Opinion
No. 3D18-2250
12-18-2019
Lazaro Quintero, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Lazaro Quintero, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LOGUE and MILLER, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
The defendant, Lazaro Quintero, seeks review of the trial court's order prohibiting him from future pro se filings in the underlying case. "[D]enying a pro se litigant the opportunity to file future petitions is a serious sanction, especially where the litigant is a criminal defendant who has been prevented from further attacking his or her conviction, sentence, or conditions of confinement." State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). The trial court's "order prohibiting pro se filings by a defendant is reviewed by the appellate court under the abuse of discretion standard." Brinson v. State, 215 So. 3d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing Ashe v. State, 106 So. 3d 956, 957 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ). Given our independent review of the record, and the State's concession that the defendant's "limited filings in this case do not demonstrate an egregious abuse of the post-conviction process warranting the extreme sanction imposed in this case," we reverse the order prohibiting the defendant from future pro se filings. It goes without saying that should the defendant at some point abuse the postconviction process, the trial court may revisit the issue.
In doing so, we treat Quintero's notice of appeal as a petition for belated appeal, grant that petition, and consolidate that disposition with the instant appeal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(c).
The defendant also argues in his brief that recusal of the trial judge is necessary and this Court should order that future proceedings in the underlying case occur before a different trial judge. We decline to do so because the defendant has raised this argument for the first time on appeal. See Farrell v. Farrell, 84 So. 3d 477, 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (noting that if a party "believes she has a good faith basis for moving to recuse the trial judge on remand, she may file such a motion in that court.")
Reversed and remanded.