2 as the baggie of suspected methamphetamine that he obtained from appellant on July 1st. He also identified appellant in open court as the individual who gave him those narcotics.
Deputy Arredondo also testified that on July 5, 2015, he again went to appellant's home and expressed his interest in buying more methamphetamine. He explained that he gave her $100 and arranged to meet her at the Budget Inn where he was staying. The deputy said that when appellant arrived at the hotel, he approached the car where she was seated in the passenger seat. According to Deputy Arredondo, appellant gave him a small Ziploc baggie containing a crystal substance that he believed was methamphetamine. He explained that he again gave appellant an additional $20 "for her assistance." The deputy testified that after appellant left, he followed the same procedure as before: he placed the baggie in an evidence bag on which he wrote his initials, the date and time he purchased the narcotics, and appellant's name, and then turned the evidence over to Sergeant Squyres. At trial, Deputy Arredondo identified State's Exhibit 1 as the baggie of suspected methamphetamine that he obtained from appellant on July 5th. He also identified appellant in open court as the individual who gave him those narcotics.
Sergeant Squyres testified that on August 4, 2015, he delivered the narcotics that he had received from Deputy Arredondo to the Department of Public Safety crime lab in person. Testimony from the DPS drug analyst reflected that subsequent lab testing revealed that the substance delivered on both occasions was methamphetamine: State's Exhibit 1, the substance Deputy Arredondo received from appellant on July 5th, contained .40 grams of methamphetamine; State's Exhibit 2, the substance the deputy received from appellant on July 1st, contained .86 grams of methamphetamine.
Appellant was subsequently indicted on two charges of delivery of a controlled substance for the deliveries that she allegedly made directly to the undercover deputy on July 1st and July 5th. The cases were consolidated for trial. Deputy Arredondo, Sergeant Squyres, and the DPS drug analyst testified for the State—as reflected by the facts recited above. In addition, video recordings of the drug transactions, which Deputy Arredondo had made covertly, were admitted without objection. Appellant testified on her own behalf, denying that she sold drugs to the deputy. The jury found appellant guilty of both offenses. Appellant elected to have the trial court assess her punishment, and the trial court sentenced her to two years in a state jail facility for each offense, ordering the sentences to be served concurrently. The instant appeal relates only to the judgment of conviction for the July 5th offense.
DISCUSSION
The indictment in this case alleged that "on or about the 5th day of July," appellant "did then and there knowingly deliver, by actually transferring, to Lorenzo Arredondo, a controlled substance, namely, Methamphetamine, in an amount less than one gram." In her sole point of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction.
Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 313 (1979); Rabb v. State, 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In our sufficiency review we consider all the evidence in the record, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted, or submitted by the prosecution or the defense. Thompson v. State, 408 S.W.3d 614, 627 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.); see Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We assume that the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318; see Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). We consider only whether the factfinder reached a rational decision. See Morgan v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (observing that reviewing court's role on appeal "is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a fact finder does not act rationally") (quoting Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). "The key question is whether 'the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime that was charged.'" Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.04; Blea v. State, 483 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Thus, when performing an evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. See Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Instead, we must defer to the credibility and weight determinations of the factfinder. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In addition, we must "determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). When the record supports conflicting reasonable inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Cary, 507 S.W.3d at 757; Blea, 483 S.W.3d at 33; Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448-49.
Because factfinders are permitted to make reasonable inferences, "[i]t is not necessary that the evidence directly proves the defendant's guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of the actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); see Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Nowlin, 473 S.W.3d at 317. The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence cases. Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599; Nowlin, 473 S.W.3d at 317; Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 170.
At trial, Deputy Arredondo recounted the details of the July 5th drug transaction. He testified that he gave appellant $100 and arranged to meet her back at his hotel. He then described how she subsequently came to his hotel and handed him a baggie with a crystal substance in it. Based on his experience as a narcotics officer, he believed the substance to be methamphetamine. Subsequent testimony by the DPS drug analyst established that the substance in the baggie contained .40 grams of methamphetamine.
In her brief, appellant summarily asserts that "Deputy Arredondo's statements alone regarding the transaction are uncorroborated by any other witnesses and are thus, factually insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict." She further contends that the video recording of the transaction was "factually insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did in fact deliver a controlled substance to Deputy Arredondo" because some of the conversation on the recording was "unintelligible."
Appellant improperly limits her sufficiency review, focusing only on select pieces of evidence, which is contrary to the well-established procedure for conducting a legal sufficiency review. See Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 (in conducting legal sufficiency review, courts assess "all of the evidence"); Boston v. State, 373 S.W.3d 832, 836 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012), aff'd, 410 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ("In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider all the evidence in the record, whether direct or circumstantial, properly or improperly admitted, or submitted by the prosecution or the defense.") (citations omitted). Moreover, appellant misapplies the sufficiency standard of review by analyzing pieces of evidence individually. "'[A]ppellate courts are not permitted to use a "divide and conquer" strategy for evaluating sufficiency of the evidence' because that approach does not consider the cumulative force of all the evidence." Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448 (quoting Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)).
In addition, appellant's argument concerning the insufficiency of the detective's uncorroborated testimony alone ignores the one-witness rule—the law that allows a jury to convict on the testimony of one witness that has established all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Blackwell v. State, 193 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd); see also Lee v. State, 206 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (recognizing continued vitality of one-witness rule by approving use of question regarding one witness during jury selection to determine whether prospective jurors are challengeable for cause). More specifically, appellant's contention directly contradicts article 38.141(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which sets forth the one-witness rule in the context of drug cases: "A defendant may not be convicted of an offense under Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, on the testimony of a person who is not a licensed peace officer or a special investigator but who is acting covertly on behalf of a law enforcement agency or under the color of law enforcement unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.141(a). Because Detective Arredondo is a licensed peace officer, his uncorroborated testimony suffices to support appellant's conviction.
Also, appellant's interpretation of the quality of the video recording and her assessment of its corroborative value (or lack thereof) simply reflect possible weaknesses in the evidence. However, in assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must "give deference to 'the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599 (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19)). Furthermore, we must be mindful that jurors are free to use their common sense and apply common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of life when giving effect to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Boston, 373 S.W.3d at 837; Eustis v. State, 191 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd).
Viewing all of the evidence in this case in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt—from the evidence presented and reasonable inferences from it—that appellant did in fact deliver a controlled substance by actually transferring methamphetamine to Detective Arredondo as alleged in the indictment. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error.
CONCLUSION
Concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance, we affirm the trial court's judgments of conviction.
/s/_________
Melissa Goodwin, Justice Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Goodwin Affirmed Filed: February 1, 2018 Do Not Publish